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The Unity Accord signed by PF (ZAPU) and ZANU (PF) in 1987 saw the 
emergence ofa 'new' party called ZANU PF. ZAPU was 'swallowed' up by a party 
which was formed by people who broke away from ZAPU in 1963. ZAPU's failure to 
win a majority in the first democratic elections and its subsequent 'disappearance' in 
1987 have an impact on the manner in which ZAPU's participation in the liberation 
struggle is presented by some people. This study traces ZAPU's contribution to the 
struggle for independence in Zimbabwe by taking a look at the history of the party from 
the time it was formed in 1961 until the attainment of independence in 1980. 
Official documents from ZAPU are not easy to come by. Post-independence 
tension and fighting between cadres from ZAPU and ZANU resulted in the confiscation, 
by the government, of ZAPU war records and other documents in 1982. These 
documents have not yet been returned and most likely will not be returned since the party 
does not exist anymore. 
Interviews with founding members of ZAPU and some ordinary cadres who 
participated in the struggle shed a light on the nature of ZAPU's participation in the 
struggle for independence. Significant figures in ZAPU like James Chikerema, the man 
who was in charge of ZAPU's first armed cadres, Dumiso Dabengwa, a member of 
ZAPU's first armed group and subsequently ZIPRA's chief of intelligence, and 
Welshman Mabhena, a founding member ofZAPU who remained within the country 
during the struggle, are among the active members of ZAPU who were interviewed for 











Nyathi bring in perspectives of people who had direct dealing,s with the party without 
being directly involved as cadres. 
This question one asks when discussing ZAPU's contribution to the liberation 
struggle is: what did ZAPU do? Joshua Nkomo, the leader of the party from its birth to 
its 'death' put together an account of his experiences as a nationalist leader in Zimbabwe 
in The Story of My Life, a book which was published in 1984, while Nkomo was in exile, 
having run away from the ZANU led government which he argued wanted to kill him and 
annihilate his party. The Story of My Life makes an invaluable contribution to this study, 
just as some bits and pieces written by Nkomo when he was in detention. Nkomo, as 
leader of the party, played a huge part in mapping out ZAPU's strategy. This study 
argues that the lack of consistence by Nkomo contributed to ZAPU's failure to employ its 
full potential on the battlefield, Nkomo was essentially a man of peace who preferred a 
negotiated settlement rather than the attainment of independence through the barrel of the 
gun. As such, in 1975, Nkomo went into secret talks with Ian Smith. 
Ultimately the independence of Zimbabwe was negotiated at Lancaster House in 
1979. ZAPU and ZANU presented their opinions at Lancaster House as a united body, 
the Patriotic Front. However, the two parties had committed hugely unequal numbers of 
manpower to the battlefront. The bulk of ZAPU' s army had not yet been deployed by the 
time the war ended. In terms of numbers then, ZANU had more cadres fighting in 
Rhodesia than ZAPU. Though it never made use of its full military potential, ZAPU's 
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The history of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, I as taught in the educational 
institutions within the country, has to a large extent been told from the 'victor's' 
perspective. The role played by the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) 
(ZANU (PF)) in the liberation of Zimbabwe has been highlighted to such an extent that 
one gets the impression that ZANU (PF) was the only nationalist party that actually took 
the Rhodesian government head on in the struggle. The rhetoric at independence was 
tailor-made to suggest that ZANU (PF) had played the decisive role in the struggle. It 
has been argued that the war started with the Sinoia battle in 1966, where ZANU (PF) 
cadres were involved.2 The impression created by portraying ZANU as the first among 
nationalist parties to launch the armed struggle was aimed at glorifying ZANU's 
contribution to the struggle and possibly seeking to legitimize the ZANU government.3 
This study seeks to highlight the contribution of the Zimbabwe African People's 
Union (ZAPU) to the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe. It is argued that even 
though ZANU (PF) played the most significant role in the struggle for independence in 
Zimbabwe, one should not overlook the contribution that was made by ZAPU. It is 
unfortunate that most accounts on the history of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle have not 
yet given a near definitive history. The constant problem has been the tendency to 
I The name adopted at independence in 1980. The country was previously known as Southern Rhodesia. 
When Smith declared UDI in 1965, Rhodesia became the official name. In discussions prior to 
independence, this study will refer to the country by the name relevant to the period under discussion. 
2 David Martin and Phyllis Johnson The Struggle for Zimbabwe (London: Faber & Faber,) 1981, p. 9. 











present biased accounts.4 Even though there has been a change of rhetoric in the post 
Unity Accord period,5 with official statements acknowledging the contribution of ZAPU 
in the liberation struggle, a book like The Struggle for Zimbabwe, by David Martin and 
Phyllis Johnson, which is often presented as the classical record of the liberation war, 
tells the story from a ZANU perspective. The rhetoric of the post Unity Accord period 
has not changed what has been written in such books and what has already been taught. 
Recognition of ZAPU' s contribution to the struggle lags behind that of ZANU. 
It is necessary to admit that the levels of commitment to the armed struggle 
between ZANU and ZAPU were different. ZAPU adopted the armed struggle as a way to 
maintain pressure on the Rhodesian government while they sought negotiations.6 
Nkomo's attempt to settle for a secret deal with Ian Smith in 19757 can be used to argue 
that while ZANU had to be forced to attend the Lancaster House talks, because of the 
party's radical commitment to achieving liberation through the armed struggle, the level 
of ZAPU' s commitment to the war was not as intense as ZANU's. Like the African 
National Congress (ANC) with which it was linked, ZAPU regarded the armed struggle 
as a way to bring the minority regime to the negotiating table. The moderate nature of 
Nkomo's approach is seen through some of the decisions he made. When Nkomo 
became commander in chief of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), he 
4 Dumiso Dabengwa 'ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation,' in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence 
Ranger (eds.) Soldiers in Zimbabwe Liberation War (Hamre: University of Zimbabwe Publications,) 1995, 
p.24. 
5 In December 1987, ZAPU and ZANU signed a Unity Accord that ended post independence hostilities 
between the two parties and also saw the amalgamation of the two parties to form a united party called 
ZANUPF. 
6 Interview with Mr. James Chikerema, Founding member ofZAPU, Harare, 28/04/03. 











appointed his own commanders, getting rid of those he regarded as radicals.s This 
suggests that Nkomo was not committed to a full':'scale armed struggle. When he realized 
that there were radical commanders, keen to launch an intense armed struggle, he got rid 
of them. 
When one considers the nature of 'The Turning Point9" ZAPU's grand military 
plan, which in fact was never realized because of the settlement at Lancaster House, one 
may conclude that ZAPU did not participate significantly in the armed struggle. 
However, a closer look at ZAPU activities during the struggle will reveal that in its own 
way, ZAPU played a key role in the liberation struggle. One calls to mind the Wankie 
battles, the Sipolilo battles, the ZIPRA attacks on the Victoria Falls airport and attacks on 
the Elephant Hills Hotel in Victoria Falls, as evidence of ZIPRA's active involvement in 
the struggle. Attacking the fuel reservoirs in Salisbury (Harare,) was a clear sign that 
ZAPU guerrillas were courageous enough to move into the capital city and launch a 
significant act of sabotage, taking the war into the backyard of the Rhodesian regime as it 
were. The shooting down of the Rhodesian Airways Viscounts in Kariba reflected the 
complexity of ZAPU' s military equipment. These ZAPU campaigns cannot be 
overlooked when one discusses the liberation of Zimbabwe. 10 The presence of ZAPU in 
the south-western region of Rhodesia and the northern region stretched the manpower of 
the Rhodesian security forces, especially after the Botswana front had been established. I I 
If indeed ZAPU had not made a significant contribution to the struggle, Rhodesian 
8 'Nkomo's Secret Deal with Smith' Document at National Archives, Harare, GEN-PINKO, Ace. 38917 p. 
1. 
9 Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) 'The Turning Point', 3rd April 1979. Ref Number RCDIl179, 
National Archives, Harare, GEN-PINKO, Ace. 39835. 












security forces would not have been stretched in their attempt to deal with the threat of 
nationalists. If only ZANU cadres infiltrated, Rhodesian forces could have gathered their 
defense along the border with Mozambique where ZANU cadres were infiltrating from, 
especially after 1975. 
Perhaps the most outstanding contribution ZAPU made to the liberation struggle 
is the fact that it brought together most of the nationalist leaders who were eventually to 
lead the independent state of Zimbabwe. Their careers in politics took shape within 
ZAPU. 12 By highlighting the plight of the African people in Rhodesia, the existence of 
ZAPU radicalized the quest for independence. With the founding of ZAPU, the desire 
for an independent Zimbabwe gained momentum as reflected by the direct reference to 
the name Africans regarded as the acceptable name of the country.13 Those who formed 
ZANU in 1963 had all been members ofZAPU. The split, leading to the formation of 
ZANU, may be regarded as a formative development in the liberation struggle. In what 
ZAPU may not have done, resulting in dissatisfaction that led to the formation of ZANU, 
there were lessons learnt and things to be avoided in the future. 
The various players in the liberation struggle made direct and indirect 
contributions. Direct contributions were those activities the players engaged in with the 
intention of achieving particular goals. The formation of the African National Council 
(ANC), as a front for opposing the Pearce Commission, is an example of a direct 
contribution. Since the main African nationalist parties were banned and most of their 
leaders were in detention, it became necessary to create a front for African opposition, 
making use of some of the African nationalist leaders who were not in detention. 
12 Interview with Mrs. Mary Ndlovu, member of ZAPU, Bulawayo, 10/04/03. 
13 Wellington Nyangoni African Nationalism in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) (Washington DC: University Press 











Consequently, the ANC was fonned in 1971 and it achieved its goal as the African 
population clearly rejected the proposals ofthe Pearce Commission. A radicalized 
African population made its demands loud and clear for "one man, one vote.,,14 
Indirect contributions refer to outcomes that players in the struggle may not have 
envisioned. The Rhodesian government was convinced that banning nationalist parties 
and arresting the leaders would paralyze African opposition and keep Africans in a 
subservient position. Unfortunately for the Rhodesians, arrests and bannings only served 
to radicalize African opposition to the government, an indirect contribution by the 
Rhodesians to the struggle. Nkomo and ZAPU made some significant indirect 
contributions to the struggle as well in areas which ZAPU has not taken credit because 
initial outcomes appeared to be failures. Nkomo's attempt to reach a settlement with Ian 
Smith in 1975 is among the indirect contributions. As the talks collapsed, ZAPU 
intensified its recruitment for the anned struggle. l5 
ZAPU experienced devastating splits during the struggle, splits which cost ZAPU 
membership and credibility in some respects. The first major shake up was the split in 
1963, which resulted in the fonnation of ZANU. In 1963, ZAPU lost leaders and 
ordinary members after the leadership ofNkomo and ZAPU policies were questioned. 
By focusing on the issues that led to the split, one catches a glimpse of what may have 
been happening within ZAPU at the time. It has been argued in some circles that the 
1963 split marked the beginning of the deterioration ofZAPU from being a national party 
14 ANC 'Why ANC Says 'NO' To The Settlement Proposals' Statement to The Pearce Commission in 
Salisbury, 3 January 1972, in W. Nyangoni and G. Nyandoro (eds.) Zimbabwe Independence Movements, 
~lliJlQQl!JJ[!g!:!s.(London: Rex Collings,) 1979, pp. 210-211. 











to eventually becoming a party with a regional following, only able to attract supporters 
mainly from the Matebeleland and Midlands regions. 
In the period between 1970 and 1972, ZAPU experienced another internal crisis. 
James R. D. Chikerema, who had led the external wing of the party in his capacity as 
vice-president of the party, left ZAPU to form the Front For The Liberation of Zimbabwe 
(FROLIZI) following irreconcilable differences between him and Jason Z. Moyo, the 
party's Treasurer. The internal crisis of the 1970s paralyzed ZAPU's war efforts and cost 
ZAPU essential contacts with the Frente De Libertacao De Mozambique (FRELIMO,) 
the liberation movement in Mozambique. FRELIMO had approached ZAPU and the 
South African ANC for assistance in opening up the Tete front in Mozambique. 16 The 
1970s split came just before the finalization of arrangements for the cooperation between 
ZAPU and FRELIMO. The internal crisis forced ZAPU to withdraw from talks with 
FRELIMO. Pressed by the war in Mozambique, FRELIMO turned to ZANU, an 
arrangement that eventually saw ZANU making use of bases within Mozambique after 
FRELIMO came to power. Had it not been for ZAPU's internal crisis, the links with 
FRELIMO, which ZANU established, would have been ZAPU'S.17 The impact of the 
Chikerema split on ZAPU's war will be discussed. 
ZIPRA was established after the Chikerema crisis. ZAPU came up with a re-
organized military wing in exile, indicating an increasing commitment to the armed 
struggle. Time will be spent probing the organizational structures of ZIPRA, the manner 
of training cadres and the actual engagement of ZIPRA cadres in battle. Recruitment 
programmes and recruitment areas will also be analyzed. ZAPU's significant 
16 Interview with Mr. Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu, Director of ZAPU's Publicity Department, Bulawayo. 











contribution to the liberation of Zimbabwe will be highlighted by exposing entries from a 
diary of a ZIPRA combatant, showing the effectiveness of the war against white 
colonists. IS 
Despite the split in 1963 that saw ZAPU and ZANU parting ways, the reality of 
fighting a common enemy resulted in bouts of collaboration between the two parties. De-
constructing the view that ZANU alone liberated Zimbabwe makes it necessary to show 
that ZANU and ZAPU collaborated in negotiations with the Rhodesian government and 
in the actual fighting; hence, the discussion below on the Joint Military Command (JMC) 
and the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). The Patriotic Front (PF) was created in 1976, 
so that ZAPU and ZANU could collaborate in their talks with the Rhodesian government. 
At Lancaster House, Nkomo played the important role of ensuing that the talks 
succeeded. The radical Mugabe kept on threatening to walk out of the talks but the 
moderate Nkomo made sure that the Patriotic Front remained present at the Lancaster 
talks. 19 What others may have regarded as Nkomo's weakness, his moderate approach, 
was in fact an essential contribution in the final negotiations that brought independence to 
Zimbabwe. 
The conclusion will summarize the significance of ZAPU' s contribution to the 
liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. Drawing on the various ways in which ZAPU 
participated in the liberation struggle, this study concludes by arguing that the 'victor's' 
perspective mode, in which the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe has to a large extent 
been presented, should be challenged. One cannot overlook the significant contribution 
ZAPU made to the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe. The fact that ZAPU did not 
18 Harold P. Ndlovu ZIPRA Combat Diary, (London Branch: ANC Zimbabwe,) May - December 1976, 
National Archives, Harare, GEN-P/AFR, Ate. 38904. 











become the first government of the independent state of Zimbabwe should not be used as 
the only means for judging ZAPU's commitment to the struggle. A presentation of the 
history of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, which acknowledges the reality of 
ZAPU's contribution, is essential. 
This study discusses the contribution of ZAPU as a party, but also focuses on the 
activities of some individuals in the party. Nkomo, as leader of the party, played a key 
role in guiding the party through the liberation struggle. While working on behalf of the 
party, Nkomo took responsibility for the manner in which the party's policies unfolded. 
James Chikerema, as vice president of the party and leader of the exiled wing of the party 
from1964 to the early 1970s, also played a key role in shaping out the policies of the 
party. Time will thus be spent highlighting the activities of some individuals through 
whom the policies of ZAPU were seen in action. 
ZAPU had a very short legal life. In August 1963, the People's Caretaker Council 
(PCC) was formed, after ZAPU had been banned and just after ZANU had been formed. 
Within Rhodesia, ZAPU would not legally exist until shortly before the 1980 elections, 
when the ban was lifted. In 1976, Nkomo formed the African National Council 
(Zimbabwe) (ANC (Z). Is it realistic then for one to discuss the contribution of ZAPU to 
the liberation struggle from the 1960s until 1980 when ZAPU was banned in 1962? Just 
as the African nationalist parties that had been banned and re-born under different names 
yet essentially the same from 1957, once formed, ZAPU existed throughout the liberation 
struggle, though under various names at times. What became the PCC and ANC (Z) 











this study respects the fact that during the struggle for independence, the party also 
appeared as the PCC and the ANC (Z). 
Sources: 
The fact that the general history of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe has to a 
large extent been presented from the 'victor's' perspective has resulted in a great 
collection of written materials with a bias in favour of ZANU (PF). The post 
independence struggle between ZANU and ZAPU saw the confiscation of ZAPU war 
records and records of ZAPU's history by the ZANU led government from the party's 
archives in 1982. The absence of these documents made it difficult to access official 
ZAPU documents on the party's history. There is nowhere where one can read through a 
major collection of ZAPU documents. In spite of the signing of the Unity Accord in 
1987, the documents that were confiscated from ZAPU have not yet been returned.2o 
Such a situation makes it difficult to access genuine ZAPU documents which give 
accounts of ZAPU's history and ZAPU's contribution to the armed struggle. One 
acknowledges the work being done by the Mafela Trust today in attempting to 
reconstruct the history of ZAPU,21 but the task is not easy. They too mourn the absence 
of documented material. There are, however, several secondary and primary sources that 
make reference to aspects of ZAPU' s history and ZAPU activities during the liberation 
struggle. 
20 Interview with Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa, ZIPRA' s chief of intelligence, Bulawayo. 
21 The Mafela Trust is a group of ZAPU ex-combatants and historians in Bulawayo. Mafela Trust was set 












Jocelyn Alexander, Joann McGregor and Terence Ranger, in Violence and 
Memory, One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matebeleland22 present a detailed 
account of experiences of violence in the Matebeleland region. This book is an essential 
source for this study because the authors present accounts from ordinary people like Julia 
Kimeta Sibanda who remembers the violence of the early 1960s as a ZAPU activist. 
Sibanda was among the ZAPU activists who made petrol bombs to destroy schools and 
damage institutions that were linked to the government,23 This book also exposes the 
problem of accessing primary sources when studying the liberation war in Zimbabwe. 
The rule limiting access to national archival sources for a period of thirty years since the 
occurrence of an event means that documented data on the liberation war is perhaps not 
easilyavailable?4 The book is of special relevance because it covers the period that this 
study focuses on, dealing especially with areas where ZAPU and ZIPRA cadres operated 
in. 
Martin Meredith's The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia U.D.! To Zimbabwe25 , 
gives an interesting account of the struggle for independence in Rhodesia. Meredith 
highlights the concerns of the Africans at the beginning of organized mass movement in 
Rhodesia. His book is an interesting source as one traces the beginnings of the 
involvement of individuals like James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, and Nkomo, people 
who played key roles in organizing the liberation struggle. The formation of the City 
Youth League in 1955 is taken by Meredith to mark the beginning of organized African 
22 (Oxford: James Currey,) 2000. 
23 ibid. p. 87. 
24 ibid. p. 113. 











nationalism.26 One catches a glimpse ofNkomo's strategy as Meredith points out that it 
seems Nkomo believed that the party's action within Rhodesia would not achieve 
anything significant.27 Meredith offers a view on issues that may have contributed to the 
split in 1963. Reading through Meredith's book, one does not doubt that ZAPU 
participated actively in the struggle for independence. The massive ZIPRA recruitments 
from August 1976 and Nkomo's desire for the success of the Lancaster House 
Conference are highlighted?S Given the loss of ZAPU's official documents and accounts 
of ZAPU' s war at the hands of the government in 1982, Meredith contributes 
significantly in presenting aspects of the history of ZAPU in the context of the liberation 
struggle. 
Andre Astrow's Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way?29 gives an 
overview of the struggle for independence, going back to the time of the beginning of the 
struggle until the post independence period. Astrow explains ZAPU's failure to 
collaborate with FRELIMO as a reflection of ZAPU' s unwillingness to commit itself 
fully to the armed struggle.3o While there is reason to question the level of ZAPU's 
commitment to the a~ed struggle, the leadership crisis of the early 1970s played a key 
role in ZAPU's loss of contact with FRELIMO. Astrow also makes the specific point 
that ZAPU was not keen to fight in 1976 while Nkomo was engaged in secret talks with 
Smith.3! One gets the impression that secret as the talks were supposed to be, ZAPU as a 
party was aware of what was happening. The title of the book however reflects a 
26 Martin Meredith The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia UD1 to Zimbabwe, (London: Pan Books,) 1980, 
p.25. 
27 ibid. p. 33. 
28 ibid. pp. 304 & 377. 
29 (London: Zed Press), 1983. 
30 ibid. p. 42. 











continuous theme in the book. Unlike Meredith whose theme is the way in which 
Rhodesia transformed to an independent Zimbabwe, Astrow is keen to show how African 
nationalists betrayed the revolution. When writing about the Lancaster House 
Conference, Astrow highlights the fact that the conference was a success for Britain 
because of the compromises that the nationalists made. ZAPU is on the whole presented 
as not being much committed to the armed struggle. Astrow's obsession with the 
compromises made by nationalists makes his book an interesting source for the purposes 
of this research because it presents a critical analysis of the nationalists in Rhodesia, 
thereby revealing some of their shortcomings. 
N gwabi Bhebe presents a very well researched perspective of the participation of 
ZAPU and ZANU guerrillas in The ZAPU and ZANU Guenilla Warfare and The 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe32• Bhebe is one of the historians in 
Zimbabwe who acknowledges the contribution of ZAPU in the liberation struggle. He 
focused his study on areas where ZAPU cadres were active during the struggle. His book 
is of special interest because ofthe scholarly account he gives and because he talks about 
ZAPU's actual participation in the war. Unlike those who have tried to downplay the 
role played by ZAPU in the struggle, Bhebe discusses the progression of ZAPU's 
involvement in the struggle, comparing it at times to ZANU's war efforts. Reference is 
made to semi-liberated areas within Rhodesia, areas where ZIPRA forces had gained 
military superiority. Green zones were areas that ZAPU controlled.33 Implied in Bhebe's 
presentation is the fact that ZAPU actually had the upper hand in the struggle in some 
areas. Even though Bhebe talks about ZANU's war efforts as well, his reference to 
32 (Gweru: Mambo Press,) 1999. 











ZAPU activities makes his book an interesting source to this research project. By the 
time Bhebe's book was published in 1999, there was a more conducive environment for 
talking about ZAPU's contribution to the struggle. Writing in the post-Unity Accord 
period, Bhebe was not limited by the constraints of trying to present an account of the 
war that glorified the contribution of the 'victor' only. 
Bhebe and Terence Ranger present an outstanding study of the liberation struggle 
in Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War34, which they edited together. Ranger and 
Bhebe are respectable scholars who have both done wide research in the history of 
Zimbabwe. One gets to hear voices from various players in the struggle. Dumiso 
Dabengwa, a key player in ZAPU's war writes on 'ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of 
National Liberation.' Given the fact that there are limited sources on the part played by 
ZAPU in the liberation struggle, Dabengwa's article makes an invaluable contribution to 
this study. Through this article, one encounters the thoughts and reflections of an active 
participant in ZAPU's war. Dabengwa begins by acknowledging that most accounts on 
the history of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle have not yet given a near definitive history 
because of the problem ofbias?5 By acknowledging the bias that some previous writers 
have submitted to, Dabengwa creates the impression that he is going to present an 
objective account of the war. He makes an important point with respect to the beginnings 
of the armed struggle. Whereas partisan accounts have tended to claim that the armed 
struggle started with the Sinoia battle in 1966 in which ZANU cadres were involved, 
Dabengwa points out that the armed struggle actually started in 1965 when ZAPU 
34 (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications) 1995. 











infiltrated small units into the country.36 The advantage implicit in getting a first hand 
account from a key player in ZAPU's war can also be a disadvantage. Given that ZAPU 
had generally not been given a chance to present its official version of the struggle, there 
is a possibility of bias from Dabengwa. His article was written in the post-Unity Accord 
period. The tone might have been different had the article been written prior to the 
signing of the Unity Accord. After 1987, ZAPU ceased to exist as a party. Dabengwa 
and many other former ZAPU leaders joined ZANU at the signing of the Unity Accord. 
Inevitably, Dabengwa may have taken the newly established relationship between the two 
parties into consideration in his presentation. 
There is a scholarly account of the dynamics surrounding the Zimbabwe People's 
Army (ZIPA) by David Moore in the same book. In his article 'The Zimbabwe People's 
Army: Strategic Innovation or More of The Same?' Moore traces the underlying forces 
within ZIP A. Writing as an outsider, since he was not a ZIPRA cadre, Moore does not 
face the challenge of a direct participant who may invoke personal feelings and thus 
cloud the required objective presentation. The fact that there were tensions within ZIPA 
makes it necessary to read an account presented by an outsider. Participants would have 
been keen to justify the actions and policies of the party they belonged to. 
Any doubt about ZAPU's involvement in the struggle is dispelled by Jeremy 
Brickhill's 'Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy ofZAPU 1976-1979,' 
also to be found in Bhebe and Ranger's book. The most detailed account ofZAPU's 
participation in the war easily available, Brickhill' s account takes us through the 
development of ZAPU' s military strategy to 1979. He brings out ZAPU's reason for not 
flooding guerrillas into the country. Brickhill points out that there was a presence of 











ZAPU guerrillas in ZIPRA operational areas and mentions some of the problems ZIPRA 
cadres faced, problems that made it difficult for them to hold on to the liberated zones 
they were establishing.37 Brickhill also spends time explaining how ZAPU's 'Turning 
Point' was distorted by Rhodesian intelligence services to suggest that ZAPU was 
planning to seize power from ZANU after independence. This was designed to increase 
animosity between ZANU and ZAPU and so derail attempts to set up a united front by 
the nationalists.38 Brickhill was a member of ZAPU, so his article presents the voice of 
an active participant. 
In African Nationalism in Zimbabwe,39 Wellington Nyangoni gives an overview 
of the development of African nationalism in Zimbabwe. He acknowledges that the 
significance of ZAPU was that it became the first party for Africans to make use of the 
concepts of imperialism and Pan-Africanism within the liberation struggle in Rhodesia.4o 
Nyangoni makes the essential observation that ZAPU played a key role in the formation 
ofliberation ideology among African nationalists. He throws light on ZAPU's strategy in 
the struggle by making reference to Nkomo's justification for the non-revolutionary 
approach, the need to maintain economic structures, hence their adoption of a fairly 
moderate strategy.41 
David Martin and Phyllis Johnson produced what has at times been referred to as 
the official account of the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe, ~~~==~~ 
Zimbabwe 42. They presented the struggle for independence in a manner that highlighted 
37 Jeremy Brickhill 'Daring to StOTm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976-1979' in Ngwabi 
Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds.) Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War, pp. 52-53. 
38 ibid. p. 59. 
39 (Washington DC: University Press of America,) 1977. 
40 ibid. p. 50. 
41 ibid. p. 120. 











the contribution of ZANU while playing down the contribution of ZAPU. The Struggle 
For Zimbabwe makes reference to claims and counter claims surrounding the blowing up 
of fuel tanks in Salisbury in 1978. According to Martin and Johnson, ZANU cadres were 
responsible for the attack.43 Dabengwa, ZIPRA' s Chief of Intelligence, and Saul 
Gwakuba Ndlovu, Director of ZAPU's Publicity Department, among other people who 
were directly involved with ZAPU, dispute this claim. In separate interviews, Dabengwa 
and Ndlovu acknowledge ZIPRA cadres as the perpetrators. 'The Zimbabwe Review,' 
ZAPU's monthly publication reported that on 11 December 1978, ZIPRA forces blasted 
the fuel deport in Salisbury, destroying 45-55% of the country's oil stocks and reserves44. 
Martin and Johnson's book allows us to get a view of ZAPU's contribution to the 
struggle from a ZANU perspective. 
Chimurenga The War in Rhodesia 1965-198045, by Paul Moorcraft and Peter 
McLaughlin, gives an account of the war from a fairly neutral basis. An important 
contribution in highlighting the activities of guerrillas is the visual presentation that 
Moorcraft and McLaughlin present through their map, which is used in chapter five of 
this study, on guerilla infiltration routes.46 By looking at the map, one gets a picture of 
the way in which cadres from ZAPU and ZANU infiltrated into Rhodesia and the borders 
of their war zones. In 1972, ZAN LA had about three hundred trained cadres while there 
were about four hundred ZIPRA cadres. However, by the end of 1975, ZANLA's 
recruitment had resulted in very large numbers, outnumbering ZIPRA. The figures which 
43 David Martin and Phyllis Johnson The Struggle For Zimbabwe, (London: Faber & Faber,) 1981, p. 88. 
44 ZAPU, 'The Zimbabwe Review,' (Cuba: ZAPU Information Bureau,) October-December, 1978, volume 
7, p. 4. 
45 (Marshalltown: Sygma Books,) 1982. 
46 Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin Chimurenga The war in Rhodesia 1965-1980, (Marshalltown: 











Moorcraft and McLaughlin present clearly indicate that statistically, ZIPRA never 
committed as many cadres as ZANLA to the struggle.47 The book stresses the difference 
in the levels of commitment to the armed struggle between ZAPU and ZANU. 
Kees Maxey highlights some of ZIPRA's military engagements in The Fight For 
Zimbabwe: The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia Since UDI48 • Maxey sheds light 
on ZAPU's strategy around 1972 by making reference to an interview in which George 
Silundika revealed that ZIPRA avoids direct confrontation with the enemy, opting rather 
for sabotage as the main tactic, hence the widespread planting oflandmines.49 The 
essence of Maxey's contribution is an acknowledgement of the fact that while ZAPU 
avoided direct confrontation, ZAPU actively participated in a different form. 
Henrick Ellert's The Rhodesian Front War, Counter Insurgency and Guerrilla 
Warfare 1962-1980,50 brings out the significance of ZAPU' s name. The name Zimbabwe 
was put in the forefront for the first time. From now on, the nationalists were committed 
to overcome the oppression of the minority regime so as to create a new country, 
Zimbabwe. 51 Ellert points out that by 1977, ZIPRA cadres were operating throughout 
Matebeleland. A new front allowed ZIPRA cadres to cross the Zambezi River near 
Kanyemba and then move into Sipolilo and Magondi. By 1978, the Rhodesian army was 
overstretched by nationalist forces. 52 Implied in Ellert's statement on nationalist forces is 
the active involvement of ZIPRA forces. 
47 ibid. p. 73. 
48 (London: Rex Collings,) 1985. 
49 ibid. p. 104. 
50 (Gweru: Mambo Press,) 1989. 
51 ibid. p. 1. 











Mordechai Tamarkin highlights Nkomo's character as a way of identifying some 
of the forces behind ZAPU's strategy in the struggle. In The Making of Zimbabwe, 53 
Tamarkin argues that when Nkomo went into secret talks with Smith, he was convinced 
that he would attain independence by peaceful means since radicalism was not really part 
of his approach. 54 Tannakin's main weakness as a source is the tendency to rely too 
much on Martin and Johnson's The Struggle For Zimbabwe, a book that is biased in 
favour of ZANU. It is however important that Tamarkin mentions that even though 
ZANU had waged a successful war, its efforts alone would not have brought down the 
internal settlement. ZAPU's contribution was thus crucia1. 55 
Cindy Courville's PhD thesis on 'The Zimbabwe Nationalist Movements: 
Strategy For Liberation' also makes an invaluable contribution to this dissertation. 
Tracing the strategies of ZAPU and ZANU in the struggle, one is able to pick out from 
Courville's thesis some of the strategies that ZAPU employed in the liberation struggle. 
Courville also evaluates the impact of these strategies, making the suggestion that respect 
for elders and loyalty to Ndebele culture made it impossible to challenge Nkomo within 
ZAPU.56 One thus understands why Nkomo's policies and actions playa key role in 
understanding the part played by ZAPU in the struggle. Not that Nkomo was identical to 
ZAPU, but respect for Nkomo played a key role in the manner in which his policies 
helped in shaping the policies of ZAPU. 
53 (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd,) 1990. 
54 ibid. p. 87-88. 
55 ibid. p. 229. 
56 Cindy Courville 'The Zimbabwe Nationalist Movements: Strategy for Liberation,' (PhD Thesis: 












The primary sources used in the writing of this dissertation can be divided into 
two groups. On the one hand, there was the use of the written word from documents 
found mainly at the National Archives in Harare, and use of the spoken word, gathered 
from interviews conducted with people who were directly involved with ZAPU during 
the various phases of its existence. 
Nkomo put together an account of his life in The Story of My Life. This gives 
Nkomo's perspective of the nature of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and the level of 
ZAPU's involvement. Since Nkomo was the leader of ZAPU throughout the struggle, his 
account becomes a key source for this research. However, one has to bear in mind some 
of the dynamics surrounding this invaluable book. The book was published in 1984 
while Nkomo was in exile, having run away from independent Zimbabwe because of 
serious violent clashes between the ZANU led government and ZAPU. One cannot 
ignore the bias in Nkomo's book. He has no kind word for Mugabe. The government's 
deSIre to present 'victor's' accounts of the liberation struggle resulted in the banning of 
Nkomo's book when it was published. The ban was only lifted after the death ofNkomo 
and indeed, after the 'death' of ZAPU, when there was no longer a viable opposition 
party to present a different account of the liberation struggle. 
In Crisis in Rhodesia, Nathan Shamuyarira57 discusses the manner in which 
ZAPU dealt with being banned. Madiro party (you do what you want,) was a ZAPU 
innovation of responding to the ban on political meetings. People would gather for a 
'funeral' for three or four days. At such gatherings, political organization went on behind 











the scenes.58 In 1965, when Shamuyarira's book was published, he was a member of 
ZANU. Consequently, Shamuyarira contributes to the history of ZAPU from the 
perspective of an outsider, yet an active participant in the struggle. 
Professor Masipula Sithole's Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle59 traces 
struggles within the nationalist parties during the struggle for independence. Sithole 
gives a detailed account of the 1963 split that resulted in the formation of ZANU. 
Sithole's account of the 1963 split is of special interest because he is the brother of 
Ndabaningi Sithole, the man who became ZANU's first President. We benefit from 
inside information the brothers exchanged. He gives a detailed account of the internal 
crisis within ZAPU in the 1970s and the tensions within the ANC. From SithQle's 
analysis of the conflicts within the nationalist movements, one gets an impression of how 
ZAPU pulled through and contributed to the liberation of Zimbabwe. Sithole presets a 
critical analysis the Patriotic Front.6o 
Ken Flower writes from a unique perspective in Serving Secretly: Rhodesia's 
CIO's Chief on Record61 • In writing about his own experiences as a leading figure in the 
secret services of the Rhodesian government, Flower exposes the manner in which the 
Rhodesian government viewed the nationalist movements in the country. While those 
who broke away from ZAPU to form ZANU in 1963 gave their reasons, Flower's book 
suggests the involvement of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) in the splitting 
up ofZAPU in 1963.62 Despite indicating that ZANU and ZAPU had different levels of 
58 Nathan Shamuyarira Crisis in Rhodesia (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd,) 1965, p. 203 
59 (Harare: Rujeko Publishers,) 1979. 
60 Masipula Sithole Zimbabwe: Struggles within The Struggle, (Harare: Rujeko Publishers,), 1979, pp. 166-
168. 
61 (South Africa: Galago,) 1987. 











commitment to the anned struggle, Flower acknowledges ZAPU's involvement in the 
struggle. In 1974, Flower made the observation that security forces were failing to deal 
with nationalist recruitment.63 Since he makes reference to nationalists, not to a 
particular party, one is left to conclude that the recruitment was being carried out by both 
ZAPU and ZANU. 
Ian Smith's ~""-,,,=~==~presents an account of the war from the 
perspective of the leader of the minority government. Smith's account highlights the 
manner in which the government viewed the war and how it responded to the various 
diplomatic initiatives that were aimed at bringing about a negotiated settlement in 
Rhodesia. Smith is obsessed with proving how Rhodesians were betrayed by external 
powers, South Africa and Britain among them, into surrendering power to nationalists. 
His memoirs highlight how the independence of Zimbabwe was attained, not only 
because ofthe war. 
Robert Mugabe's Our War of Liberation has a collection of his speeches, articles 
and interviews from 1976 to 1979. Though he discusses the progression of ZANU' s 
efforts on the battlefront, Mugabe's speeches make a significant contribution to this 
study. He conveys the manner in which ZANU sought to be different from ZAPU. The 
levels of ZANU' s commitment to the anned struggle as the only means of demanding 
independence and ZANU's unwillingness to engage in talks are brought out by Mugabe. 
Mugabe helps us learn about ZAPU from a ZANU perspective. 
Wellington Nyangoni and George Nyandoro (eds.) put together a collection of 
documents relevant to the topic in Zimbabwe Independence Movements, Select 
Documents. Among these various documents are some articles that were produced by 











ZAPu. Considering that ZAPU original documents are not easy to come by, Nyangoni 
and Nyandoro make an invaluable contribution to this dissertation. Whereas various 
writers provide a glimpse of the character ofNkomo and the policies ofZAPU, original 
documents bring one in touch with the tone of players in the party. In 'The case for 
majority rule in Rhodesia', written by Nkomo while he was at Gonakudzingwa detention 
camp in 1964, Nkomo makes reference to the fact that the Africanization that ZAPU was 
seeking did not exclude whites. What needed to be done was opening up opportunities 
previously denied to Africans.64 Nkomo's approach was moderate. 
Thomas Arbuckle, in a document at the National Archives entitled, 'Rhodesian 
Bush War Strategies and Tactics: an Assessment,' points out that operation Tangent on 
the south~west part of Rhodesia, along the Botswana border, was a result of the manner in 
which ZIPRA had gained strength in the area.65 Such information is evidence of ZAPU 
and ZIPRA's significant contribution to the liberation struggle. 
ZAPU's concept of the Patriotic Front is revealed in an interview the Liberation 
Support Movement had with Nkomo in 1978. According to Nkomo, while ZANU was 
keen on establishing combined military operations while maintaining separate political 
organizations, ZAPU wanted military and political union.66 One reads a difference of 
intentions that was bound to haunt the Patriotic Front. However, the fact that ZAPU 
eventually chose to uphold the Patriotic Front rather than be lured into participating in the 
64 Joshua Nimmo 'The case for majority rule in Rhodesia,' Gonakudzingwa camp, 1964, in Nyangoni and 
Nyandoro, (eds.) Zimbabwe Indtmendence Movements, Select Documents, (London: Rex Collings,) 1979, 
p.l04. 
65 Thomas Arbuckle, 'Rhodesian Bush War Strategies and Tactics: an Assessment', National Archives: 
Harare, GEN~P/ARB, Acc. 34011, p. 31. 
66 Liberation Support Movement Zimbabwe: The Final Advance (Oakland: L.S.M Information Centre,) 











internal settlement must be acknowledged as an outstanding achievement.67 The Patriotic 
Front became the main negotiating block for the African nationalists in the negotiations 
that saw Zimbabwe getting independence. 
The National Archives in Harare has a number of documents from the ZAPU 
Information Department under the title 'Our Path to Liberation.' These papers make an 
invaluable contribution to this dissertation because through them, one gets to read the 
official writings of ZAPU. Entries from a combatant's diary indicate that ZIPRA had 
various fronts, including a south, southwest and western fronts; a north and northwest 
fronts; an eastern front and an urban terror campaign.68 The entries on these fronts 
highlight the manner in which ZIPRA engaged in the struggle in various areas. 
Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu, ZAPU's Director ofInformation and Publicity sheds light 
on aspects ofZAPU's approach to the liberation struggle. In Zimbabwe: Some Facts 
About Its Liberation Struggle, Ndlovu denies the claim that Nkomo accepted the 1961 
constitution. He says that the distortion surrounding the 1961 constitution was an aspect 
of the settler regime's attempt to destroy Nkomo.69 Ndlovu's contribution forms part of 
the writings that come from people who were directly involved with the party, people 
whose voices were silenced in the immediate post independence rhetoric on the liberation 
struggle. 
A party's regular publication obviously contains a lot of propaganda and some 
factual information about the party. ZAPU's monthly publication, 'The Zimbabwe 
67 ibid. Interview with Eddison Zvobgo, 'You Either Support the Patriotic Front Or You Support the 
Enemy,' p. 34. 
68 ZAPU Information Department 'Our Path To Liberation,' 20 November 1976, National Archives, 
Harare, pp. 13-19, GEN/OURP, Ace. 39857. 
69 Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu, Zimbabwe: Some Facts About Its Liberation Struggle, p. 22, National Archives, 











Review' exposes the various ways in which ZAPU engaged in the liberation struggle. 
One catches an overview of some of the areas that ZAPU penetrated; a list of twenty 
areas is mentioned in one edition.7o Reports of ZAPU's engagements in the struggle are 
presented in 'The Zimbabwe Review'. ZAPU's own evaluation of the war is presented 
by the edition that looks at the 'Effects of The War On Rhodesian Economy. ,71 
'Moto' magazine offers objective reports on the liberation struggle. Though on 
the whole sympathetic to the nationalist cause, the fact that 'Moto' was a publication of 
the Catholic Church kept the paper away from publishing partisan propaganda. 'Moto' 
thus offers an interesting perspective to the liberation struggle. A report on ZANU's first 
congress highlights how claims of being radical could be challenged. At the congress, 
ZANU resolved, among other things, to collect signatures to petition Britain and the 
United Nations to release political prisoners, and the Central Committee resolved to form 
a government in exile and declare African people independent, should the Rhodesian 
government declare Unilateral Declaration oflndependence (UDI).72 To a large extent, 
these resolutions were a continuation of the approach ZAPU had used. One is thus left to 
conclude that ZAPU had in fact laid the foundation of the strategy to the struggle. 
State controlled newspapers during the time of the liberation struggle did not give 
much attention to African nationalist movements. It was part of government policy to 
remain silent on the war in the beginning so that nationalist guerrillas, operating in small 
groups, would find it difficult to trace their impact.73 The Bantu Mirror later known as 
The Central African Daily News, made up for the gap created by the government's 
70 ZAPU 'The Zimbabwe Review', (Cuba: ZAPU Information Bureau,) September/October 1968, Volume 
1, Numbers 4 & 5. pp. 12-13. National Archives, Harare, S/ZIM, Ace. 5996. 
71 'The Zimbabwe Review,' Volume 7, May-June 1978, pp. 24-25. 
72 Paul Chidyausiku (ed.) 'Moto' (Gwelo: Catholic Mission Press,) Volume 6, number 6, June 1964, p. 1. 











silence. Detailed reports on activities of the nationalists were reported in Bantu Mirror, a 
paper whose target readership comprised mainly of the oppressed Africans in Central and 
Southern Rhodesia. This newspaper is an important source of information as one focuses 
on the formative period of organized nationalism in Zimbabwe. The paper was banned in 
1964 because of its sympathy for the nationalists. 
Tackling a topic that is not rich on written primary sources makes oral sources 
indispensable. This dissertation draws information from the personal experiences of 
eighteen people who were linked with ZAPU and ZIPRA in different ways during and 
after the struggle. These people were asked to give accounts of their experiences of the 
manner in which ZAPU participated in the liberation struggle. Questions on the party's 
aims, strategies, organizational structures, support base, and actual engagements in the 
armed struggle, were asked. The relationship between ZAPU and ZANU during the 
struggle was also looked at in the interviews, beginning from the time of the split in 1963 
to the period of the attempt to set up combined military operations and the eventual 
setting up of the Patriotic Front. Interviews concluded with a question specifically asking 
for the significance of ZAPU and ZIPRA's contribution to the liberation struggle. 
What follows are brief profiles of some of the individuals interviewed, 
highlighting their special relevance to this study: 
James Chikerema was a founding member of the Southern Rhodesia National Youth 
League (SRNYL) in 1957, commonly referred to in publications as The City Youth 
League. Chikerema pointed out that reference to the City Youth League was propagated 
by Shamuyarira, consequently portraying it as an urban-based group. Chikerema's 











rural areas.74 Chikerema was thus present and active from the time African nationalism 
in Rhodesia took an organized form. He was part of the NDP leadership and from 
August 1963, Chikerema was ZAPU's vice president. Based in Zambia and leading the 
party's external wing, Chikerema was directly responsible over ZAPU's first armed 
cadres in the Special Affairs Department, as they were known then. A crisis in the early 
1970s saw Chikerema leaving ZAPU, having contributed to the internal crisis that saw 
ZAPU losing the possibility of establishing close ties with FRELIMO. Chikerema's 
reflections make an invaluable contribution to this dissertation. 
Dumiso Dabengwajoined the NDP's Youth Wing in 1958. At the formation of 
ZAPU, he was elected Youth Secretary and was a member of the Special Affairs 
Department carrying out acts of sabotage. Dumiso remained faithful to ZAPU after the 
1963 split and was among the first ZAPU cadres to be sent out of the country for 
training.75 His name will always be mentioned whenever one discusses the command 
structure ofZIPRA. In 1971, he was appointed Secretary ofZAPU's War Council, 
eventually becoming ZAPU's Chief oflntelligence?6 As a military leader within ZAPU, 
Dabengwa's contribution to this research is invaluable. One gets to hear about ZAPU's 
war from one of the people who played a leading role in coordinating the war. 
Welshman Mabhena was involved with nationalist politics from the days of the 
NDP and was very close to Nkomo. In 1962, Mabhena was arrested and sentenced to 
five years in prison for carrying explosives. Upon release from prison, Mabhena 
remained within the country, participating in coordinating the affairs of ZAPU under the 
74 Interview with Mr. James Chikererna, Harare, ZAPU founding member. 












various names the party existed in the country. 77 One thus gets the perspective of a 
ZAPU leader who witnessed the struggle from within the country by listening to the 
experiences of Mabhena. 
Amos Ngwenya first made contact with an African political movement in 1954 in 
Johannesburg. Back in Rhodesia, he joined the SRANC, making him a participant in 
African nationalist politics in Southern Rhodesia from the time of its birth. N gweya 
remained faithful to ZAPU after the 1963 split and was part of the ZAPU leadership 
based in Lusaka from where the beginnings of ZAPU's war were organized.78 Ngwenya 
presents the view of a ZAPU leader who was directly involved in the administration of 
the party in exile. 
Jane Ngwenya joined African nationalist politics at the formation of the SRANC, 
when Nkomo had not yet become prominent. She insisted that she did not join 'Nkomo's 
party' like other people; she met him in leadership. She had been a member of the 
Bulawayo African Women's Organization. When the NDP was formed, Ngwenya was 
one of the two women elected to the national council. She remained part of the 
leadership when ZAPU was formed and remained faithful to ZAPU throughout the 
struggle.79 Her experience as a mother during the struggle sheds a unique perspective to 
history of the struggle. Accounts of the war have tended to come from men who were the 
majority in leadership. Ngwenya thus makes an invaluable contribution to this study. 
Swazini Ndlovu joined the youth wing in 1961. The task for the youths then was 
to educate the African popUlation, to make them understand issues that were fundamental 
to the struggle and drum up support for ZAPU. From the early 1970s, Ndlovu was 
77 Interview with Mr. Welshman Mabhena, Bulawayo, ZAPU founding member, 17/0] 103. 
78 Interview with Mr. Amos Ngwenya, ZAPU Founding member, Bulawayo, 08/04/03. 











operating as an administrator in ZAPU camps in Tanzania.so Leaders in exile, among 
them, Ndlovu, carried out coordination and planning of ZAPU's war. 
Enos Nkala joined nationalist politics during the time of the City Youth League, 
later joining the successor parties until ZAPU was fonned. Nkala is of special interest to 
this research because ZANU was fonned at his house in Highfields Township, 
SalisburyY He brings in the perspective of the group that left ZAPU in 1963 to fonn 
ZAND. What members of ZAPU may not say about the reasons behind the 1963 split, 
Nkala brings out. One is thus able to get the view from the other party through Nkala. 
Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu presents a perspective largely infonned by experience 
from working in ZAPU's Publicity Department. Ndlovu became the Director of 
Publicity of ZAPU as well as founder and chief editor of 'The Zimbabwe Review: 
ZAPU's official regular publication.82 Ndlovu came into contact with ZAPU's 
propaganda through which the party communicated its involvement in the liberation 
struggle. Having worked in ZAPU's Publicity Department, one can see the possibility 
that Ndlovu's contribution will be sympathetic to ZAPD. Despite the inevitable bias, 
there is reason to pay attention to the contribution of a man who witnessed ZAPU's 
participation in the struggle. 
A glimpse of the experiences of ordinary ZIPRA cadres is caught by analyzing 
the participation of Vincent Ndlovu and Baleni. Ndlovujoined ZAPU in 1974 without 
much understanding of the policies and goals of the party. Personal experience had 
taught him though that Africans in Rhodesia were being oppressed. He operated in the 
80 Interview with Mr. Swazini Ndlovu, ZAPU founding member, Bulawayo, 10104/03. 
81 Interview with Mr. Enos Nkala, ZANU founding member, Bulawayo, 09104/03. 











lambezi-Wankie-Victoria Falls area.83 Baleni is one of the ZIPRA cadres with first hand 
experience of the attempts by ZAPU and ZANU to establish military collaboration. In 
1976, Baleni arrived at Chimoio in Mozambique, leading a group of ZIPRA cadres sent 
to establish a united army with ZANLA.84 Having listened to the experiences of 
members of ZAPU in leadership positions, a contribution from the ordinary soldiers 
brings in a perspective from the 'people on the ground' as it were. 
Professors Phenias Makurane and Ngwabi Bhebe's interviews bring in the 
perspective of academics that were close to the leadership of ZAPU. Makurane gives a 
largely objective analysis of the struggle since he was in touch with both ZAPU and 
ZANU in exile.85 Bhebe is among the historians who have studied the history of the 
liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. Author of ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the 
Evangelical Church and co-editor ofSoldieIs in Zimbabwe's Liberation War, Bhebe 
contributed to this study through his experiences as a writer and an oral historian. Having 
given time to studying both ZAPU and ZANU, one gets the impression of a balanced 
presentation from Bhebe. 
Another interesting account of the liberation struggle is presented by Pathisa 
Nyathi, a man who claims not to have joined any political party during the struggle. 86 
Nyathi brings the perspective of an observer, but an observer who is also a researcher in 
the history ofthe liberation struggle. Looking at the split within ZAPU, which saw the 
formation of ZANU, Nyathi suggests the role played by the government's secret service 
83 Interview with Mr. Vincent Ndlovu, ZIPRA Ex-combatant, Bulawayo, 16/01103. 
84 Interview with Mr. Baleni, ZIPRA Ex-combatant, 08/04/03. 
85 Interview with Professor P. Makurane, Academic, Bulawayo, 09104/03. 











in trying to weaken ZAPU. 87 Members of ZANU will never acknowledge that the 
Rhodesian regime participated in splitting up ZAPU as a way of weakening the 
nationalist opposition to the regime. 
The experiences ofIsabel Ncube and Nigel Johnson present an insight into life in 
ZAPU holding camps. Ncube was at Victory Camp, just outside Lusaka, together with 
about four thousand other young women. She discusses how young ladies coming into 
the camp were vetted before being exposed to training. Ncube is an interesting source 
because the manner of her recruitment by ZIPRA exposes the way in which ZIPRA 
cadres sometimes used force to recruit. She was abducted by ZIPRA cadres and forced to 
join the military wing. Nigel Johnson's work at Jason Moyo Camp II for young men in 
Solwezi, Zambia, gives the perspective of an 'outsider.' Johnson lived with members of 
ZAPU in the camp but never became an active member of the party. He operated in the 
camp as a social worker and thus was able to point out how supplies destined for the 
young men at 1.Z Moyo Camp sometimes got diverted to feed ZIPRA cadres. 
While I am grateful to all the people who granted me interviews, I must 
acknowledge the limitations of the interviews as a tool for gathering information. Two 
interviewees identified one limitation by suggesting that they would only answer 
questions that they were comfortable with since there is sensitive information with 
respect to the armed struggle. Consequently, some questions were not answered because 
there were deemed sensitive. This simply means that there are things that the public may 
not get to know about the liberation struggle since people who were directly involved are 












information ever vanish? The people with first hand experience will die before the 
sensitive information is divulged. 
Most of the ZAPU members interviewed for this research are now members of 
ZANU PF, the ruling party. Consequently, they spoke as representatives of the party 
they belong to, ZANU PF. ZAPU is no longer there since it was 'swallowed up' by 
ZANU in 1987 with the signing of the Unity Accord. ZAPU was not given a chance to 
present its account of the liberation struggle just after independence and perhaps will 
never get a chance to present that account since the party is no longer there. While the 
post-Unity Accord period has seen a shift from the tendency to glorify the contribution of 
ZANU to the liberation struggle, it seems the desire to maintain unity will keep those 
former ZAPU members now in ZANU silent over issues that make founding members of 
ZANU uncomfortable. They will not want to be seen criticizing the party they belong to. 
There was a deliberate attempt to get a panel of interviewees that was truly 
representative of ZAPU, but how does one ascertain that? The individuals who were 
interviewed for this dissertation present a window through which we can have a glimpse 
ofZAPU's participation in the liberation struggle. While it would have been a brilliant 
idea to have a number of interviewees who were not members of ZAPU, the limitations 
of time and space for this research did not make it possible. 
How much and what does one remember and in what context? This is a question 
that haunted me through the interviews, especially as I was dealing with some individuals 
who were no longer young. The interview with Chikerema in particular, highlighted this 
dilemma. Without doubting the authenticity of the information supplied by Chikerema, 











more vigorous interview might have been possible if Chikerema was ten years younger 
than he is today, I was forced to tone down my approach in order to accommodate 
Chikerema's advanced age. 
The current government of Zimbabwe does not tolerate dissenting voices. As 
such, individuals are not comfortable to discuss topics that seem to oppose the 
government with strangers. In conducting these interviews, I was a stranger to most of 
the interviewees. This made some interviewees uncomfortable to divulge information 
because they were not sure how I would end up using it. The interviews were conducted 
at a time when there is a dislike of the current leadership in government because of a 
collapsing economy, triggered by the government's land reform programme. This 












The Birth of ZAPU, 1957-1962: 
Introduction: 
A discussion of ZAPU's contribution to the liberation struggle must begin by 
constructing a background of the context in which the party was born. This chapter 
traces the beginning of organized African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia. The 
emergence of ZAPU was a result of the work of the founding fathers and mothers of 
African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia. The manner in which ZAPU emerged as a 
national party and the nature of the party's structures will be examined, and so will the 
goals of the founding leaders of the party. The manner in which the Southern Rhodesian 
government responded to the emergence of organized African nationalism will also be 
examined. Government's tough reaction to the African nationalists helped in radicalizing 
their demands. 
The origins of organized African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia go back to 
1957. Chikerema argues that the Southern Rhodesia National Youth League (commonly 
referred to as the City Youth League) opened up nationalist campaigns in the country.88 
He points out that the sentiments for a national organization were borne within the 
National Youth League, which, according to him, was not based in Salisbury only_ It 
also had branches in some rural areas. Chikerema, George B. Nyandoro, and other 
members of the Youth League made consultations across the country, meeting other 
smaller groups to make enquiries about the possibility of setting up a national body to 
represent the interests of the African people in Southern Rhodesia. These consultations 
culminated in the formation of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress 











(SRANC) when the African National Congress, which had been based mainly in 
Bulawayo, and the National Youth League,joined hands.89 Nkomo was invited to the 
leadership of the party because of the seniority of his age. Chikerema, N yandoro, and 
Jason Z. Moyo, were also part of the leadership of this new party.90 Nationwide meetings 
held by the leadership saw the SRANC spread its wings to most rural areas. The party 
became very strong, setting up branches in areas that had previously not had any 
organized movement championing the cause of African nationalism.91 
Unlike the National Youth League, which had adopted a radical strategy in 
registering opposition to the government, the SRANC was moderate in its approach. Its 
main concerns included the promotion of non-racialism, economic progress for the black 
population, land reform for the benefit of the many dispossessed Africans, and an 
improvement of the franchise to give Africans an opportunity to participate m the 
political administration of their country.92 Pressure by the SRANC to improve the 
franchise touched on an issue that was central to the concerns of the African population. 
The emergence of an organized African nationalist body provoked a response 
from the government. Whereas there had never been a strong body championing the 
concerns of the Africans on a national level, the presence ofthe SRANC meant that 
Africans could now make their concerns loud and clear to the government, which was 
however not ready to improve the plight of blacks. The activities of the SRANC caused 
the government to harass and arrest blacks for their involvement in politics. Most leaders 
89 Interview with Mr. Enos Nkala, ZANU founding member, BUlawayo. 
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of the SRANC were arrested in 1959, the period during which the SRANC was banned. 
Nkomo survived imprisonment because he was in exile when the party was banned.93 
The National Democratic Party (NDP) succeeded the SRANC in January 1960, 
basically assuming the same leadership and party structures of the SRANC. The 
leadership of the banned SRANC formed the NDP while they were in prison following 
the banning of their party. A constitution for the new party was smuggled out of prison 
in 1959.94 The NDP continued with the strategy adopted earlier by the SRANC-
conscientizing the African people about their oppression and demanding that the living 
conditions of Africans be improved. Michael Mawema and Willie Musarurwa, who had 
not been imprisoned, led the party while Nkomo was in exile.95 
The main aim of the NDP was to persuade the British government to curb the 
excesses of the Southern Rhodesian government. 96 In 1961, Nkomo, who had now 
assumed leadership of the party upon his return from exile, led a delegation of the NDP 
to a Constitutional Conference. While Rhodesians wanted to secure their hold over 
Southern Rhodesia constitutionally, the British wanted to give up control over Southern 
Rhodesia on condition that Africans were assured of advancement. Out of sixty-five 
seats in parliament, the 1961 constitution gave Africans fifteen seats only. 97 
There are differing opinions on the position of the NDP at the conference, 
especially Nkomo' s position as leader of the delegation. These varied opinions will be 
seen playing a part in the first split experienced by ZAPU in 1963. On the one hand, 
there are those who argue that Nkomo initially accepted the provisions of the 1961 
93 Interview with Mrs. Thenjiwe Lesabe, ZIPRA ex-combatant, Bulawayo, 08/04/03. 
94 Interview with Mr. James Chikerema, ZAPU founding member, Harare. 
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constitutional talks, only to reject them after experiencing protests within the party.98 
Astrow agrees with Meredith in suggesting that Nkomo gave in to a constitutional deal 
with a dual electoral roll, giving Africans fifteen seats while whites were assured of a 
comfortable fifty reserved seats.99 Through the constitutional deal, Britain had followed 
a legal process in drawing up the constitution. Consequently, Britain was ready to give 
up her powers to veto discriminatory legislation. While Nkomo and the NDP delegation 
may have regarded the conference as a step towards majority rule, they were in fact 
compromising the reality of majority rule. 100 Leopold Takawira, at the time running the 
NDP office in London, condemned the agreement, calling it "treacherous' to the future 
of the three million Africans (in Southern Rhodesia)."IOI It was only then that Nkomo 
and his delegation reneged, rejected the constitutional proposals and encouraged NDP 
supporters to boycott the constitutional referendum. 102 
Dabengwa agrees with those who acknowledge that Nkomo had in fact accepted 
the 1961 Constitution. He points out that Nkomo's approach at the time had been to 
accept the constitutional talks with a grain of salt. However, when the whites insisted on 
a gradual process of empowering blacks rather that granting independence immediately, 
the party rejected the idea and encouraged party leaders to break off from links with the 
constitutional talks.103 
On the other hand, there are those who deny the fact that Nkomo ever accepted 
the 1961 constitutional proposals. Nkomo says that the 1961 constitutional talks yielded 
98 ibid. p. 32. 
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no fruit because whites sought to protect their interests at the expense of the concerns of 
the blacks. 104 While Africans wanted to be allowed to vote and to have the land question 
addressed through the constitution, the British did not want to allow both topics 
discussed. lOS Sa~l Gwakuba Ndlovu maintains that it is not true that Nkomo ever 
accepted the proposals of the 1961 constitution. He argues that the results of negotiations 
leading to the 1961 constitution were imposed on the nationalists. 1 06 Ndlovu said that 
Nkomo's critics seem to have deliberately misrepresented Nkomo's comments in 
rejecting the constitution when he acknowledged that the fifteen 'B' roll seats granted to 
the blacks were in a way better than nothing. 107 Ndlovu's sentiments are confirmed by 
Nkomo who points out that while African representatives at the constitutional conference 
rejected the proposed constitution, Duncan Sandys, the chairman, announced that they 
had accepted it. 108 
We may not know what actually happened at the constitutional conference, but 
seeds of division were sown among the nationalist leaders because ofthe outcome of the 
conference. The series of violent activities led by African nationalists, coupled with the 
refusal of the nationalists to participate in anything related to the new constitution, 
provoked a radical response from the government. 109 The NDP was banned in December 
1961, following the realization that the consciousness of nationalist concerns had been 
awoken in all corners of the country by the NDP. IIO When the NDP was banned, Nkomo 
was in exile, having gone out of the country to avoid a clampdown by government 
104 Joshua Nkomo The Story of My Life p.93. 
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security forces. Chikerema smuggled a letter to Nkomo when the party was banned, 
advising him to remain in exile, as a way of making sure that not all the nationalist 
leaders got arrested. I I : Nkomo's critics would later on accuse him of running away from 
being arrested. It will be important later on to bear in mind the circumstances under 
which Nkomo remained in exile after the banning of the NDP. 
From NDP to ZAPU: 
Ten days after the banning of the NDP, a 'new' party was formed in December 
1961, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). For the first time in the struggle 
for independence in Southern Rhodesia, a party was formed which had a name significant 
to the oppressed Africans in the forefront. The Zimbabwe that Africans were seeking 
was reflected in the name ofthe 'new' party. The birth of ZAPU would see remarkable 
changes in the struggle for independence. There was clearly a quest for a change from 
Southern Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, hence the name of the party. I 12 
This 'new' party, ZAPU, was to a large extent, a continuation of the African 
politics of the day in Southern Rhodesia. Just like the previous African nationalist parties 
that had been formed and banned since 1957, the concerns of ZAPU were initially not 
radically different from those of the previous parties. At birth, the abolition of racial 
discrimination was a central concern for the ZAPU leadership. I 13 Experience had proved 
that while clear racial lines had been drawn up, the regime would occasionally treat 
Africans on the basis of merit, giving privileges and opportunities to a few educated 
nurses and teachers, while the majority uneducated Africans were left to suffer. In 
III Interview with Mr. James Chikerema, ZAPU founding member, Harare. 
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demanding for one man one vote, ZAPU leaders were challenging this selective treatment 
of Africans by the white minority.114 
Whereas African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia before the formation of ZAPU 
had generally sought an improvement of the living and conditions for Africans, the 
emergence of ZAPU added a new tone to the demands of the Africans. With the 
formation of ZAPU, one began to hear clear demands suggesting that Africans wanted to 
rule themselves. I IS Taking advantage of the concerns of the people as the leadership 
knew them, and looking at the experiences of fellow African people in Ghana and 
Nigeria, the idea of having a large African party that would engage in demonstrations, 
strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience, as a way of achieving independence, was 
attractive to the leadership. I 16 
'Mwana wevhu' (son/daughter ofthe soil) was the manner in which members of 
ZAPU addressed each other. lJ7 Regardless of being Ndebele or Shona, or any other tribe 
in Southern Rhodesia, by joining ZAPU, one joined a national party championing the 
interests of all the black people in Southern Rhodesia. Rural areas were actively involved 
in the affairs of ZAPU. 118 All this was in line with the intentions of the leaders to form a 
party that represented all the oppressed people in the country. The beginnings of African 
nationalism in Southern Rhodesia had been largely urban based. The leaders who got 
together were living in urban areas, but they were aware that the success of their project 
required the support of the majority of the African people, especially those who were in 
rural areas, where the majority of the African population was based. Consequently, with 
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the formation of ZAPU, nationalist leaders spread their influence to rural areas, 
conscientizing the rural community about its rights and firing them up to oppose the 
government. 119 
ZAPU's significance at its formation was that it became the first party for 
Africans in Rhodesia to make use of the concepts of imperialism and Pan-Africanism 
within the liberation struggle. 120 From then on, the struggle for the liberation of the 
African people in Southern Rhodesia was presented and spoken of in terms that resonated 
with the general struggle for independence which various oppressed peoples were taking 
up. As such, the Africans in Southern Rhodesia identified with and drew inspiration from 
other countries that had just got their independence. Africans in Southern Rhodesia also 
identified with the oppressed masses in Mozambique and South Africa, sharing in a 
common struggle against imperialist forces. 
At the formation of the party, various people expressed objectives and aims of 
ZAPU in different ways. To a large extent, ZAPU succeeded the NDP in manpower, 
supporters and goals. The question of a universal franchise was prominent among the 
goals. Each person had to have the right to vote regardless of race or educational 
qualification. 121 Such a universal franchise, it was hoped, would encourage democracy 
and promote liberty and foster unity in the country. 
ZAPU should be allowed to take credit for including among its goals and 
objectives, the internationalization of the Southern Rhodesian crisis. Seeking to speak 
the language of the United Nations in the promotion of human rights, ZAPU put the 
struggle of the oppressed African people in Southern Rhodesia on an international 
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scene. 122 The Rhodesians and the British realized that the internationalization of the 
Rhodesian crisis gave the liberation movement an opportunity to cooperate with other 
anti-colonial forces in the world. ZAPU's anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiments 
made her a voice that spoke the language of liberation that many African nationalists 
were speaking at the time. 
Speaking during the formative period of the party, Nkomo spelt out five basic 
aims of ZAPU. These were: 
11 the immediate fight against imperialism while cooperating with international 
organizations supporting the struggle. 
21 the setting up of a democratic state that granted one man one vote. 
31 fostering Pan-Africanism and contact with other African nationalist movements. 
41 the efimination of economic exploitation of blacks in Southern Rhodesia. 
51 fostering values of African culture. 123 
The idea of the liberation by making use of resources beyond the borders of Southern 
Rhodesia was embraced by ZAPU from the time of its formation. The policy makers in 
the party did not regard the struggle for the liberation of Southern Rhodesia as an isolated 
case. It had to be adopted in the wider spectrum of the struggle against imperialist forces. 
ZAPU Leadership: 
The nature of ZAPU at its formation as a party representing the concerns of the 
African people in Southern Rhodesia can be seen through the representative manner of 
the initial leadership of the party. The idea of forming ZAPU was mooted in the house of 
122 ibid. 











Herbert Chitepo, a Shona speaker. 124 The national executive at the formation of the party 
comprised the following members: 
Mr. Joshua Nkomo, President 
Mr. Samuel Parirenyatwa Vice-President 
Mr. Leopold Takawira National Secretary, Pan African Affairs 
Mr. Morton Malianga General Secretary 
Mr. Jason Z. Moyo National Treasurer 
Mr. Aggrippah Mukahlera National deputy secretary 
Mr. C. Muchachi Organizing Secretary 
Mr. Robert Mugabe Information and Publicity 
Mr. Joseph Msika Secretary for youth 
Mrs. Jane Ngwenya Secretary for Women Affairs 
Mr. Ndabaningi Sithole National Chairman 
Mr. George Nyandoro National Financial Secretary 
Mr. James D. Chikerema National Secretary for Public Affairs125 
The significance of the ethnic mixture of the first ZAPU national executive is 
highlighted by a commentary in the Bantu Mirror on the importance ofParirenyatwa's 
acceptance of the Vice Presidency of ZAPU. With Nkomo, a Kalanga, though generally 
grouped with the Ndebele, as President, it was observed that the acceptance by 
Parirenyatwa of the post of Vice President had to be read as a reflection that ZAPU was 
124lntelView with Mr. Enos Nkala, ZANU founding member, Bulawayo. 
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certainly a national party, not a tribal grouping as some critics were keen to point out. 126 
Identifying roughly the ethnic groups of the members of the national executive, one sees 
the following picture: Shona speakers included Parirenyatwa, Malianga, Muchachi, 
Mugabe, Nyandoro and Chikerema. Ndebele speakers included Nkomo, Moyo, 
Mukahlera, Msika, and Ngwenya. Sithole, the National Chairman, belonged to the Ndau 
speaking community from the eastern highlands. One thus sees within the ZAPU 
executive a collection of leaders who were representative of the general African 
population in the country. These leaders made the concerns and intentions of the party 
known to their own people. As such, ZAPU easily took up a national character through 
the representativeness of the first national executive. 
Party cells, the basic grassroots structures of the party, brought together a number 
of families in the same residential area. As a number of cells were put together, party 
branches were formed. Districts comprised several branches in close proximity. Putting 
together several districts reasonably close to each other, the party's provincial structures 
took shape. From these provincial structures, the national committee was formed. 127 
ZAPU aimed at strengthening the party's existence at grassroots level so that should the 
party be banned, it could effectively defy the ban by operating underground. This 
decision was based on the experience gained after the banning of the NDP. Another 
reason for the desire to set up strong structures at grassroots levels was because the 
ZAPU leadership was beginning to prepare for the armed struggle. 128 Solid structures at 
cell level would be an essential resource in supporting guerrillas. It must be remembered 
126 'The Move by Parirenyatwa' in Bantu Mirror January 6, 1962, volume 20, number 42, p. 6. 













that even though ZAPU might have set up new cells and branches as the party's 
membership grew, at the time of its formation, ZAPU essentially took over structures and 
the leadership of the NDP. 129 
ZAPU's initial strategy for liberation did not differ much from the strategy that 
had been followed by the NDP. The use of constitutional means in carrying out the 
revolution saw petitions being sent to the United Nations and to other independent 
African countries. 130 From December 1961, there was an increase of violence aimed at 
whites. In the middle of 1962, ZAPU began training militants,131 indicating a new trend 
in the struggle for independence. Besides the constitutional means, which had been 
characteristic of the nationalists' struggle in Southern Rhodesia, within ZAPU one finds 
the roots of the armed struggle. ZAPU youths took up defiance of the regime seriously. 
Their idea was to begin sabotaging the government to make it collapse. 132 Dynamites 
were being smuggled from places like Mashava mine and used to blast electric pylons. 
The senior leadership in the party was aware of a separate department within the party 
under Chikerema, the Special Affairs Department. 133 The question of strategy caused 
tensions within the party. Some argued that the constitutional campaign had failed and 
thus saw the necessity of full-scale armed struggle; Nkomo was not in favour of adopting 
full-scale armed struggle. 134 
African nationalists in ZAPU had believed that there would be a British military 
intervention sympathetic to their cause. Britain had suggested the possibility of such an 
129 Interview with Mr. Amos Ngwenya, ZAPU founding member, Bulawayo. 
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intervention should law and order breakdown in Southern Rhodesia. 135 The increased 
violence targeting whites did not result in British military intervention. Instead, rumor of 
the impending banning of ZAPU began to circulate. ZAPU had become too strong for 
the Southern Rhodesian government to deal with. 136 As the rumor of the impeding ban 
was making the rounds, a decision was passed by the ZAPU leadership that should the 
party be banned, no other party would be formed. Instead, the operations of ZAPU 
would go underground. This would give ZAPU the chance to continue championing the 
cause for the liberation of the African people despite the ban. 137 On 20 September 1962, 
ZAPU was banned. 138 The government argued that it was necessary to ban ZAPU as a 
way of curbing the escalating violence that the government blamed ZAPU for. 139 
By the time ZAPU was banned, about 190000 Africans were members of the 
party.140 In the nine months of its legal existence, ZAPU had managed to draw a 
significant number of African supporters. Throughout the legal and the illegal existence 
of ZAPU under its various names, there were two main categories of members. On the 
one hand, there were those who joined the party and bought membership cards. When 
counting members, these cardholders are the ones counted. On the other hand, there were 
those who became members of the party but never bought membership cards. Various 
reasons explain such a move. In urban areas, Africans feared to be caught by government 
police with party cards. There was also the possibility that poverty did not allow some 
Africans in rural areas to buy party cards since membership also implied the payment of a 
135 Andre Astrow Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way?, p. 36. 
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subscription fee. By the time ZAPU was banned, the party had a significant following in 
the country. 141 
Preparations for the armed struggle were already underway when ZAPU was 
banned because it had been felt within ZAPU that taking up the armed struggle was 
necessary in order to propagate the interests of the black popUlation. By late 1962, 
Nkomo was receiving arms from Cairo. 142 ZAPU leaders who were in Southern 
Rhodesia when ZAPU was banned were all placed into restriction for three months. 
Nkomo was in Lusaka, Zambia, when ZAPU was banned. Contrary to popular 
expectation that he would return to Southern Rhodesia and join the other members of his 
executive in facing the government, Nkomo did not return immediately. He argued that 
he only remained outside the country for a while because he wanted to make contacts to 
ensure that arms continued flowing. 143 It has been suggested that he did not return 
immediately to Southern Rhodesia when ZAPU was banned because he intended to form 
a government in exile, but this idea did not receive support from leaders of the 
Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) and fellow ZAPU executive committee members. 144 
Those who had expected Nkomo to return immediately and be arrested with the others 
were not happy with Nkomo's decision. 
In banning ZAPU, the government was working on a plan to destroy African 
nationalism. Placing the leaders under restriction was aimed at paralyzing the work of the 
nationalists. But due to the activities of ZAPU in conscientizing the masses, many 
Africans came to believe that the injustices they were experiencing would disappear with 
141 Interview with Mr. Pathisa Nyathi, Academic, Bulawayo. 
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the disappearance of the government that was championing these injustices. 145 Africans 
were radicalized by ZAPU, led to expect change, and to desire to struggle for the change 
to be realized. Never before in the history of Southern Rhodesia had the black population 
managed to organize itself into a national body resisting white rule. Once the ball was set 
rolling by ZAPU, radicalized Africans realized that it was indeed possible to put pressure 
on the settler government by challenging it and attacking it through acts of sabotage 
aimed at crippling it. As long as there was a sound leadership to invite African 
participation in resisting the colonial government, there would always be a huge number 
of Africans willing to participate. Gone were the days of passive resistance. With the 
banning of ZAPU the Southern Rhodesian government failed to realize the simple fact 
that placing the nationalist leaders in restriction and in detention would not necessarily 
cripple the activities of the nationalist movement. While the momentum of the wave of 
African nationalism might have been slowed down by the detention and arrests of the 
leaders, the underlying spirit of revolution remained within the hearts of the African 
people. The seed had been planted. It was a mater of time before it bore fruit. 
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'Splitting Up,' 1963-1964: 
Introduction: 
The previous chapter discussed the birth of ZAPU, setting out the goals and aims 
of the party. This chapter deals with a major crisis that ZAPU experienced in 1963. This 
was the first of two major splits that the party went through. The second major split was 
experienced in the early 1970s when James Chikerema left ZAPU to form FLORIZI. 
The split in 1963 is of special significance in the history of the liberation struggle in 
Southern Rhodesia because it produced a party from among the founding members of 
ZAPU, people who had bound themselves in agreeing that African nationalists would 
form no new party after the banning of ZAPu. 146 Instead, taking up from the experience 
of their brothers and sisters in South Africa, they would all go underground and 
coordinate the struggle in hiding. This new party formed in 1963 formed the first 
independent government in Zimbabwe in 1980. Nkomo was pushing for the idea of 
setting up a government in exile, but there was some resistance to the idea among the 
ZAPU leaders. 147 Opposition to Nkomo's suggestion of setting up a government in exile 
produced tension among the leaders. 
This chapter thus focuses on the various reasons that led to the 1963 split. Several 
reasons have been put forward suggesting that the 1963 split was to a large extent 
inevitable. One comes across the argument that Nkomo was too weak as a leader, 
without much capacity to make quick and firm decisions. Consequently, for the sake of 
146 Terence Ranger 'The African Experience In Southern Rhodesia: Some Primary Sources for 1963' held 
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progress in the struggle, he had to be replaced. 148 On the other hand, one encounters the 
interesting suggestion that ZANU was partly a creation of the Rhodesian Special Branch. 
Flower claims that the Special Branch infiltrated ZAPU and engineered a split as a way 
of weakening African opposition.149 Capitalizing on tribal sentiments and loyalties, the 
Rhodesian Special Branch claims to have succeeded in getting most Shona speakers to 
leave ZAPU.150 There was only one prominent Ndebele among the individuals who 
broke away from ZAPU, Enos Nkala. Most Ndebele speakers remained loyal to 
Nkomo. 1S1 Chikerema also throws his weight behind the claim that ZANU was a 
creation of the enemy to ensure a weakened and divided African opposition.152 
Nkomo's movements will be of special interest in this chapter. Accusations based 
on Nkomo's personality require us to look at what Nkomo actually did in order to 
understand them. Hence, when Nkomo is accused of being a coward who feared going to 
prison, there is need to look at how Nkomo responded to the possibility of going to prison 
when the party was banned. Nkomo was a very shrewd politician. Though most ZAPU 
leaders rejected the idea of forming a government in exile, Nkomo managed to persuade 
them to travel to Dar-es-Salaam to form a government in exile. It was while in Dar-es 
Salaam that it became very clear that a split within ZAPU was inevitable. Is3 Nyandoro 
pointed out that Nkomo's attempt at setting up a government in exile provoked criticism 
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from members of the ZAPU executive. Nkomo should have made prior arrangements 
with Prime Minister Julius Nyerere before taking the executive there. 154 
When the split occurred, a new party, ZANU, was formed. At this stage, ZAPU 
was not in legal existence, having been banned in 1962. How did the banned ZAPU react 
to the formation of ZANU, a rival party in the struggle for independence? ZAPU sought 
to be the only party that got international recognition, so it re-organized itself to become 
the People's Caretaker Council (PCC) from 10 August 1963. While the PCC was a 
socially based organization, ISS not a registered political party, it was a way through which 
ZAPU sought to deal with the formation of ZANU. I56 This chapter will continue to make 
reference to ZAPU since the PCC was essentially ZAPU trying to avoid its ban by 
appearing under a different name. A number of violent clashes between members of 
ZAPU and ZANU emerged. Having the appropriate party card at a given time became 
necessary whenever one was moving around. To a large extent, members of ZAPU were 
hunting down ZANU supporters. I5? 
It is essential to highlight how the split weakened ZAPU. Some cadres whom 
ZAPU had invested in and sent for training defected to join the new party. This saw 
ZAPU losing trained personnel before the launching of the armed struggle. ISS Loss of 
trained personnel during the infancy stage of the armed struggle meant a loss of essential 
fighting force for ZAPU. The chapter will conclude by pointing out that the emergence 
ofZANU helped to radicalize ZAPU. While Nkomo showed a lack of urgency in taking 
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up the armed struggle before the formation of ZANU, competition for an impact within 
the country and for international recognition saw ZAPU laying out a clear path towards 
the armed struggle. This chapter also shows how ZANU, whose leaders left ZAPU 
because they did not approve of the idea of setting up a government in exile, proceeded to 
set up the party's headquarters in exile like ZAPU. This will leave us questioning some 
of the reasons put forward for the split by members of ZANU. 
Grumblings within ZAPU: 
In September 1962 when ZAPU was banned, there were grumblings within the 
party, mainly on the question of strategy. Facing the dynamics of politics within 
Southern Rhodesia, some African nationalist leaders were becoming impatient with their 
failure to achieve anything significant by sticking to a strategy formulated during the time 
of the NDP. It was argued that the constitutional means, which ZAPU was using, were 
no longer appropriate to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Nkomo however was not in 
favor oflaunching a full-scale armed struggle. He believed that reasoning would prevail 
on the minds of the Rhodesian government leaders. 159 Nkomo failed to see the 
stubbornness of the Rhodesians, and their desire to cling to power as long as they could. 
When ZAPU was banned in September 1962, the party's leadership was placed 
under restriction, each person in hislher rural home. Nkomo was in Lusaka at the time 
and instead of returning home as expected by the party's leadership and face restriction 
with the others, and contrary to the advise given to him by Sikota Wina, one of the 
leaders of Zambia's United National Independence Party (UNIP), a nationalist party, 
Nkomo left Zambia and headed further north to Dar-es-Salaam.160 According to those 
159 Cindy Courville 'The Zimbabwe Nationalist Movements: Strategy for Liberation,' p. 102. 











who eventually left ZAPU to form ZANU, Nkomo tried to escape from arrest by going to 
Dar-es-Salaam. Word ofNkomo's escape from Lusaka demoralized many Africans in 
Southern Rhodesia. 161 According to Nkomo, his immediate return to Salisbury was not 
possible since he had to establish contacts to ensure that arms continued flowing. 162 
Bearing in mind that some cadres within ZAPU were becoming uncomfortable with 
Nkomo's lack of eagerness to launch a full-scale armed struggle, it is interesting to note 
that he used the need to make arrangements for the armed struggle as the reason for not 
joining his fellow leaders in restriction. Explaining his failure to return to Salisbury 
immediately when the party was banned, Nkomo also said that after he had made plans 
for his return to Rhodesia following the banning of ZAPU, Joseph Msika was sent by 
members of the ZAPU executive in the country to inform him not to return immediately 
'for reasons they knew better than 1.,163 
Nkomo creates the impression that he was advised to remain outside the country 
longer than he intended to. But as leader of the party, why did he give in to the advice to 
remain outside the country if he did not know the reason for doing so? Was Nkomo 
trying to shift the blame for not returning to Southern Rhodesia immediately from 
himself? Granted that he only returned to Salisbury after Sithole had remonstrated, there 
is reason to believe that the party's executive had not officially sanctioned Nkomo's 
extended stay outside the country.164 The remonstration by Sithole, coupled with Sikota 
Wina's objection to Nkomo's move to Dar-es Salaam, suggest that Nkomo was forced to 
return to Southern Rhodesia. Left to his own initiative, Nkomo might have very well 
161 ibid. p. 174. 
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remained outside the country while his brothers and sisters faced the wrath of the police 
in restriction. Nkomo's actions thus seem to confirm the accusation that he feared going 
to prison. 
But, it might not have been a question of fearing prison. Bearing in mind 
Nkomo's conviction that the struggle for independence could never be successfully 
launched and coordinated within Southern Rhodesia,165 probably regarded being placed 
in restriction or even detention, a waste of time. Having seen the harsh manner in which 
the Rhodesian government was willing to deal with the nationalist movement, Nkomo 
was not ready to make himself a sacrificial lamb. Unfortunately, at that time, Nkomo 
seems to have been the only one who understood his vision of setting up a base outside 
the country. Nkomo's vision of the struggle was not shared by those who sought to 
physically attack whites, the motivating force behind the criticism by those who regarded 
him as a weak leader who was determined to take them far away from the country where 
they were supposed to engage in actual fighting. 166 
In October 1962, Nkomo returned to Rhodesia and was placed in restriction in 
Semukwe, a small village south of Bulawayo, towards the border with Botswana. He 
proposed to the other ZAPU leaders that they should form a government in exile in Dar-
es-Salaam, but the idea was initially rejected. 167 The idea of a government in exile was 
not just one ofNkomo's wild dreams. Learning from the experience of Angola where 
nationalists had set up a government in exile in Morocco, and launched military attacks in 
the north of Angola using the Democratic Republic of Congo as a base, Nkomo intended 
to establish a base outside Rhodesia from where the struggle could be coordinated. 
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However, the approach had not achieved any significant results in Angola, a fact that 
Nkomo seems not to have taken into consideration or perhaps was not aware of. Since 
Tanzania was the closest African state that had become independent by then, it made 
sense for Nkomo to want to set up base there since the nationalist government there was 
sympathetic to the struggle in Southern Rhodesia. Nkomo thought that the idea of a 
government in exile would be effective for Rhodesia. 168 A government in exile would 
have strengthened Nkomo's diplomatic campaign but the turn of events overtook him. In 
April 1963, Nkomo convinced ZAPU leaders that Nyerere had invited them to set up a 
government in exile. Amid resentment, members of the ZAPU executive went to Dar-es-
Salaam with the hope of finding Nyerere sympathetic to their cause as Nkomo had told 
them. Much to their surprise, they discovered that Nyerere was against the move to form 
a government in exile. 169 Nyerere's opinion, which he made known to the ZAPU 
executive, was that in the case of Southern Rhodesia, the struggle would be coordinated 
better within the country .170 It was clear that N yerere had not been in favour of the idea 
of setting up a government in exile. Though Nyerere and Nkomo may have discussed 
the issue, there was obviously no prior agreement before Nkomo brought the ZAPU 
executive to Dar-es-Salaam. George Nyandoro would later make the comment that 
Nkomo's attempt at setting up a government in exile without making prior arrangements 
with Nyerere turned members of the ZAPU executive against him.l7l There was every 
reason for the ZAPU executive to tum against Nkomo because of the embarrassment they 
experienced by being told by Nyerere to go back and fight it out in Southern Rhodesia. 
168 Interview with Mr. Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu, Director of ZAPU's Publicity Department, Bulawayo. 
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Mugabe and Takawira had broken their bail conditions by going to Dar-es-Salaam. lfthe 
idea of a government in exile had worked out, breaching bail conditions would not have 
mattered much to Takawira and Mugabe. But now that they had to go back to Southern 
Rhodesia, Mugabe and Takawira realized that Nkomo had left them exposed to the wrath 
of the police. At this point, there was a clear reason for a split. 172 Nkomo could be 
accused of being inconsiderate to the plight of the other members of his executive by 
exposing Mugabe and Takawira to imprisonment for violating bail conditions. Takawira 
would later argue that the reason for rejecting Nkomo was because of the weakness of his 
leadership.173 No good leader would move his executive to another country before doing 
the necessary groundwork as Nkomo did. 
So, why was Nkomo keen to set up a government in exile, bearing in mind the 
failure of the Angolan experience? Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu sheds some light on Nkomo's 
understanding of the politics at the time. Nkomo expected that Southern Rhodesia would 
become independent as a matter of course, following the dissolution of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, whose other members, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and 
Nyasaland (Malawi) were going to be independent by 1964. According to Ndlovu, 
Nkomo would wonder loudly why the British government wanted to treat Southern 
Rhodesia differently from the other two members of the Federation, but would say in 
confidence that he was sure that Britain would never grant Southern Rhodesia 
independence on the basis of white minority rule.174 Nkomo's idea of setting up a 
government in exile may have been persuaded by the hope that since independence was 
172 Nathan Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, p. 177. 
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coming with the dissolution of the Federation; the government in exile would thus just 
wait to come into power, as a matter of time. Implied in this approach is the lack of 
urgency for launching the armed struggle. Being a peace lover by nature, Nkomo had 
expected common sense to prevail, leading to independence without loss of life. 
However, these were grave miscalculations by Nkomo. 175 The passion of those who saw 
the need for the immediate undertaking of a full-scale armed struggle as the only way 
forward would spring up within the ZAPU executive. There was a feeling at home and 
abroad that Nkomo's approach of appealing to peaceful means when nothing significant 
was being achieved was reason enough to consider his replacement as leader. Nyerere 
and Kamuzu Banda expressed such sentiments as well. Nd10vu pointed out that Banda 
described Nkomo as a spineless leader.176 It is surprising that Nkomo tried to set up his 
government in exile in Tanzania, a country whose leader was advocating for a violent 
mass uprising in Southern Rhodesia. The government in exile would have removed 
nationalists from the domestic scene a situation Nyerere was not in favour of. This was 
another sign of Nkomo 's lack of a strong vision as a leader. This lack of vision saw 
Nkomo playing into the hands of those who wanted the split as he invited the party's 
leadership to a meeting before getting Nyerere's approva1. 
One wonders whether or not Nkomo had an alternative plan should the idea of 
setting up a government in exile fai1. As things turned out, the embarrassment 
experienced in Tanzania left a deep disgruntlement among ZAPU's leadership. Nkomo 
had clearly failed to 'steer the ship.' At a meeting in Dar-es-Sa1aam attended by seven 













with Sithole. Three of the executive members, because of their loyalty to Nkomo, 
abstained from casting their votes. 177 Nkomo rejected the results of the vote that deposed 
him, but according to ZAPU's constitution, a meeting attended by seven members of the 
executive constituted a quorum. Consequently, the Tanzania meeting, which removed 
Nkomo from the party's leadership, constituted a binding force. 178 Nkomo was quick to 
act. With his position as leader of the party under threat, he returned to Southern 
Rhodesia, leaving the executive financially crippled in Tanzania because he blocked their 
access to party funds. This meant that they could not move around easily. Meanwhile, 
Nkomo had the advantage of being back in Southern Rhodesia to affirm his position as 
leader among the party's faithful who had not yet grasped the unfolding events. 
Addressing a rally in Salisbury in 1963, Nkomo denounced the members of the executive 
who had criticized his strategy in Tanzania. 179 The people who had been trying to depose 
him were not in the country to present their side of the story, so Nkomo was able to 
secure his position as leader of ZAPU. Remaining within the leadership of ZAPU was 
important for Nkomo because of the decision the party's leadership had committed itself 
to that no other nationalist party would be formed after the banning of ZAPU. To further 
weaken the people who were opposing him, Nkomo announced the suspension of Sithole, 
Takawira, Mugabe and Malianga from the party's executive. 180 
The actual sequence of events is not clear from the sources used. The Central 
African Daily News gives the impression that faced with the possibility of being deposed 
from the leadership of the party after a vote of no confidence had been passed against 
I77 D.S.M Zvaka 'Nkomo will sink in the mud like Ben Khedda,' in The Central African Daily News 
Thursday I August 1963, p. 4. 
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him, Nkomo rejected the vote and denounced the individuals who had expressed their 
opinions against him. lSI Masipula Sithole and Wellington Nyangoni have a slightly 
different sequence; suggesting that after Nkomo had announced the suspension of his 
critics from the party, they (the suspended people,) voted to depose and replace him. 
Sequence may not be of particular significance; the essential fact to note was that Nkomo 
had managed to remain as leader ofthe party. The attempt to depose him failed partly 
due to Nkomo's shrewd tactic. The man who had been accused of running away from 
Southern Rhodesia because he was afraid of being arrested had in fact run back to 
Southern Rhodesia because there was political mileage to be gained by being present in 
Southern Rhodesia at the time. Nkomo was obviously aware that since Mugabe and 
Takawira had breached their bail conditions by going to Tanzania, they would not be in a 
hurry to come back to Southern Rhodesia, again adding to his advantaged position of 
having his critics outside the country. While NImmo had been accused of lacking 
firmness in his decisions, the manner in which he dealt with the 'dissidents' from his 
party showed a deep willingness to neutralize their political influence among the Africans 
in the country. A final blow was to be delivered to the 'dissidents' at a conference at Cold 
Comfort Farm, to which Nkomo invited them to discuss the leadership problems ofthe 
party. Realizing that delegates to the conference had been hand picked by Nkomo from 
among his loyal supporters, the 'dissidents' refused to attend the conference. IS2 A 
dissident is generally an unwanted element. So, dissidents within ZAPU, the people who 
were challenging Nkomo's leadership, were unwanted elements. 
181 Central African Daily News Thursday 1 August 1963, p. 4. 











The events of August 1963 marked a turning point in nationalist politics in 
Southern Rhodesia. The failure of the attempt to depose Nkomo as leader of ZAPU and 
Nkomo's suspension of those who were trying to oust him left the possibility of a split 
within the party inevitable. ls3 Daggers were drawn on both sides in the contest for the 
leadership of the party but it was clear that Nkomo had managed to secure his position 
within ZAPU, hence his courage to summon the 'dissidents' to a conference. Though 
Nkomo's critics wanted to remain within the party, their suspension left them with no 
alternative but to launch their own party, ZANU. 184 Having bound themselves to an 
agreement not to form another party after ZAPU's ban, the failure of the attempt to 
depose Nkomo from ZAPU's leadership resulted in the formation of ZANU. Pre-
empting Nkomo's conference at Cold Comfort Farm, which was to be held on 10August 
1963, Mugabe, Takawira, Nkala, Malianga, and Sithole, among others, on 8 August, 
announced the formation of a more radical African nationalist party, ZANU. The new 
party proclaimed a willingness to take the enemy head on and seek to physically attack 
the white settlers. 18S 
There has been an intensive discussion ofthe events surrounding Nkomo's 
attempt to set up a government in exile mainly because the events in Dar-es-Salaam made 
the split inevitable. One can argue that the failure ofNkomo's attempt to set up a 
government in exile became the immediate reason for the split. However, various other 
factors contributed to the split. It is essential to address some of these factors in order to 
deepen one's understanding of the struggles within ZAPU. The idea for the formation of 
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ZANU was discussed and finalized at the house ofNkala, a Ndebele speaker. I86 The 
significance of this fact will be exposed when considering the part played by tribal 
sentiments in the formation of ZANU. Nkomo raised the tribal question. He points out 
that Msika discovered that Malianga had a document which suggested that the majority 
tribe should take over the leadership of the party, getting rid of 'Zimundevere, ' 
(derogatory description of the old Ndebele man.) Nkomo argues that he was being 
accused of giving preferential treatment to the Ndebele speaking members of the party, a 
point that he denies. Is7 Ndlovu also attributes the split to issues of ethnicity. He points 
out that many of the Masvingo based Shona speaking leaders such as Henry Hamadziripi, 
Michael Mawema, Mhizha, and Patrick Mutumba, resented the idea of being led by a 
Ndebele, often referring to Nkomo as the reincarnation of Lobengula, an ancient Ndebele 
king who 'gave' white settlers passage into the Shona speaking regions of the country.188 
Ndlovu makes reference to another manifestation of tribal sentiments at the 
funeral service ofParirenyatwa; ZAPU's first vice president, a Shona speaker, who died 
on his way to Bulawayo. When the funeral procession reached Norton, about 40km from 
Salisbury, Shona speaking ZAPU leaders from Salisbury demanded that Takawira leads 
the procession from Norton, since he was the most senior leader in Salisbury who should 
be seen playing a leading part in his area. Nkomo had led the convoy from Bulawayo and 
he was not going to take a less prominent role upon arrival in Salisbury, consequently, he 
refused. 189 
186 Interview with Mr. Enos Nicala, ZANU founding member, Bulawayo. 
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The people who formed ZANU did not refer to tribalism at all. The list of 
reasons given by Sithole makes no mention of tribal sentiments. 190 Shamuyarira also 
pointed out that while there were several clashes between party members, tribal 
sentiments were never part of the tensions in 1963. 191 If feelings of tribalism motivated 
the split, there was no way that ZANU leaders would admit it since the segregation 
associated with tribalism is condemned internationally. However, making the observation 
that Nkala was the only prominent Ndebele who joined ZANU as a founding leader, it 
has been argued by some people that the feelings of tribalism should not be left out when 
one discusses the reasons behind the 1963 split. l92 
Perhaps ZANU's unwillingness to admit that tribal sentiments played a role in the 
1963 split is linked to the claim by Flower that the Rhodesian government, through the 
hidden activities of the Special Branch, took advantage of the tribal sentiments within 
ZAPU and infiltrated the party, thereby igniting deeper tribal resentment which 
eventually contributed to the split. 193 NyatlIi also makes reference to the role played by 
the Rhodesian government in splitting ZAPU. He said that the party had become too 
strong for the comfort of the Rhodesian government and there was no way that it was 
going to be allowed to continue existing, even underground. As more educated African 
leaders in Southern Rhodesia became more involved in politics from the 1960s, so 
entered the hidden hand of the Rhodesian Special Branch (which later became the C.I.O) 
into African politics. 194 Nkomo, who clashed several times with Takawira, accuses him 
(Takawira) of belonging to the dubious Capricorn African Society, which specialized in 
190 Masipula Sithole, Zimbabwe: Struggles within The Struggle, ppA0-41. 
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training educated Africans to collaborate with rich whites in running African 
governments. 195 Nyathi argues that it was through the assimilation of educated Africans 
who were not politically conscious that whites in the Special Branch infiltrated into 
ZAPU and eventually engineered a split in the party. 196 At the time of the split, those. 
who remained within ZAPU were of the opinion that ZANU was being formed by the 
enemy as a way of weakening African opposition to the regime. Whereas the NDP and 
ZAPU had been parties with national identities, hence the slogan 'mwana wevhu ' 
(son/daughter of the soil,) ZANU was taking up a huge Shona identity, thus dividing 
African opposition to the settler regime along tribal lines. 
From the ZANU perspective, four reasons necessitated the split. There was the 
need to establish an African party' that was willing to confront the settlers. 197 ZAPU had 
failed to launch significant attacks on the Rhodesian regime because ofNkomo's 
commitment to constitutional means. Nkomo's fear of going to jail was also raised as a 
point against his leadership qualities. When fellow members of the executive had needed 
his bold leadership, Nkomo deserted them because he did not want to be arrested. Such 
was the case when ZAPU was banned and Nkomo had to be forced to return to 
Rhodesia. 198 The fact that Nkomo was showing signs of not tolerating criticism within 
ZAPU made the creation of another party necessary. The people who had expressed 
disappointment with Nkomo's unclear plans in Dar-es-Salaam had all been suspended 
from the party. To pursue their political ambitions within Southern Rhodesia, they 
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formed their own party. J 99 The lack of confidence in Nkomo' s leadership expressed by 
other African leaders left some members of the ZAPU executive considering the 
necessity of replacing him.2oo Pride and the need to assert themselves as true nationalists 
motivated the founding members of ZANU to go their own way, abandoning Nkomo who 
was beginning to lose respect among African leaders. 
Nkomo argues that he was having problems relating with Nyerere because 
Nyerere was not in favor of the armed struggle that he was committing ZAPU to. 
According to Nkomo, Nyerere wanted ZAPU to adopt a peaceful strategy in the struggle 
for independence, a strategy he had used in Tanzania's struggle for independence.201 
This is an absurd claim by Nkomo because the fact that Nyerere was more in favor of 
Nkomo's critics, Takawira and Sithole, among others, people who were advocating for 
more direct confrontation with the settlers, shows that Nyerere was in fact in favor of the 
armed struggle. The sad face of bias is thus seen in Nkomo's autobiography as he tried 
to create the image that he was more radical than he really was. 
The Impact of the Split: 
The emergence of ZANU had a huge impact on the future of the liberation 
struggle in Southern Rhodesia. There were outcomes that contributed positively to the 
struggle for independence and some outcomes that were detrimental to the cause for the 
liberation of Africans. In 1963, there was a lot of inter-party fighting among nationalist 
leaders. The struggle for power and leadership among African nationalists resulted in a 
shift of focus from the real enemy, the oppressive regime. The split weakened opposition 
199 ibid. p. 4. 
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to the oppressive regime because African nationalists no longer had a united front. 202 On 
the other hand, faced with a rival nationalist party claiming to be radical and willing to 
physically attack white settlers, ZAPU had to flex its muscles and show a bold 
commitment to the armed struggle. The emergence of ZANU thus contributed to the 
radicalization of the campaign by nationalists. 
This section takes a look at the impact of the 1963 split paying particular attention 
to the manner in which ZAPU responded to it. It could be argued that this split marked 
the beginning of the deterioration of ZAPU. As party supporters found themselves 
having to choose between the two parties, tribal and regional loyalties began to playa 
part in the way choices were being made. The loyalty of most Ndebele people saw them 
remaining faithful to Nkomo while Shona speakers rallied behind ZAND. ZAPU 
gradually lost its credibility as a national party as Ndebele speakers living in 
Matebeleland and Midlands rallied behind ZAPU, giving the party a regional identity.203 
This section will close by highlighting the significance of the banning of the pee and 
ZANU in 1964. For those persuaded by the argument that ZANU was a creation ofthe 
Rhodesian government, there is reason to conclude that the government was 'just putting 
icing on its cake' by banning the two organizations. Having managed to divide African 
opposition and left the Africans fighting each other, the government would intervene in 
1964, out of concern for the 'well being' of Africans, and stop inter-party fighting by 
banning the pee and ZANV. 
Two days after the formation ofZANU, Nkomo announced the launching of the 
pee, a 'caretaker' council that would promote the interests of African people. The pee 
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confirmed Nkomo' s presidency of the party.204 Events just before the formation of 
ZANU had challenged the leadership ofNkomo. It was thus necessary for Nkomo and 
for ZAPU to establish solid leadership for the party. A nationalist party requires stable 
leadership for it to function well. It was perhaps with the notion of securing the position 
ofNkomo as leader of the party that Chikerema proposed that Nkomo be made life 
president of the party. The delegates gathered at Cold Comfort Farm adopted this 
suggestion.205 As long as Nkomo lived, party members expressed their willingness to be 
led by him. Any ambitious individuals within the party got the message loud and clear 
that there was no place for them in ZAPU. Granted that a life president assured the party 
of stable top leadership, the concept however, contradicted the democratic system that 
ZAPU was claiming to be fighting to establish. The party's acceptance of a life president 
entrenched the lack of tolerance for opposition, which Nkomo had expressed in his 
dealings with Takawira, Sithole, Malianga and Mugabe. Confirming Nkomo as life 
president of the party also meant that Nkomo would influence the strategy for the armed 
struggle adopted by ZAPU to a large extent. While having a president who was not 
radically committed to the armed struggle, there was no way that ZAPU would ever 
radically commit itselfto the armed struggle without first changing Nkomo's approach. 
The Cold Comfort Congress also re-affirmed the decision made before the 
banning of ZAPU, which had also been confirmed just after the banning of ZAPU, that 
no other political party would be formed following the banning of ZAPU.z°6 In line with 
this decision, the PCC did not regard itself as a political party. Operating as a socially 
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based group, the PCC was set up to continue the work of ZAPU.207 However, the 
decision not to form another party had been reached while ZAPU had a leadership wider 
than the leadership of the PCC that was now re-affirming the decision. From the re-
affirmation, it was obvious that in ZAPU's eyes, ZANU was a sore sight that had to be 
dealt with. The solution was not too complicated for ZAPU. The 'dissidents' had to 
come back to the mother party, the people who had broken away to form ZANU had to 
be brought back to their senses and re-join 'the real' party.208 
ZAPU should be credited for the creativity of coming up with the PCC just after 
the formation of ZANU. Considering that ZAPU was banned and thus could not openly 
hold meetings in August 1963, the formation of ZANU might have overshadowed 
completely the banned ZAPU if the latter had not done anything significant at the time of 
the formation of ZANU The emergence of the PCC was thus necessitated by the birth of 
ZANU ZAPU was forced to find a manner of existence in public that would not attract 
the wrath of the government while continuing with the political activities of the party. 
The PCC also provided ZAPU an opportunity to reorganize itself to meet the challenge 
that ZANU was posing, and the challenge that was emerging from trying to exist 
underground.209 
In the past, a 'new' African nationalist party, formed after the banning of the 
previous one, would succeed its predecessor. This was the manner in which the NDP had 
been succeeded by ZAPU. At the time of the formation of ZANU, Takawira said that 
ZANU had been formed to replace ZAPU as an African political party since the PCC was 
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not a political party?1O The contest for power, which had be~n experienced in the period 
before the split, continued. Between August and December 1963, there was bitter 
fighting between the pee and ZANU members.211 While the pee emerged as aggressor, 
hunting down all ZANU supporters, ZANU was forced to be on the defensive. At that 
time, the pee had the advantage of commanding a large following of supporters who 
were keen to preserve their identity, so they fought running battles with ZANU 
supporters?12 The use of petrol bombs in African townships became common. Thirty-
three people were injured in Mpopoma Township, Bulawayo, after a petrol bomb was 
thrown at a crowd. pee gangsters were blamed for the violent attacks. ZANU insisted 
that it was necessary for the pee to change significantly to make room for honorable 
unity with ZANU.213 ehikerema, the pee vice president, refused to sit down with 
ZANU to discuss the split and the violence their parties were entangled in. For 
ehikerema, the 'honorable' thing was for ZANU to disband and come back to ZAPu.214 
In 1964, the pee made reference to an upcoming exercise of kunyora mazita 
evanhu mubhuku rehupenyu, (writing people's names 'in a book oflife,' as a way of 
finding out the number of supporters and members the party had.) Given the background 
of violent clashes between ZANU and pee supporters, Sithole accused Nkomo of trying 
to intimidate people by compiling a list of names of ZAPU supporters. Only God could 
compile 'a book oflife,' Sithole said?15 With a list of names of party members, it would 
have been easy for ZAPU to identify and attack ZANU members. Presumably if one's 
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name was not in 'the book oflife,' that was a sign that one's life could be terminated 
easily. The level of competition between the two groups had made ZAPU conclude that 
membership to ZAPU gave one a right to life. Possession of the appropriate party card 
became an essential survival tactic in African townships?16 
A vigilante group known as Zhanda carried out several attacks on blacks accused 
of supporting the government or ZANU. On February 13 1964, Ernest Veli was stabbed 
to death because he was a ZANU supporter. David Dodo was beaten to death in 
September because he had given evidence in court at a criminal trial of a member of the 
PCC.2I7 Violence became the norm. Another example of the gruesome attacks on 
ZANU members was the case of Mr. B. Manda who was beaten up and set alight with 
petrol in his house by suspected PCC members. PCC supporters beat Anthony 
Kandodzinya, a member of ZANU who had just returned from detention at Hwa Hwa 
prison, to death.
2lg 
There were attempts by people like Mr. Ngoma, a trade unionist from Umtali 
(Mutare), east of Salisbury, to reconcile ZAPU and ZANU. Ngoma organized a meeting 
in Umtali at which Nkomo and Chikerema would represent ZAPU while Nkala and 
Nyagumbo would represent ZANU and explain to the people what the dynamics were 
between the two parties. When the ZANU delegation arrived at the meeting, Nkomo and 
Chikerema walked out, with Nkomo saying '1 cannot speak on the same platform with 
these rats.,219 
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ZANU found it difficult to organize any meetings because ZAPU always sent 
youths to disrupt the meetings. In rural areas, teachers, businessmen, and nurses, were 
targeted by ZAPU thugs. According to Nyagumbo, there was a systematic destruction of 
properties owned by ZANU members. It became necessary for ZANU leaders to be 
guarded by party youths. Nyagumbo's house in Highfields Township was broken into by 
ZAPU youths while he was sleeping. Nkomo had told the masses at the launching of the 
pee that the Rhodesian government was using the founding members of ZANU. 
Consequently, ZAPU youths felt justified in working to destroy ZANU. Initially, the 
Rhodesian police did not bother to intervene, only doing so in 1964 after Nkomo was 
placed under restriction.22o 
One thus sees the pee fighting two enemies in the immediate aftermath of the 
split. There was the government to fight and there was also ZANU to deal with. 
Inevitably, ZAPU's campaign against the government was weakened as most attention 
had to be diverted to the problem of ZANU. Acts of aggression by the pee against 
ZANU are the only ones that have been highlighted in this section mainly because of the 
interest ofthis study to focus on ZAPU's history. Members of ZANU were not mere 
victims in the clashes with ZAPU. Takawira had said that ZANU had replaced ZAPU;221 
consequently, members ofZANU had the understanding that they were the only 
legitimate African nationalist party at the time. Though outnumbered, they too sought to 
mark their presence among the ordinary party supporters by fighting pee supporters. 
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Just as it became necessary to possess a ZAPU party card, it also became necessary to 
have a ZANU party card easily accessible.222 
Preparations by ZAPU for the launching of the armed struggle suffered a setback 
because of the split. By 1962, ZAPU had begun preparing for the armed struggle. The 
first group of cadres was sent for training in China under the leadership of Charles 
Chikerema.223 People like Emmerson Munangagwa224 were part of the second group to 
be sent for training by ZAPU prior to the Split,225 The 1963 split was reflected among the 
cadres in training and as they returned home. They split into parties, with Munangagwa 
being part ofthe ZAPU trained group that joined ZANU.226 ZAPU thus lost the expertise 
and the skills that the cadres who joined ZANU had acquired, a big blow to ZAPU's 
initial preparations for the armed struggle. The cadres who joined ZANU were attracted 
by the radical sounding war rhetoric that was being propagated by ZAND. Having been 
trained, they were keen to fight, so they joined the party that was most likely going to 
make it possible for them to fight. 
Even though ZAPU lost 'military muscle' by loosing cadres it had sent for 
training, ZAPU should be given credit for being the first party to actually send cadres for 
training. Launching the armed struggle required an initial group of trained personnel, and 
these were trained by ZAPU. Though the party may have lacked a deep commitment to 
the armed struggle, it provided the nationalist struggle with the first batch of trained 
cadres227. No doubt those cadres who joined ZANU, having trained in China, maintained 
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contacts with their trainers in China because throughout the struggle, ZANU maintained 
close contact with the Chinese, getting military equipment and trainers from them. Here 
is another contribution ZAPU made to the future of the armed struggle in Southern 
Rhodesia. Even though Nkomo had been criticized for wanting to spend too much time 
outside Southern Rhodesia, there was no way that the resources within Southern 
Rhodesia alone would sustain the struggle. The cause for the liberation of Africans 
benefited from the external contacts established by ZAPU. This is a positive contribution 
to the struggle emerging from the split. 
A discussion of the 1963 split should also pay attention to matters ofNdebele 
character in order to understand how ZAPU emerged after the split. While some views 
suggest that after the split, ZAPU emerged much stronger since divisive and power 
hungry elements removed themselves from the party,228 there is reason to believe that the 
split weakened the support base of ZAPU. When the split occurred, most Ndebele people 
felt that they could not abandon Nkomo, their leader. Respect for elders, especially 
people in leadership positions, which is prominent in Ndebele culture, motivated the 
loyalty ofNdebele people to Nkomo. Consequently, most of the Ndebele people who 
were on the ZAPU executive prior to the split remained faithful to the party, and with 
them, the various Ndebele people who supported them. Nkala was the only prominent 
Ndebele nationalist who joined ZANU at its formation. A largely Ndebele image of 
ZAPU began to emerge, even though Chikerema, a Shona speaker, was vice president. 
ZANU on the other hand was acquiring a largely Shona identity. 











Terence Ranger's study of the Makoni district, east of Salisbury, revealed that 
religious beliefs of the peasants became an indispensable part of the war ideology.229 
Nkomo was not just an ordinary leader to the Ndebele people. ZAPU nationalism and 
ideology came to embrace aspects of traditional Ndebele religion. In 1953, Nkomo 
visited the Dula shrine, which was one of the significant shrines in Ndebele traditional 
religion. Grey Bango, a trade union leader and William Sivako accompanied him and 
they asked the spirits how, as nationalist leaders they could overthrow the domination of 
the whites. At Dula, Nkomo heard the voice from the shrine telling him that the land 
would only be given back to the black people after thirty years of fighting, during which 
many people would die. A belief developed suggesting that the voice of Mwali had told 
Nkomo that he would be the first black leader of the independent nation of Zimbabwe.23o 
Consequently, there was a belief in Ndebele tradition that Nkomo was the divinely 
appointed leader.231 It was only natural for Ndebele people to remain loyal to their 
divinely appointed leader. 
It must be pointed out though that none of the African nationalists campaigned by 
appealing to tribal allegiances. In fact, Mrs. Jane Ngwenya, a founding member of 
ZAPU, denies that tribalism played a part in the 1963 split.232 However, one cannot 
ignore the external manifestations as pointed out by Nyathi. Just after the split, ZAPU 
membership greatly outnumbered that of ZANU. Edison Zvobgo made reference to the 
fact that in the beginning, ZANU members were very few, with the first ZANU meeting 
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attracting twenty-three people only since it was risky to be associated with lANU?33 
Overtime, as Ndebele speakers gradually rallied behind lAPU while Shona speakers 
teamed up behind lANU, numbers began to playa key role. Shona speakers are the 
majority in the country. Consequently, as more Shona speakers joined lANU, the 
number of supporters gradually increased. Nyathi argues that as a way of entrenching 
division between the two parties, the Special Branch portrayed an image of lANU as the 
radical party that was committed to the armed struggle, an image that was bound to cause 
more defections from lAPU.234 The ethnic question of will be taken up again when the 
second major split experienced by lAPU is discussed. 
While most Ndebele people remained faithful to lAPU, the radical rhetoric, 
which lANU was propagating, attracted most of the black students at the University of 
Rhodesia.235 Young educated men and women who were highly influential in their home 
areas because oftheir educational levels, the young indigenous intellectuals, rallied 
behind lANU, regarding it as the more progressive and practical party in the struggle for 
independence. These people inevitably played a key role in contributing to the popularity 
of lANU within and outside the country. lANU did not just become a party of 
intellectuals. As the struggle progressed, lANU's strategy of mass mobilization made 
the party even more popular than lAPU in most rural areas. 
On an administrative level, lAPU lost effective members of the Central 
Committee?36 The people that led the break away to form lANU had all held key 
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positions in ZAPU. Takawira had been ZAPU's National Secretary for Pan-African 
Affairs, Malianga had been ZAPU's General Secretary, and Mugabe had been in charge 
of lnfonnation and Publicity, while Sithole had been ZAPU's National Chainnan?37 All 
these people had the experience of involvement in politics on a national level, an 
experience that ZANU benefited from. These leaders had also built national and 
international profiles because of their participation as nationalists from the fonnative 
stages of organized nationalist politics in Southern Rhodesia. People who did not have 
this experience, let alone the talents of some of the leaders who fonned ZANU filled in 
the gaps they left in ZAPU. ZANU's infonnation and publicity department benefited a 
lot from Mugabe's fieriness and eloquence as a speaker?38 ZANU was always far ahead 
ofZAPU in publicity during the struggle.239 This is a reflection of the weakened ZAPU 
that emerged after the split. The PCC was forced to embrace new people into its top 
leadership, people who did not have the national experience that founding leaders of 
ZANU had. This may have resulted in concentrating more responsibility on already 
experienced leaders in ZAPU, Nkomo and Chikerema, whose prominence easily 
overshadowed others. The problem of power later caused another split in ZAPU. 
At ZANU's first congress, a number of resolutions were adopted, indicating the 
general direction that the new party would follow. It was decided at the congress that 
ZANU would collect signatures for a petition to Britain and the United Nations, calling 
for the release of all political prisoners. It was also resolved that if the Rhodesian Front 
declared Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDl), ZANU's Central Committee 
would then fonn a government in exile and in turn declare the African people 
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independent. ZANU called on Afro-Asian countries to withdraw from the 
Commonwealth if the UDI was declared and Britain failed to act against the Rhodesian 
government. ZANU encouraged Africans in Southern Rhodesia to reject state-sponsored 
community development projects. These were identified as a form of disguised apartheid 
since they were not affording equal opportunities to the various population groups in the 
country.240 
The significance of ZANU: 
One could say that there was no significant difference in the goals of the two 
African parties. Just as ZAPU had committed itself to the liberation of the African 
people, ZANU also came into the struggle calling for majority rule, seeking external 
support in pushing Britain and eventually setting up external bases.241 So, what was new 
about ZANU? Should one accept the argument that Nkomo's attempt to set up a 
government in exile caused the split in ZAPU because the founding members of ZANU 
were against the idea of a government in exile? Or should one be persuaded by the 
argument that the people who formed ZANU were a group of power hungry individuals 
who had failed to assert themselves as leaders within ZAPU? A number of questions 
should be asked when one looks at the resolutions put forward by ZANU, noting how 
identical they were to ZAPU's approach to the struggle. It had become clear to all the 
nationalist leaders that given the nature of government repression within Southern 
Rhodesia, there was no way that the liberation struggle could be successfully organized 
internally. Indeed, while the struggle for independence had to be led by black Africans, 
ZANU was aware that given the power of the Rhodesian government, nationalists would 
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achieve very little if they chose to engage the government by themselves. External 
support had to be sought. Since these things were all being done by ZAPU, what was the 
idea behind the split then? There is reason to agree with Swazini Ndlovu in saying that 
the various forces at play during the 1963 split will never be completely understood?42 
However, going back to the essence of this study, one sees how ZAPU policies 
informed the founding members of ZANU in formulating their own resolutions. As 
members of ZAPU, these nationalists participated in mapping out a strategy for the 
struggle. Their experience in ZAPU gave them a deeper understanding of the political 
problems they were facing in Southern Rhodesia. It was while participating in ZAPU 
that ZANU founder members identified what was missing in the struggle for 
independence by black people, a radical commitment to taking up arms. The rigidity of . 
. the Rhodesian government made it necessary to show the seriousness of black 
commitment to the struggle by taking up arms. 
In not responding to the calls for more intense commitment to the armed struggle, 
ZAPU created a platform for those who felt that fighting, physically attacking whites was 
the only way forward, constitutional means having failed from the time of the NDP.243 
What ZAPU was not doing, the cadres who formed ZANU sought to do. Thus, ZANU's 
rhetoric was war propaganda. Benefiting from getting some cadres who had already been 
sent for training by ZAPU, a new wave to the struggle for independence was introduced 
by the emergence of ZANU. 
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According to Mugabe, ZANU advocated for the anned struggle as a way of 
gaining total independence so that the majority people in Southern Rhodesia could rule 
themselves. The idea was to completely overthrow the settler government through the 
barrel of the gun since constitutional talks had failed to achieve anything.244 The radical 
approach of ZANU was evident in the declaration ofNdabaningi Sithole, the founding 
President. Sithole said that 'we are our own liberators through direct confrontation.' 
ZANU sought to distinguish itself from ZAPU and from all previous African nationalist 
parties by insisting on action rather than seeking refonn policies aimed at simply 
improving the conditions ofblacks.245 ZANU understood its adoption of 'action' to be 
more radical than the previous strategy of refonn. The founding members of ZANU 
made it clear that they were moving away from Nkomo's policy of seeking international 
diplomatic assistance as the main strategy of fighting for independence. Africans were 
now convinced that the bulk of the work in the struggle was to be taken up by them 
within Southern Rhodesia. 
Aware that sitting back would be a sure way of allowing ZANU to overshadow it, 
once ZANU started laying serious plans for the anned struggle; ZAPU suddenly took a 
more pronounced interest in engaging the settler government in fighting. Though ZAPU 
had dragged its feet about the anned struggle, because ofNkomo's preference for a 
peaceful transition, ZANU's desire to engage in fighting forced ZAPU become the first 
Black Nationalist party in Rhodesia to launch the anned struggle. 
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In 1965 ZAPU launched its first military operations in the country. A small group 
of cadres was sent into the country for reconnaissance and training people locally. In the 
early skirmishes, Airman Chikwakwata and John Maduso, both ZAPU fighters, were 
captured and sentenced to death for trying to topple the government by force. 246 ZANU's 
first battle at Sinoia in 1966, which has been presented by propagators of the 'victor's' 
perspective, as marking the beginning of the armed struggle,247 came after ZAPU had 
already begun the fighting. A more detailed account ofZAPU's military engagements 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
The struggle between ZAPU and ZANU in the aftermath of the split was also put 
on an international front as the two parties struggled for international recognition. 
International recognition was essential since sponsorship for the activities of the party, 
possibilities for training camps and the significance of claiming to be representing the 
interests of the African population required the recognition of the Organization of African 
Unity and other international bodies. Chikerema made appeals that ZAPU be recognized 
as the only legitimate liberation movement in Southern Rhodesia since the people had 
rejected ZANU the day it was launched.248 The people who rejected ZANU the day it 
was formed were all ZAPU members, most of whom were not very sure of what was 
going on at the time of the split. Chikerema was trying to cripple ZANU on a regional 
and international diplomatic level. 
Although the two parties were later forced to collaborate during the armed 
struggle, tension and mistrust remained because of the 1963 split. Many innocent people 
246 Interview with Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa, ZIPRA's chief of intelligence, Bulawayo. 
247 Robert Mugabe Our Way of Liberation, p. 42. 
248 James Chikerema 'ZAPU: Political Situation in Zimbabwe' Statement to The Committee of Nine, Dar-
es-Salaam, 5 June 1964, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro (eds.) Zimbabwe Independence Movements, Select 











were killed in the post independence period because of tension between the two parties 
and the 'unity' eventually established between them in 1987 was based on Chikerema's 
notion that ZANU should come back and join ZAPU. When the Unity Accord was 
signed in 1987, members of ZAPU joined ZANU One wonders what impact the 
intolerance of ZAPU to opposition had on ZANU's attitude towards opposition. It could 
be argued that the violent clashes that resulted from ZAPU's attempt to crush ZANU 
served to radicalize ZANU in its struggle against settler domination and against African 
opposition. Chased after and hunted down by ZAPU supporters, survival and 
commitment to the struggle developed within the founding members of ZANU.z49 
As clashes between ZAPU and ZANU supporters increased, many Africans were 
arrested for the violence that broke out in townships. The government argued that the 
arrests were a way of controlling the clashes. Party leaders were also being arrested and 
harassed. On April 15 1964, Nkomo and other PCC leaders were detained at 
Gonakudzingwa250, a detention camp set up by the Rhodesian government in the 
southeastern comer of Southern Rhodesia, close to the Limpopo River.251 For the next 
ten years, Nkomo was confined at Gonakudzingwa,252 removed from the heart of the 
struggle, according to the expectations of the government, and yet he remained central 
within ZAPU as an inspiration to the many cadres who sacrificed their lives for the 
liberation of Zimbabwe. 
The government's normal way of dealing with African opposition parties did not 
take long to show face again. On 26 August 1964, the PCC and ZANU were banned, as a . 
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way of dealing with the uncontrolled violence that was prevalent in African townships.253 
September 1964 saw the arrest of Sithole, Mugabe, Nkala, and Takawira.254 These 
arrests were aimed at weakening campaigns by nationalists even more. By removing 
leadership from among the people, the government hoped that Africans in Southern 
Rhodesia would fall apart and find no coordinated approach of resisting oppression. By 
this time, the Special Branch was aware that there were preparations to launch the armed 
struggle. Arrests and harassments were thus also directed at disrupting preparations for 
the armed struggle.255 According to Nyagumbo, the Special Branch had very detailed 
knowledge on the movements and plans of the nationalists. When the Special Branch 
took him in in 1966, while planning to launch acts of sabotage on government 
institutions, the Special Branch informed him that it was aware of the plans and activities 
of the nationalists in Zambia and in Salisbury.256 The banning of the PCC and ZANU 
and the arrests of the leaders, saw an end of the inter-party violence that had rocked 
African townships.257 
By the time ZANU and the PCC were banned, ZANU had been in existence for 
about a year, most of which had been spent trying to resist efforts by ZAPU to annihilate 
it. Numerically, ZAPU outnumbered ZANU supporters mainly because while ZANU 
was starting from scratch, ZAPU had had the advantage of taking over the national 
structures that had been set up by the NDP. To further weaken the banned ZANU, 
Nkomo announced that since all African political parties were now banned, nationalist 
politics would be continued without political parties. Nkomo said this while claiming at 
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the same time that the only political party that had been banned in 1964 was ZANU, 
since the PCC had not been a political party. The way forward as seen by Nkomo was 
for all Africans in Southern Rhodesia to unite as Zimbabweans in the struggle.258 If all 
Africans had heeded to Nkomo' scalI, ZANU would have ceased to exist, and perhaps the 
agreement entered before ZAPU was banned would have seen ZAPU emerge as the only 
party for the African people but operating underground. The 1964 banning however put 
the struggle on another path. Chikerema and Chitepo, representing ZAPU and ZANU 
respectively, were sent to exile by their parties, from where they organized the armed 
struggle?59 
Attempts by African nationalists to establish political parties within the country 
had been frustrated by the government. From the time of the birth of ZANU, ZAPU's 
contribution to the liberation struggle would be measured against ZANU's. In fact, 
because of ZANU's victory in the 1980 elections and the tense relationship between the 
two parties, the story of ZAPU's contribution to the liberation struggle would be told 
from the 'victor's' perspective, highlighting ZANU's role while playing down some of 
ZAPU's significant contributions.26o 
The idea of forming a government in exile before proper arrangements had been 
made offered the immediate cause for the split. Some members of the ZAPU executive 
were not happy with Nkomo's leadership since the time of the 1961 Constitutional 
Conference, but they had never found an appropriate opportunity to directly challenge 
him. Nkomo thus made the split inevitable by not planning wel1.261 Inter-party clashes 
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witnessed after the birth of ZANU diverted the attention of African nationalists from the 
oppressive government. The failure by ZAPU to respond to demands for a radical 
approach to the struggle for independence had an immediate negative impact as time was 
spent on efforts to crush ZANU through violent inter-party clashes. The next chapter 












ZAPU and The Battle Front, 1965- 1973: 
Introduction: 
The anned struggle in Rhodesia can be divided into three phases. The period 
from 1964-1969 marked the first phase, during which ZAPU made an outstanding 
contribution, while ZANU was still struggling to establish structures and external 
contacts. The second phase, from 1970-1974, saw ZANU doing most of the fighting. 
ZAPU had been crippled by an internal crisis in the beginning of 1970 and had also lost a 
number of its trained cadres in the first phase of the struggle. A process of re-structuring 
was thus underway within ZAPU. From 1975 to 1980, both ZAPU and ZANU engaged 
in the decisive phase of the struggle. ZAPU having re-structured, now had an established 
fighting wing with clear leadership structures.z62 As fighting intensified and international 
pressure continued pressing on all parties, a negotiated settlement at Lancaster House 
resulted in the drawing up of a constitution for Zimbabwe, followed by the adoption of a 
ceasefire agreement. Zimbabwe was granted independence in 1980. There was no 
military victory for any of the parties involved in the war but the anned struggle had 
become the main channel through which nationalist parties registered their opposition to 
the oppressive minority regime following the failure of previous constitutional means. 
This chapter analyses ZAPU's participation in the anned struggle in Rhodesia. It 
traces the reason why ZAPU took up the anned struggle, making a significant shift from 
the strategy that nationalists had followed since 1957. According to Dabengwa, the claim 
that ZAPU did not fight because it was waiting to seize power from ZANU after 
262 Ngwabi Bhebe The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in 











independence should be dismissed since ZAPU actively participated in the anned 
struggle.263 One does not hear much about ZAPU's engagements during the first phase 
of the anned struggle because the Rhodesian government deliberately decided not to 
publish reports from the war as a way of making it difficult for nationalist guerrillas to 
trace their impact. Rhodesian security forces preferred to fight' a silent war' during the 
first phase.264 Coupled with ZANU's bias in giving accounts of the final phase of the war 
that highlight ZANU's contribution to the struggle only, ZAPU's participation in the 
anned struggle has not received the acknowledgement it deserves. 
An extract from a song that ZAPU cadres used to sing sheds some light on the 
spirit with which they joined the anned struggle. ZAPU cadres sung that, ' ... we are 
soldiers of the people. We have come from very far, from overseas countries where we 
were given help. ·Now we are here, fulfilling the wishes of the people. We will do so 
until the final victory. ,265 The song tells the story of the training of ZAPU cadres, mostly 
outside the country, and their commitment to liberating the country. It acknowledged the 
assistance ZAPU was getting outside the country and identified ZAPU's war with the 
concerns of the oppressed masses in Rhodesia. 
ZAPU suffered a second major split at the beginning of the second phase of the 
anned struggle. Chikerema, ZAPU's Vice President, the man who had coordinated 
ZAPU's war during the first phase, left the party, taking with him some cadres trained by 
ZAPU. During this second internal crisis, ZAPU also lost an essential contact with 
FRELIMO, which got snatched by ZANU. ZANU was able to open the eastern front, 
giving its cadres an opportunity to set up bases in Mozambique and infiltrate into 
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Rhodesia without the difficulties ZAPU was facing crossing the Zambezi River. The 
dense forest marking the border between Mozambique and Rhodesia made it difficult for 
Rhodesian security forces to guard the border. Robson Manyika, who had been 
negotiating with FRELIMO on ZAPU's behalf, defected to ZANU, having been 
frustrated by the internal crisis in ZAPU, which was crippling the party's involvement in 
the armed struggle. Rex Nhongo, another prominent commander in ZAPU, and a number 
of other cadres also defected to ZANU. A mutiny led by Walter Muthimukulu during 
this period further weakened the party because cadres faithful to Muthimukulu were 
forced to leave the party.266 It has been argued that after Chikerema's split, ZAPU took a 
more tribal identity because he left the party with most of the Shona members in exile 
while other Shona speaking members joined ZANU. Most of the people who remained 
faithful to ZAPU were Ndebele speakers.267 
Are-structured ZAPU in exile emerged after Chikerema's split, with Jason. Z 
Moyo as the prominent leader. A more radical commitment to the armed struggle was 
experienced as the party set up a highly trained fighting wing, the Zimbabwe People's 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). A Revolutionary Council was established to take direct 
charge of the army, as a way of avoiding giving one individual sole responsibility over 
the military wing?68 
This chapter takes a look at the revival ofthe ANC in 1972, but this time called 
the African National Council, since the African National Congress had been banned in 
1959. The reason behind the revival of the ANC lay in the need to mobilize African 
opposition to Anglo-Rhodesian proposals to constitutional changes. The banning of 
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nationalist parties and the arrest of leaders had to a large extent killed political activity 
among Africans within Rhodesia. ZAPU and ZANU had both set up bases in exile for 
the coordination of military activities, while party structures within the country went 
underground. Setting aside allegiance to parties, the ANC brought together Africans in 
Rhodesia to give a resounding 'NO' to the Pearce Commission. Abel Muzorewa was 
appointed to lead the ANC because he was considered as a neutral character that 
commanded a national following because of his role as a religious leader. Muzorewa was 
also considered an ideal candidate to lead the ANC by the nationalists because the 
Rhodesian government did not consider him a threat because of previous participation in 
nationalist politics. The manner in which African nationalists responded to the Pearce 
Commission highlights one way in which African nationalists successfully collaborated 
in forging a united front. With a united voice, they objected to the Anglo-Rhodesian 
proposals. Perhaps equally important is the fact that the revival of the ANC was a 
domestic initiative. Faced with the coming of the Pearce Commission, African 
nationalists had to find a quick way of mobilizing their supporters. Abandonment of 
partisan identities proved to be the right way. 
The Armed Struggle: 
After the Rhodesian government declared Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) in 1965, through which Smith declared Rhodesia independent from the United 
IGngdom,269 ZAPU nationalist leaders believed that the British government would 
intervene with military force to prevent the declaration. Britain had indicated the 
possibility of military intervention should law and order break down. But when the 
Rhodesian government declared independence in 1965, the British government did not 











intervene.27o ZAPU nationalists were left hoping for a breakdown oflaw and order in 
Rhodesia that would provoke the British to intervene. African nationalists believed that 
the British would come to their aid to halt the excesses of the Rhodesian government.271 
The initial idea behind the anned struggle was thus aimed at creating chaos within the 
country through various violent acts of sabotage. This chaos, it was hoped, would create 
sufficient reason for British intervention. The chaos that was created by the series of 
violent acts of sabotage during the beginning of the anned struggle did not achieve the 
intended goal.272 
According to Chikerema, ZAPU initially engaged in the anned struggle as a way 
of bringing Rhodesians to the negotiating table by instilling fear in them through acts of 
sabotage. Dabengwa also acknowledged that the initial military training of ZAPU cadres 
sought to give strength to acts of sabotage.273 The birth of ZANU was a reflection of the 
tensions nationalist leaders were experiencing with respect to strategy. The mass 
politicization of the Africans that Nkomo had sought, learning from the experiences of 
Ghana and Malawi, had failed to achieve anything in Rhodesia. It was thus necessary to 
change the strategy. By 1964, ZAPU had begun training cadres for the anned struggle.274 
Taking up the anned struggle was part of the struggle against white domination. 
It was not acceptable to Africans that in a country of about four million people, only 
eighty to ninety thousand people comprised the electorate. Most of the voters were 
whites, with Africans comprising less than five percent of the electorate, yet they were 
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the majority in the country. Since the white community was determined to safeguard this 
privilege, Africans had to show, in very bold ways, their willingness to challenge this 
form of oppression?75 The armed struggle was part of the radicalization of the African 
political leaders, as they saw that their demands were not being realized. For them to 
remain relevant to the cause for the liberation of Africans, they had to find a more violent 
method to register their demands. However, within ZAPU, the armed struggle was going 
to be used as one of several means to achieve independence. Labour strikes, boycotts and 
talks would still be continued.276 
Nkomo put James Chikerema in touch with various people he had established 
contact with in the Soviet Union, China, Egypt and Cuba. Chikerema's trips to the Soviet 
Union and China helped him make contact with groups that were willing to help people 
in the colonies who were fighting for independence. On the advice ofNkomo, 
Chikerema remained in exile in Dar-es-Salaam while coordinating the training of ZAPU 
cadres.277 When ZAPU started active preparations for the armed struggle by sending 
people out for training, the origins of an external wing of the party began to be 
established. This external wing played a key role in the struggle since the party was 
banned within Rhodesia. Even after the release of the political leaders in 1974, the ban 
on ZAPU remained. There was no way that the armed struggle could be organized within 
Rhodesia. 
Dabengwa was part of the first ZAPU youth group that began sabotaging the 
government in an attempt to destroy it. A Special Affairs Department under the 
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leadership of Chikerema was secretly set up by ZAPU. This Special Affairs became 
ZAPU's first armed wing. Militant cadres were secretly recruited into this group to carry 
out acts of sabotage. It was from this group that cadres were drawn from for military 
training.278 Charles Chikerema led the first group of cadres sent out for training by 
ZAPU in 1962, returning to Southern Rhodesia in 1964. Dabengwajoined the second 
group, which returned from training in 1965. In 1965, the first Command Structure for 
ZAPU's Special Affairs was set up with Akim Ndlovu as Commander, Robson Manyika, 
Deputy Commander, Dabengwa as Chief of Reconnaissance and Intelligence, Albert 
Mutinhiri looking after operations, and Report Mpofu in charge of Logistics. By the time 
the Command Structure was set up, about thirty ZAPU cadres had returned from training 
in various countries.279 China, the 'Soviet Union and Egypt offered the first training 
camps. As the struggle progressed, training camps were also established in Zambia, 
Tanzania, and Angola.28o Cuba and Algeria also offered training facilities for some of the 
cadres sent out by ZAPU. 
ZAPU's early training was comprehensive. Cadres were trained to copy 
documents, open letters without detection and they were also given lectures in political 
science. Basic exposure to the use of guns and explosives was an essential part of the 
training of ZAPU cadres. Russia in particular gave ZAPU cadres intensive training in 
military intelligence.281 As the first recruits began returning from training, there were 
differing opinions on the strategy to be adopted because of different training 
backgrounds. There was a group that was keen to launch immediate operations while 
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another group wanted to infiltrate and begin recruiting cadres. The Command Structure 
of the Special Affairs decided to establish a command system with rear bases and a 
Headquarters in Zambia. The first cadres were thus sent into Rhodesia to recruit and 
undertake limited operations when it was necessary.282 
The first operations took place in 1965. Two units, each consisting of about five 
people, were infiltrated. One unit crossed the Zambezi River at Mana Pools, east of 
Chirundu, and the other unit infiltrated just east of the Victoria Falls. Rhodesian forces 
spotted the unit that crossed at Mana Polls after crossing the Zambezi River. In a surprise 
attack by the Rhodesian forces, two members of the unit were captured while the rest 
were killed. The other unit was betrayed by locals to Rhodesian Security forces once it 
reached populated areas. An attack by the Rhodesia forces resulted in loss of valuable 
manpower for ZAPU. These encounters in 1965 marked the beginning of the armed 
struggle.283 Among the first cadres to be sent into the country was Airman Chikwakwata, 
who was killed in a battle with Rhodesian forces, while John Maduso was captured and 
sentenced to death, charged with treason.284 
The biggest problem the first cadres faced upon returning from training was that 
the police were after them. The Special Branch was aware that these cadres had gone for 
training and so it tracked them down. Small things betrayed the cadres, such as shoes or 
pants that had been bought in Russia. Consequently, most of the initial cadres got 
arrested in the process of infiltrating. Those who survived arrest retuned to Zambia. 
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Early attempts by ZAPU to infiltrate yielded no fruit. Besides failing to achieve anything 
significant, ZAPU lost some of its best-trained cadres through arrests.285 
From 1965 until the middle of 1967, ZAPU military leaders suspended military 
operations while reviewing the strategy they had used. A camp called Nkomo was 
established 25km outside Lusaka, on a farm owned by a ZAPU supporter. The purpose 
of this camp was to bring together ZAPU cadres trained in different places for integration 
into a fighting unit. They were to prepare for battle so as to avoid the mistakes of the first 
units to be infiltrated. The review of strategy resulted in a decision to infiltrate larger 
groups to recruit and train cadres locally. These cadres were to be infiltrated through the 
northwestern part ofRhodesia.286 
The ZAPU-ANC Alliance: 
In February 1964, ZAPU sent Chikerema, Vice President, Nyandoro, National 
. 
Secretary, Moyo, National Treasurer, Silundika, National Secretary for Publicity, and 
Ndlovu, Deputy National Secretary, to Zambia, to coordinate the struggle from there. 
Zambia had just been granted independence and thus was now in a position to support 
African liberation movements. Though Chikerema had initially set up base in Tanzania, 
Zambia's proximity to Rhodesia and the fact that Zambia and Rhodesia shared a common 
border, made it strategic to relocate to Zambia. Up to 1966, ZAPU had no bases to 
launch the armed struggle from. Trained cadres were placed in ordinary homes and on 
farms owned by blacks from Rhodesia who were living in Zambia and were sympathetic 
to the struggle. Until relations between ZAPU cadres and members of the Zambian 
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security forces had been improved, ZAPU found it difficult to bring in arms into Zambia. 
This was partly due to the fact that the Zambian government feared being attacked by the 
Rhodesian government.287 
In 1967, Oliver Tambo, leader of the ANC in exile, and Chikerema, committed 
their respective parties to a joint military collaboration aimed at helping Umkhonto 
weSizwe (MK) cadres establish a route to South Africa while simultaneously helping 
ZAPU cadres gain passage into Rhodesia. This followed a request by Tambo to ZAPU 
for assistance in creating a route for Umkhonto weSizwe cadres. The desire to liberate 
African people in South Africa and Rhodesia created the sense of fighting a common 
enemy, the minority white communities in both countries?88 Infiltration into South 
Africa through Botswana had proved impossible for Umkhonto weSizwe cadres because 
Botswana policemen were arresting them. Infiltration through Rhodesia, in the company 
of ZAPU cadres, would assure cadres from both parties the assistance of the local 
population.289 
The experience from initial attempts by ZAPU to infiltrate cadres had failed 
because as they came in small numbers, Rhodesian security forces had easily nabbed 
them. Collaboration with Umkhonto weSizwe would thus give ZAPU a chance to 
infiltrate in larger groups. 1967 witnessed the first Umkhonto weSizwe-ZAPU operations 
in the Wankie area. About seventy cadres, twenty of who were Umkhonto weSizwe and 
fifty were ZAPU, crossed into Rhodesia, undetected by security forces. ZAPU cadres in 
this group were instructed that one unit should set up base in the Wankie area; another 
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unit would proceed to Tsholotsho, while the third unit was expected to operate south of 
Plumtree and then go with ANC cadres to Tuli River and help them cross into South 
Africa. The ZAPU guerrillas would then remain in the country to receive cadres from 
both parties coming into the Rhodesia.29o The instruction from ZAPU Headquarters was 
that ZAPU cadres would recruit and set up training camps in Rhodesia. Sabotage attacks 
would be launched when possible, but far away from bases. There was no intention to 
engage the enemy head on in conventional battles since the main task of the cadres was to 
recruit. 291 
Unfortunately, lack of discipline cost the lives of many cadres in this group. An 
MK cadre decided not to walk with the others, opting to catch a lift and then stealing a 
motorcycle in Bulawayo. He got arrested and after being interrogated and tortured, 
revealed the movements of the group. Rhodesian forces pounced on the nationalist 
guerrillas, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. ANC and ZAPU cadres who 
managed to escape found their way back to Zambia?92 
Combined operations were also carried out in the Sipolilo area, on the northern 
border district of Rhodesia, close to Zambia. A much bigger group of about one hundred 
cadres, comprising three ZAPU platoons and one ANC platoon, was infiltrated into 
Rhodesia. ZAPU platoons were divided as follows: one unit was based in Sipolilo-
Hurungwe area; another was to go further south to Kadoma. The third unit moved along 
the border with Mozambique. The MK unit was set to cross at Gonarezhou Park into 
Mozambique and then get into Kruger Game Park. While the infiltration was underway, 
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some comrades who went to bath in the Angwa River were reckless. They left behind 
footprints that were discovered by the enemy. The Rhodesian government flew Spotter 
planes into the area to hunt down the guerillas. Fierce battles were fought over several 
weeks. A number of nationalist cadres lost their lives, while others were captured and 
arrested by government security forces. The nationalist guerrillas who survived escaped 
into Botswana and made their way back to Zambia?93 
An analysis of the impact of the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns must 
acknowledge that the infiltration oflarge groups of cadres to fight communicated to the 
white community that oppressed Africans were ready to die for the sake of the demands 
they were putting forward. A willingness to go to war for the sake of achieving these 
goals revealed the seriousness that ZAPU was giving the armed struggle,z94 Violence 
was now going to be used in the struggle for independence. Large groups of guerrillas 
were being infiltrated into the country, showing that ZAPU had trained a number of 
cadres to carry out a military campaign as a way of putting pressure on the Rhodesian 
government. 
The collaboration of ZAPU and the ANC resulted in a more explicit participation' 
of South African police in the armed struggle in Rhodesia. The South African police was 
sent to block the infiltration of Umkhonto weSizwe into South Africa. The Rhodesian 
government was happy to get assistance from the South African regime in patrolling the 
border between Rhodesia and Zambia,z95 The presence of the South African police in 
Rhodesia caused some discontent among African nationalists in Rhodesia and South 
Africa. ZANU and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) from South Africa criticized the 
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ZAPU-ANC alliance. They argued that the coming of South African police only served 
to strengthen the position of the Rhodesian Front. These critics argued that the ANC 
should not be involved in fighting within Rhodesia?96 
While the presence of the South African police indeed strengthened the position 
of the Rhodesian Front, Dabengwa and others in ZAPU deny the accusation that 
Umkhonto weSizwe cadres were helping ZAPU to fight the struggle in Rhodesia. 
Referring to the nature of the agreement between the two parties, Dabengwa pointed out 
that ANC cadres were under strict instruction not to engage in battles within Rhodesia, 
except in self-defense. Consequently, ZAPU gave the impression that ANC cadres were 
just passing through Rhodesia. Dabengwa also raised the point that by the time ANC and 
ZAPU cadres began infiltrating into Rhodesia, ZAPU intelligence reports had already 
picked up the presence of South African police along the border with Zambia. ANC-
ZAPU collaboration should thus not be seen as the only reason behind the presence of the 
South African police in Rhodesia?97 However, there was no way'that ANC cadres would 
simply walk through Rhodesia without ending.up engaging in battles because Rhodesian 
security forces were on high alert to prevent the infiltration of nationalist guerrillas. 
Given the manner in which the Sipolilo and Wankie battles were fought, ZANU 
as well as the PAC also criticized ZAPU and the ANC for trying to take on a huge 
conventional army?98 Nationalist cadres were not yet ready for the level of fighting 
which they were exposed to since they had to fight a conventional army using guerrilla 
tactics. The Rhodesian army had much better military equipment than that of the 
nationalist cadres. However, given the conditions, we must give ZAPU and the ANC the 
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credit they deserve for the courage cadres showed by engaging in the Wankie and 
Sipolilo battles. 
Flower acknowledged the courage and high quality training of ZAPU and ANC 
cadres during the Wankie and Sipolilo battles. At this stage, nationalist guerrillas were 
fighting and infiltrating without much help from civilians. Their defeat was made 
possible only by the involvement of the Rhodesian Air Force?99 The strength of the 
combined ANC-ZAPU cadres was enough for the Rhodesian government to accept 
military assistance from South Africa openly. 
Since the British government had indicated that if there was chaos in Rhodesia, it 
would consider intervening, the presence of the South African police in Rhodesia was 
interpreted by ZAPU as a sign of chaos, enough to justify British intervention.30o The 
British government did not see reason for military intervention since the combined efforts 
of the Rhodesian government and the South African police was managing to deal with the 
threat of the nationalists. 
Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu, ZAPU's Director of Publicity and Information, 
acknowledged that one of ZAPU' s biggest mistakes at the beginning of the armed 
struggle was the large size of the groups infiltrated after the establishment of the ANC-
ZAPU collaboration. They caused a logistical problem that was detrimental to the 
advancement ofthe war. The large groups that ZAPU and the MK infiltrated were highly 
visible and extremely difficult to accommodate and feed. It was also impossible to 
transport such large groups by road within Rhodesia without detection.301 While a 
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significant number of ZAPU cadres made their way into the country during this phase of 
the struggle, they suffered heavy casualties in these early engagements. The Wankie 
battle is reported to have cost the lives of thirty nationalist cadres, while twenty were 
captured. The few who managed to escape made their way back to Lusaka.302 Only a 
few nationalist cadres from the Sipolilo group survived the attack. Some ZAPU officials 
held Chikerema responsible for the loss of many lives, accusing him of having kept the 
Sipolilo group for too long in an area that was constantly under surveillance by the Smith 
regime.303 Cadres that ZAPU had trained lost their lives even before they had made 
significant contributions to the struggle. The cadres who died in the Wankie and Sipolilo 
campaigns had been sent mainly to do reconnaissance work and to prepare the way for 
the infiltration of more cadres. Their deaths thus meant that ZAPU lost people who had 
knowledge about possible internal movements even before that knowledge had been 
used.304 
The loss of lives in the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns testified to the African 
people in Rhodesia that the armed struggle was not going to be an easy task. It was not 
going to be easy for a guerrilla movement to challenge a well-established conventional 
army. The sacrifice that the first cadres made inspired many young people among the 
African population to join the struggle. As Rhodesian forces clashed with ZAPU cadres, 
the differences between the Rhodesian government and the nationalists reached a point 
where simple reconciliation was no longer possible. Both sides had shown their 
determination to fight for their interests.305 
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The problem of discipline amongst ZAPU and ANC cadres was exposed by the 
manner in which the carelessness of some of the cadres compromised their security.306 
The ANC cadre who refused to walk with the others and instead caught a lift and the 
footprints, which were discovered after some cadres had gone to bath in the Angwa 
River, helped the Rhodesian security forces to hunt down the guerrillas.307 It was enough 
for them to catch just one whom they tortured until he revealed the movements of the 
others. The question of discipline among cadres reflects badly on the nature of training 
they were exposed to. One would have expected rigid discipline from cadres who were 
going into a very hostile area. However, that indiscipline can be viewed as a reflection of 
frustration among cadres because of the challenges they were facing by walking long 
distances in the bush and as part of tension caused by putting cadres trained in different 
places together before undertaking a proper integration exercise. 
ZAPU's infiltration in the first stages ofthe armed struggle produced many 
casualties for the party but also hardened the spirits of the cadres who managed to make 
their way back to Zambia. According to Chikerema, this was especially true with the 
cadres who participated in the Wankie battles. They realized that with good training, 
Rhodesian security forces were not to be feared. The main problem though had to do 
with supplies. These first cadres had carried all their supplies; ammunition and food 
were taken to certain fixed points, but as troops moved in battle; storage places became 
too far and sometimes insecure for the cadres to reach. 308 Consequently, cadres ended up 
running short of supplies. 
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Towards the end of 1967, ZAPU and ANC guerrillas introduced a new tactic. A 
supply line with good stocks was established. A reliable supply line for ZAPU guerrillas 
was essential since they had not yet established a strong relationship with civilians for the 
guerrillas to infiltrate while depending on civilians. By then, CIO penetration of ZAPU 
was still minimal, so it was difficult for the Rhodesian forces to monitor the movements 
of the guerrillas. Consequently, nationalist guerrillas had an advantage over government 
security forces. The presence of Rhodesian scouts across the Zambezi and within Zambia 
later changed the situation such that by the end of 1968, government security forces had 
the upper hand. Infiltration and recruitment across the Zambezi gradually became 
difficult.309 
ZAPU sources claim that Rhodesian forces also experienced significant losses 
during the first infiltrations. During the 1967 encounters, four Rhodesian helicopters 
were destroyed and seven Rhodesian soldiers were killed. However, by the end of 1969, 
the ANC-ZAPU alliance had come to an end. Both parties had lost a lot of manpower in 
clashes with the Rhodesians, and a continuation of such encounters would simply deplete 
the number of nationalist guerrillas without achieving anything significant. MK cadres 
had not managed to infiltrate into South Africa by collaborating with ZAPU. A review of 
strategy was inevitable. Collaboration between the ANC and ZAPU came to an end 
because an internal split that resulted from attempts to review the initial encounters of the 
armed struggle haunted ZAPU.31O The manner in which Chikerema was directing 
ZAPU's war was' challenged by other members of the external leadership, resulting in a 
leadership crisis in Lusaka. Up to 1967, ZAPU had used a Maoist strategy that saw its 
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cadres fighting in rural areas and targeting government strongholds. Strategy had to 
change following the decline ofmanpower.311 
Joint Military Command (JMC): 
While the ZAPU-MK alliance was underway, there was an attempt to establish 
military collaboration between ZAPU and ZANU The idea behind the Joint Military 
Command (JMC) was that military leaders from ZAPU and ZANU would work together 
in coordinating the armed struggle by having cadres from the two parties fighting 
together. According to Dabengwa, the idea of setting up a JMC was initially mooted in 
1967 by the OAU. At Mbeya in Tanzania, the countries that were hosting them 
pressurized ZAPU and ZANU and they ended up signing an agreement that they did not . 
really have faith in. The Mbeya agreement set up the JMC, stipulating that cadres from 
the two parties would fight side by side. The leadership of the JMC would be drawn 
from both parties. The JMC remained an agreement on paper only because of the 
unwillingness of the two parties to work with each other. ZAPU sabotaged the 
agreement by sending junior officers to work with top ZANU commanders. 1967 was a 
time when ZANU was still struggling to get established. There was no interest within 
ZAPU to work with a party that was just beginning to recruit and train cadres since 
ZAPU was already engaged in fighting. 312 Even though ZANU was keen to participate in 
the Mbeya agreement, ZAPU was not willing to implement an agreement which would 
see ZAPU 'carry' ZANU on its back. Consequently, the Mbeya agreement collapsed and 
the JMC failed to take off.313 
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ZAPU's Second Internal Crisis: 
Between 1969 and 1970, ZAPU did not fight.314 This was partly due to the fact 
that infiltration across the Zambezi had become increasingly difficult, and also due to an 
internal leadership crisis ZAPU was experiencing. In October 1969, Chikerema took a 
reporter from World in Action and a film unit into a ZAPU guerrilla camp by the banks 
ofthe Zambezi River on the Zambian side. The journalists were allowed to film and 
interview ZAPU cadres who were waiting to infiltrate into Rhodesia. The rest of the 
ZAPU executive in exile in Zambia and the Zambian government were surprised to see 
the images on television since Chikerema had not said anything to them.315 Though the 
Zambian government was offering ZAPU bases, it did not want to admit it openly least 
the Rhodesian government used that as an excuse for attacking Zambia. Allowing a 
television crew to film cadres in their camps compromised their security because the 
enemy could make use of the infonnation gathered from the film to plan attacks.316 
Consequently, the Zambian government and some members of the exiled ZAPU 
executive felt uncomfortable with Chikerema's move. 
It is difficult to understand why Chikerema let ZAPU guerrillas be filmed and 
interviewed by a crew which made use of the film in a way which ZAPU could not 
control. Mabhena suggested that Chikerema's main problem was his desire to show off 
power. According to Mabhena when Chikerema took the journalists to the camps, he did 
not think about matters of security at all. His interest was to reveal to the world the fact 
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that he was in charge of an anny that was ready to launch attacks on the Rhodesian 
government. 317 
Confrontation within the ZAPU exiled executive came out openly after Moyo, the 
National Treasurer, put his reflections on ZAPU's war in writing, putting forward points 
that challenged the manner in which Chikerema was taking charge of the war. In 
'Observations on our Struggle', Moyo pointed out that a War Council with five members 
had been set up to coordinate the anned struggle. This War Council was answerable to 
the National Executive of the party. However, since the middle of 1969 there had been a 
gradual deterioration of military administration within ZAPU as strained relations 
between some members of the War Council and some members of the military 
administration were causing problems. There was also a serious lack of planning of 
strategy and no coordination in the deployment of cadres, according to Moyo.318 
Allegations of poor planning and lack of coordinated deployment of cadres directly 
challenged Chikerema' s responsibility within the party. Since the beginning of ZAPU' s 
war, Chikerema had been directly responsible over the anned guerrillas, but not as a 
private anny. He was supposed to run the anned wing of the party in consultation with 
the War Council and answerable to the National Executive, which gave Moyo the right to 
question Chikerema's strategy. 
Moyo further remarked that discipline was becoming a matter of concern among 
ZAPU cadres as tensions and mistrust were being fuelled by allegations of corruption and 
tribalism within the party. There was a general feeling that Ndebele speaking members 
of the party were being favored by getting opportunities to study which Shona speakers 
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were being denied.319 The fact that guerrillas in Lusaka were choosing where they 
wanted to live, instead of living together in camps, was another manifestation of the 
indiscipline Moyo was referring to. The example of a cadre who refused to be sent by 
Moyo to Manyika, the Chief of Staff, was yet another example of the breakdown of 
discipline among the cadres.32o Ordinarily, guerrillas were expected to take orders from 
members of the National Executive without any problems. The fact that there was a 
cadre who would not take orders from the National Treasurer was a sign that there was a 
serious breakdown of discipline in the party. In any military setting, discipline is an 
important thing. One must call to mind the fact that the lives of some of the first 
nationalist cadres to infiltrate into Rhodesia were lost because ofthe lack of discipline by 
some cadres. 
The question of tribalism is rejected by some people when discussing ZAPU's 
second internal crisis. Jane Ngwenya, a founding member of the ZAPU Executive, 
denies overtones of tribal sentiments in the tensions surrounding the second internal 
crisis. According to her, there was competition for power among members of the party's 
Executive in Zambia and this resulted in a split.321 ZANU sources suggested that the split 
experienced by ZAPU in 1972 was not caused by tribal clashes. Instead, ZANU presents 
the crisis as having originated from clashes within ZAPU's War Council. Moyo and 
Chikerema clashed because ZAPU's strategy in the 1960s had led to the deaths of many 
soldiers, with no significant gains for the party. Disagreement on the way forward led to 
irreconcilable differences between the two leaders. 322 There is no doubt that the results 
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of the first incursions caused disappointment within ZAPU. However, the impact of the 
role played by tribal sentiments can only be fully grasped when one takes a look at the 
effects ofthe Chikerema split on ZAPU. This point will be discussed in more detail 
when analyzing the impact ofChikerema's split. 
The problem within the party was also being reflected through the manner in 
which members of the National Executive carried out their responsibilities. Moyo raised 
the point that lack of specification of duties for members of the Executive left him not 
knowing the scope of his duties as a member of the War CounciL Moyo felt left out in 
some of the decisions that had a direct bearing on the manner in which ZAPU executed 
its war. The filming of ZAPU cadres was of major concern to him. As a member of the 
War Council, Moyo was not consulted before the filming was done and the film was 
hidden from him, an expression of no confidence in him.323 Moyo's observations 
concluded with suggestions on the way forward. Military rules had to be implemented 
immediately and the rights of all members of the Executive were to be respected. The 
unity of those involved in military administration was to be addressed as a matter of 
urgency and it was proposed that regular meetings between members of the War Council 
and members of the High Command were essential so that the planning of strategy would 
be a te~m effort.324 
Moyo's observations created the impression that there was an individual, or a 
small group of people running the administration of ZAPU affairs in exile, while 
unjustifiably sidelining other members of the National Executive. In his capacity as 
Acting President of the party, Chikerema responded to Moyo by stating that there were a 












number of misrepresentations in the 'Observations.' Going back to 1963, the time of the 
Cold Comfort People's Conference, Chikerema remarked that only one person had been 
elected to lead the party as a way of avoiding the problem of power hungry individuals. 
Nkomo had been appointed the leader of the party, and in his absence, his deputy would 
take charge. Chikerema argued that Nkomo had asked him to lead the party in exile, and 
since ZAPU had moved away from the concept of collective responsibility, all party 
structures in exile were answerable to him?25 The notion of collective planning of 
strategy, which Moyo was suggesting, was not acceptable to Chikerema who was 
regarding himself as the sole leader of the party. 
Denying allegations that ZAPU was not actively engaging in the armed struggle, 
Chikerema pointed out that the aim of the armed struggle for ZAPU was to instill fear 
within the white settler community through acts of sabotage and so provide sufficient 
reason for British military intervention through which blacks would be granted majority 
rule. Given the goal ofZAPU's war, the fighting cadres were investing sufficient effort to 
meet ZAPU's requirements.326 According to Chikerema, his apology to the Zambian 
government over the filming of ZAPU cadres was sufficient to close the case. There was 
no need for further discussion ofthe issue within ZAPU. Appealing to the authority 
given to him by Nkomo, Chikerema dissolved the military command, replacing it with 
another group and a command structure that gave him direct power over the party. 
325 ZAPU: Reply to 'Observations on Our Struggle' by James Chikerema, Acting President, Lusaka, 17 
March 1970, in C. Nyangoni & G. Nyandoro (eds.) Zimbabwe Independence Movements Select 
Documents, pp. 147-149. 











Silundika, Ndlovu, and Moyo, among others, lost their jobs, which were taken over by 
Chikerema.327 
Chikerema's move to suspend members of the Executive who were asking for 
proper leadership of the party was interpreted as a coup by the suspended members. A 
statement issued by Moyo, Ndlovu and Silundika argued that Chikerema's claim that the 
Cold Comfort Conference had given all power to the President of the party was not true 
because the People's Congress and the People's Council had remained as powerful 
bodies within the structures of the party. They also reminded Chikerema that he had not 
been sent out alone. The fact that they were all members of the National Executive, 
commissioned by the President of the party to deal with party affairs in exile meant that 
they were equally responsible for the manner in which the party was being 
administered.328 Fellow members of the Executive thus rejected Chikerema's assumption 
of power. His actions gave the impression that it was not proper for him, as leader of the 
party in exile, to be challenged, just as it was not right for the life President of the party to 
be challenged. Bearing in mind that the idea of a life President for the party was 
suggested by Chikerema at the Cold Comfort Conference, there is reason to conclude that 
Chikerema probably regarded himself as Vice President for life, and thus equally immune 
to challenge. Chikerema was of the opinion that people like Moyo, political leaders 
within the party, should have nothing to do with military matters. As such, Chikerema 
did not accept criticisms from Moyo over military matters.329 
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Fighting erupted between members of the two groups in Lusaka, and these were 
often very bloody.33o The tension between Chikerema and Moyo degenerated into a 
tribal clash, with Shona speakers rallying behind Chikerema, while Ndebele speakers and 
Kalanga speakers teamed up behind Moyo. The inevitable split within the party was 
based on these tribal lines, further weakening ZAPU. 331 
Chikerema brought another perspective to the crisis by arguing that the leaders of 
Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana caused the crisis, as they tried to create unity between 
ZANU and ZAPU. According to him, the Frontline States had proposed that ZAPU and 
ZANU should cease to exist and form a front uniting all African nationalists. Only this 
front would get funding from the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Liberation 
Committee. Chikerema claims that when the idea was mooted, he sent a memorandum to 
Nkomo but Nkomo's reply did not reach him because the Moyo faction intercepted it. 
Nkomo had apparently given Chikerema the green light to set up of the front. 
Meanwhile, Chikerema had already begun negotiations with Chitepo and Shamuyarira, 
from ZANU. Objections to the formation ofthe front from Moyo saw the ZANU 
delegation withdrawing from the talks.332 Shamuyarira compliments Chikerema's point 
on the attempt by the OAU to unite ZANU and ZAPU. He argues that issues of internal 
democracy split ZAPU's external leadership. While Moyo, Silundika, and Ndlovu 
opposed unity with ZANU, Chikerema and Nyandoro were in favor of it. The split 
became inevitable as direct confrontation between the two factions caused a stalemate in 
the party and as the Moyo faction rejected the proposed unity with ZANU while a faction 
330 Masipula Sithole Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle, p. 49. 
331 Ngwabi Bhebe The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
~llli!!;~, p. 25. 











in ZANU also rej ected the proposal. 333 Moyo regarded unity with ZANU as useless since 
ZANU did not have a well-established military wing as yet. ZANU had not yet reached 
the levels of training cadres, which ZAPU was now capable of.334 
Adding to the chaos within ZAPU at this time was the mutiny of some cadres led 
by Walter Muthimukulu in 1971. Professor Makurane gave an eyewitness account of 
how some ZAPU cadres encouraged ZAPU members to retire to Zimbabwe House, the 
party's headquarters, in Lusaka, on one particular evening, from a pub in Lusaka where 
they were gathered for drinks. Meanwhile, the Muthimukulu group laid ambush and 
arrested everyone who came into Zimbabwe House. Dabengwa was one of the people 
arrested. Thomas Ngwenya, ZAPU's driver, managed to escape from Zimbabwe House 
and went to Makurane's house where Ndlovu and another ZAPU leader, Sibanda, had 
slept and he reported the arrests. Muthimukulu's group claimed to have come from the 
war front and wanted to kill all party administrators and take over the leadership of the 
party because leaders in Lusaka were not taking care of cadres on the battlefront. 
However, since it was clear that Muthimukulu was not interested in arresting Chikerema 
and Nyandoro, there was speculation in ZAPU that Muthimukulu was working with 
Chikerema. Once alerted of the problem, Ndlovu reported the matter to the Zambian 
Home Affairs Minister. The Zambian government negotiated the release of the people 
taken prisoners by Muthimukulu's group. The British High Commissioner then took 
members of the Muthimukulu group into exile in Britain to Zambia as a result of a deal 
made by the Zambian government. 335 
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Dabengwa suggested that at the time of the Chikerema crisis, there was 
speculation within ZAPU that Chikerema was collaborating with the enemy. 
Chikerema's unwillingness to commit cadres to fighting from 1969 seemed to have been 
prompted by a beliefhe had that there was going to be an internal settlement soon. Such 
a belief could only come if one was having direct contacts with the government.336 The 
suspicion of collaborating with the government was also strengthened by the fact that 
while Muthimukulu's group did not want to arrest Chikerema and Nyandoro; it wanted to 
kill all key leaders of the Moyo faction. The manner in which members of 
Muthimukulu's group were taken to Britain after the mutiny created the impression 
among faithful ZAPU cadres that Muthimukulu and Chikerema were probably 
collaborating with Britain and the Rhodesian government. Some members of the 
Muthimukulu group came back to Zimbabwe after ZANU had won the 1980 elections 
and they were given government posts. According to Pathisa Nyathi, had ZAPU won, 
none of these people would have set foot in Zimbabwe.337 
Frustration among ZAPU cadres had crept in. While they had trained to fight, 
they were finding themselves being restricted to camps, with no chance of engaging in 
battle as they had expected. Those who were on the battlefront accused members of the 
Executive of living in comfort in Lusaka while they were suffering from lack of supplies 
in the bush. The leadership was accused of enjoying 'chicken in the basket,' a Lusaka 
Hotel delicacy popular with African nationalists from Rhodesia, while guerrillas were 
starving in the bush.338 ZAPU cadres also complained that they were being forced to 
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build houses for some of their commanders instead of fighting. This added to the 
disgruntlement among cadres who believed that their task was to fight a liberation war 
not to make sure that their commanders lived in comfortable houses. Respect ofthe 
military code of conduct was compromised as cadres found themselves living non-
military lives.339 
As attempts to unite ZAPU and ZANU failed, Shamuyarira was forced to leave 
ZANU by a faction in ZANU that was against the idea of unity with ZAPU. Shamuyarira 
teamed up with Chikerema in announcing the launching of the Front For The Liberation 
of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) in October 1971. The founding members of FRO LIZ I claimed 
that they were uniting ZAPU and ZANU, a point that was rejected by mainstream ZAPU 
and ZANU members.34o The formation of FROLIZI effectively meant that ZAPU lost 
some members who followed Chikerema and Nyandoro into the new party. The next 
section looks at some of the effects of this split on ZAPU's war effort. 
Effects of the Second Internal Crisis: 
Just as there were positive and negative results from the 1963 split, the effects of 
the second internal crisis should be seen in a similar light. Some of the effects were 
devastating to ZAPU's war effort, in fact, marking a turning point in ZAPU's 
engagement in the armed struggle. ZAPU came out of the second internal crisis with a 
more professionally organized and disciplined military structure. 
While the party's leadership in exile was caught up in arguments, active 
involvement in the struggle suffered neglect. The stalemate between the Chikerema 
faction and the Moyo faction resulted in intra-party clashes. Focus was inevitably shifted 
339 ibid. 











from the war that ZAPU guerrillas had been engaged in to bloody clashes among 
members of the opposing factions in Lusaka. The emergence of the Muthimukulu group 
did not make things better. The mutiny by the Muthimukulu group brought in cadres 
from the frontline into the squabbles within the party's leadership. Instead of fighting the 
enemy, the focus became Lusaka where there was a power struggle for the way forward 
for ZAPu.341 The tension between the two camps resulted in a stoppage of all ZAPU 
military operations, which only revived effectively seven years later. 342 
For cadres who had been keen to fight and thus were finding themselves caught in 
between the two factions, there was no reason to remain within ZAPU. They defected to 
join ZANU, which was beginning to have well-organized military structures, even though 
it was still struggling for recognition. Manyika, as ZAPU's Chief of Staff, had been 
involved in talks with FRELIMO over collaboration in the opening up of the Tete Front 
when the internal crisis erupted. As the stalemate among the ZAPU leadership 
continued, Manyika went over to ZANU, and with him went the contacts that ZAPU had 
established with FRELIMO for military collaboration in the opening of the Tete Front. 
ZANU benefited from the strategy for infiltration and military engagement that Manyika 
took away from ZAPU. As Chief of Staff, Manyika had inside knowledge of ZAPU's 
military plans. Rex Nhongo, who eventually became one of ZANU' s leading 
commanders, also broke away from ZAPU during this time of the internal crisis.343 
Manyika, Nhongo and many other soldiers regarded the stoppage of the war because of 
the disagreement among their political leaders as detrimental to the cause for the struggle 
for the liberation of African people. ZAPU thus lost essential links with FRELIMO, 
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which were embraced by ZANU. Some scholars have pointed out that ZAPU's failure to 
respond to the invitation by FRELIMO was a sign of ZAPU's unwillingness to commit 
itself to the armed struggle.344 One must acknowledge that given what was happening 
within ZAPU at that time, there was no way that negotiations with FRELIMO could 
continue. ZAPU had become paralyzed because of tension among the external leaders. 
The internal crisis cost ZAPU the possibility of infiltrating from Mozambique.345 
The second internal crisis 'saw the exiled members of ZAPU splitting into four 
groups. There was the Chikerema and Nyandoro faction that established FROLIZI, the 
Muthimukulu group, which ended up being forced into exile, the Moyo group, which 
remained faithful to ZAPU, and the group of cadres led by Manyika and Nhongo, which 
defected to ZANU. ZAPU cadres had to choose from these four groups in deciding their 
future in the armed struggle. Bhebe states that about eighty fighters only remained 
faithful to ZAPu. As such, ZAPU had to start from scratch in re-establishing its military 
campaign.346 Instead of active engagement ZAPU cadres changed their tactics and 
started focusing on planting landmines along the banks of the Zambezi.347 About one 
hundred ZAPU cadres were deported from Zambia after the crisis, accused of being 
Rhodesian spies. The deportation of these cadres further weakened ZAPU's participation 
in the war.348 
Contrary to the opinions of those who dismiss the role played by tribal sentiments 
in the second internal crisis, Mary Ndlovu, the wife of Edward Ndlovu, ZAPU's National 
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Treasurer, argued that as ZAPU re-organized in the aftermath of the crisis, it took up a 
more Ndebele identity. As Chikerema left ZAPU, he was followed by the bulk of Shona 
speakers who were members of the party. Ndlovu pointed out however that the bulk of 
ZAPU supporters had been Ndebele speakers anyway.349 From the time of the second 
internal crisis, ZAPU became associated more and more with the Ndebele speaking 
communities of the southern-western and Midlands regions of Rhodesia. The 
regionalism that had shown face at the time of the 1963 split became more defined after 
the second internal crisis. This regionalism was strengthened by the manner in which 
ZAPU recruited cadres from the 1970s, focusing mainly on Matebeleland and Midlands. 
Revival of the JMC: 
When Chikerema broke away from ZAPU, setting up FROLIZI with Shamuyarira 
and claiming that the said new party was a union of ZAPU and ZANU, the mainstream 
ZAPU and ZANU leaders attempted to pre-empty Chikerema and Shamuyarira's efforts 
by reviving the Joint Military Command (JMC) in Tanzania, in 1972. IfChikerema's 
claim had been recognized by the OAU and Frontline States, then, the original ZAPU and 
ZANU would have lost the funding they were getting, besides loosing the audience they 
had been previously granted by the organizations.35o The motivation behind the revival 
of the JMC was thus directed at weakening FROLIZI, not the settler government. 
At the time of the Chikerema crisis, the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA) 
had promised ZAPU financial and material assistance valued at 85000 Sw Crs. This 
assistance was not handed over because of the internal crisis. The revival of the JMC 
was aimed at securing this grant. In August 1972, ZAPU blew up a goods train on the 
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Victoria Falls railway line and also blew up a Rhodesian army truck, killing seven 
Rhodesian soldiers. SIDA responded to these sabotage attacks and attempts by ZAPU to 
collaborate with ZANU by reinstating annual grants. 50 000 Sw Crs was paid to ZAPU's 
Welfare Trust Account in Zambia. From 1972 to 1974, ZAPU's sabotage acts were 
aimed at claiming stability within the party.351 
Self-preservation was a strong aspect in all the attempts at collaboration in the 
struggle. Each party sought agreements that would ensure its continual existence. 
Political union was never attained between ZAPU and ZANU during the struggle because 
either party wanted to be assured of the opportunity of setting up the first independent 
government in Zimbabwe. If Chikerema had snatched the funding that ZAPU and ZANU 
were getting, it would have become increasingly difficult for the two parties to continue 
with the armed struggle, since they did not have sufficient sources of income within 
Rhodesia. In reviving the JMC, the two were not destroying their political identities. 
Instead, they were preserving themselves, yet setting up collaboration in military 
activities. Power was at stake and the two nationalist parties were competing for it as 
well. One could argue that the existence of ZAPU and ZANU was indeed a blessing in 
disguise to the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. Despite the desire of the 
Frontline States to ensure that African nationalists were united, the manner in which 
ZAPU and ZANU sought to outdo each other in the struggle at times contributed 
positively to the struggle. Unintentionally, the efforts ofthe nationalists would 
compliment and provide checks and balances on what the other party was doing. 
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In reviving the JMC, ZAPU's interest lay in wanting to prove stability so as to 
impress donors, and also lay a foundation for unity with ZANU in the future by fighting 
together. Again, the JMC was stillbom.352 Political leaders from ZAPU and ZANU were 
trying to forge the coordinated military effort, which should perhaps have best been left 
to military cadres who understood the dynamics of trying to bring fighters from different 
parties together. 
The JMC was the beginning of many attempts to unite ZAPU and ZANU. The 
idea was to set up military collaboration with the belief that political union would follow 
naturally. This was a serious miscalculation. There was no way that one could expect 
any sort of unity to flow naturally between ZAPU and ZANU because of the hostilities 
which had been experienced since the time of the split in 1963. These two parties were 
competing for many things such that expecting unity naturally was being too optimistic. 
Perhaps ZAPU was hoping that by accepting military collaboration, ZANU cadres would 
encourage their political leaders to go back to ZAPU. The attempt to revive the JMC was 
very short lived.353 
According to ZANU sources, the formation of the JMC was not to be perceived as 
a means to an automatic victory in the struggle. The importance of thinking about a 
united front before partisan politics was highlighted but talk about the logistics of the 
JMC was not accompanied by joint action on the battlefield. ZANU's advanced 
infiltration through the northeast would have to be pulled back in order to accommodate 
ZAPU. This would have slowed down ZANU's infiltration into Rhodesia, an 
unacceptable option for a party that wanted to distinguish itself as having a radical 
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military wing. By March 1973, it was clear that there was not going to be a united 
military front. 354 Just as ZAPU had found the question of setting up military 
collaboration with ZANU in 1967 detrimental to the war ZAPU was already prepared to 
launch, in 1972, ZANU came to the conclusion that military collaboration with a party 
that had just experienced an internal crisis, and had lost a number of cadres in the 
process, was not a viable idea. ZANU's war was on such a good footing that the party 
had no need for ZAPU's collaboration and saw no reason for dividing the fame it was 
gaining within Rhodesia because of its massive infiltration and recruitment.355 
While the involvement of outsiders was always welcome in bringing ZANU and 
ZAPU together, the involvement ofNyerere in the setting up of the JMC saw ZAPU 
going into the agreement with misgivings. According to Mary Ndlovu, a member of 
ZAPU, from the time Nyerere embarrassed Nkomo following Nkomo's attempt to set up 
a government in exile in 1963, ZAPU had not trusted Nyerere again. ZAPU thus never 
gave itselfwhole-heartedly to an alliance that was being drawn up in Tanzania. Given 
ZANU's reluctance to collaborate with ZAPU and ZAPU's lack of confidence in 
Nyerere, there was no way that an agreement between ZAPU and ZANU, mediated by 
Nyerere, would take off. Nyerere never trusted or liked Nkomo, while Nkomo saw no 
reason for trusting Nyerere since he was aware that he did not like him. 356 
Since the JMC was the first serious attempt to unite ZAPU and ZANU, its failure 
was not surprising. Both parties were not yet ready to accommodate each other.357 
However, even though it was a complete failure, the JMC set the ground for the 
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establishment of the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), another attempt at establishing 
military collaboration between ZAPU and ZANU. 358 
Reviving and re-structuring ZAPU: 
Highlighting the manner in which ZAPU's war effort was weakened by the 
second internal crisis should not overshadow some of the positive developments that rose 
from the crisis. As ZAPU reviewed the impact of the first incursions and as ZAPU went 
through a process of self-evaluation, lessons from mistakes of the past were taken note of 
and plans for the future were set up in a manner that sought to avoid past mistakes. A 
revived ZAPU in exile emerged, now under the leadership of MoYO.359 
In a letter to SIDA in 1972, Moyo pointed out that ZAPU was undergoing a 
process of restructuring in order to launch the armed struggle on an improved leve1.36o 
This restructuring saw the drawing up of a new strategy for the armed struggle. A 
Revolutionary Council was created and in turn, it set up the Zimbabwe People's 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) in 1972. The Revolutionary Council was responsible for 
the liberation campaign in and outside the country, including the gathering of the required 
resources. It was also expected to engage in constant review of the party's strategy, 
dealing with aspects of strategy that required improvement or change.361 The 
Revolutionary Council consisted of four National Executive members, six external party 
representatives, two representatives from the trade union, and twenty-six ZIPRA officers. 
Alfred Nikita Mangena was appointed Commander of the army, with Lookout Masuku as 
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his Deputy.362 Dabengwa became Secretary of the Revolutionary Council, while Moyo 
was overall in charge. As ZIPRA was being set up, cadres took an oath of loyalty to the 
party, vowing never to abandon ZAPU again. This oath was motivated by the experience 
of witnessing two splits out of which cadres trained and raised by ZAPU had joined rival 
groups. Through the oath, the cadres bound themselves in unity and loyal service under 
ZAPU. According to Nyathi, it was partly because of this oath of loyalty that some 
ZIPRA cadres refused to join ZANU PF at the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987. 
They respected their promise to be loyal to ZAPU. To them, joining ZANU PF was a 
betrayal to ZAPU. 363 
The restructuring process, which ZAPU went through, resulted in one very 
distinct development. Having experienced the dangers of putting too much power in the 
hands of one person, the new structure ZAPU came up with sought to avoid the 
possibility of dictatorship by encouraging broad participation in the administration of 
military and political affairs. While the Revolutionary Council decided on party policy, 
the implementation lay in the hands of the War Council. The party's Central Committee 
appointed this War Council. 364 All party administrators were sent for military training as 
ZAPU was restructuring. This was to expose them to some of the experiences guerrillas 
went through, an experience that would help party administrators understand guerrillas.365 
ZAPU undertook a heavy recruitment exercise to make up for the depleted 
numbers of cadres after the second internal crisis. Recruitment was on the whole 
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countrywide, but tended to focus on the Matebeleland and Midlands areas and parts of 
Mashonaland West, areas in which ZAPU cadres had operated during the first incursions. 
Recruits were taken to Botswana first and then flown to training camps in Zambia, 
Tanzania, and Angola, with others being sent out for specialized training in Cuba, and 
Russia.366 
ZAPU established a number of camps in Zambia. Nampundwe camp was the first 
holding camp to be established in Lusaka as the number of recruits began rising. At 
Nampundwe, recruits were sorted according to age, sex and physical fitness. Those 
below the age of sixteen were put into a school in the camp. Six military training camps 
were set up in Zambia where cadres underwent an eight month long basic military 
training programme after which those selected for specialization were sent to other 
African countries or overseas.367 . Training camps marked a transition from civilian life to 
life as a soldier. Recruits were exposed to physical exercises, lessons on guerrilla skills, 
learning how to handle and use weapons, and basic survival tactics in the bush. Political 
education was an essential component of the training. Recruits were introduced to the 
concepts of socialism and they were taught that they were fighting against an oppressive 
system rather than against white people. They were reminded of the various reasons for 
taking up the armed struggle. Life in the camps was harsh because of food shortages, 
strict discipline, and the constant threat of being bombed by Rhodesian forces, especially 
in the last years of the war. 368 
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Isabel Ncube was at Victory Camp, a holding camp west of Lusaka, with about 
four thousand other young women. She gave the following account of her experiences.369 
The camp served as a holding camp and a refugee camp as welL Before female cadres 
went to Mkushi for military training and before those going overseas for studies were 
sent out, they had to pass through Victory Camp where they were vetted. The heavy 
network of spies, which the Rhodesian government had established, made it necessary for 
the party to seek thorough knowledge of people who were accepted for training. Those 
with professional qualifications, teachers, medical personnel, tailors, builders, and 
carpenters, were given jobs within the camp. A makeshift school was set up in the camp 
to offer basic primary education. 
Life in the camp was tough. Every day at 4:00 am, the young ladies got up for 
vigorous physical exercises. Later in the day, they would receive political education. 
Victory Camp had no buildings. Everyone lived in tents. At times food was in short 
supply but morale was always kept high through singing revolutionary songs and by the 
propaganda cadres were subjected to. They remained hopeful that they would soon 
return to a liberated Zimbabwe.37o 
Nigel Johnson was a social worker at J. Z Moyo Camp II (1.Z) in Solwezi, 
northwestern Zambia, close to the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. He 
gave the following account of his experiences at the camp.371 There were about four 
thousand young men at the camp. Close to the 1.Z camp, there was a military training 
camp for ZIPRA cadres. Most of the young men at J.Z came from Matebeleland, having 
fled the war by walking into Botswana and were then transported to Zambia by ZAPU. 
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Everyone in the camp lived in tents. The United Nations Human Rights 
Commission through the World Lutheran Federation supplied tents, food, and clothing. 
Rice and beans were the staple diet in the camp. At times food was in short supply for 
the young men because instead of feeding them, supplies were taken to the military camp 
nearby. The camp was run like a school, offering primary and secondary education. 
Singing revolutionary songs was the main source of entertainment in the camp since there 
were about forty choirs in the camp. 
According to Johnson, most of the senior cadres in the camp had been to the 
Soviet Union and they showed clear signs of Marxist-Leninist influence. A society very 
close to a socialist community was established at the camp. No one had personal money 
and no one owned anything valuable. Senior cadres in the camp believed that when the 
refugees returned home, they would form the vanguard of socialist principles.372 
Paulos Matjaka Nare, the man who was put in charge of education in ZAPU 
holding camps, pointed out that the main focus of education in the camps was poly-
technical. Education with production was encouraged as a way of establishing the basis 
of a self-reliant post-independence society. Technical subjects such as agriculture, 
integrated science, metal work, building and leatherwork, were central to the curriculum 
in holding camps. The systematic conscientization of students against oppressive 
political systems was also part of the political education taught in the schools. Students 
were kept occupied to avoid tensions and boredom.3?3 
The large number of Zimbabweans living in Zambia also provided ground for 
recruitment. There have been allegations that as ZAPU was restructuring, the recruitment 
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exercise included forced abductions. While party officials deny these allegations, the 
experiences of a young lady who was abducted by ZAPU guerrillas while she was a 
temporary teacher in rural Matebeleland is evidence of forced recruitment by ZAPU.374 
Training in ZIPRA took two forms. Some cadres were trained for guerrilla 
warfare while others, perhaps a larger number, were trained as conventional soldiers. 
The guerrillas, in their small groups, had bases along the Botswana border while the 
conventional soldiers were based in Zambia.375 For Moyo, it was important to train 
highly competent soldiers since ZAPU's war from the 1970s would concentrate on 
launching 'quality' engagements rather than 'quantity'. It was not the number of cadres 
on the ground that mattered but the significance of their targets.376 ZIPRA was going to 
target strategic points in attacking the government. Seeking to produce quality and 
highly trained cadres meant that ZAPU could not train cadres in huge numbers. Unlike 
ZANLA, which concentrated on massive infiltration of guerrillas, most of whom had 
been given very basic training, ZIPRA's better-trained cadres were produced in smaller 
numbers at a given time. It must be remembered that Botswana was not as 
accommodating to nationalist forces as Mozambique. Consequently, while ZANU could 
recruit large numbers and send them to Mozambique, the Botswana government was 
willing to accommodate a few ZAPU recruits at a time. This meant that though ZAPU 
was recruiting and training on a large scale after the second internal crisis, the number of 
trained cadres would always be limited by external factors. 377 
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Moyo was keen to launch a full-scale armed struggle, and that was what the 
Revolutionary Council was planning. The Soviet Union's revolutionary theories formed 
the basis of ZIPRA' s ideology and training. For ZIPRA, the decisive factor in the armed 
struggle was going to be a military victory. Consequently, the acquisition of powerful 
military equipment became important for ZIPRA. The Soviet Union supplied most of the 
equipment. 378 
Unlike the first incursions during which ZAPU had maintained its cadres self 
reliant, from 1972, there were efforts to politicize civilians in the Wankie area and on the 
shores of Lake Kariba. ZIPRA had realized the importance of an assurance of support 
from civilians in fighting a government that had established a wide network of spies and 
informers. 379 
The African National Council, 1972: 
The banning of African nationalist parties and the arrests of most of the leaders 
and a number of supporters paralyzed internal African political activity. While ZAPU 
had already established a number of branches by the time it was banned, ZANU was just 
beginning to lay structures, in fact, was still unknown in many areas, when the party was 
banned in 1964.380 ZAPU underground structures did not playa significant role before 
1972 other than keeping supporters aware of their leaders and loyal to the party, because 
of the heavy network of spies and informers the Rhodesian government had set up. The 
main political activity for ZAPU and ZANU at this time was the war, which, for both 
parties, was being coordinated by external wings. While armed guerrillas were making 
37& Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin Chimurenga The War in Rhodesia 1965-1980, p. 76. 
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an impact in the country, extemalleaders remained outside, aware that a presence in 
Rhodesia meant going to prison. Consequently, their influence on African political 
activity within Rhodesia was not very significant. Internal branches of both parties 
suffered from an absence ofleadership and political activity. 
An Anglo-Rhodesian proposed settlementto the Rhodesian crisis in November 
1971 resulted in an attempt at reaching a constitutional agreement that would be put to 
the Africans in a referendum to test their opinion.381 The Anglo-Rhodesian settlement 
acknowledged that a solution had to be found to end the racial segregation that was 
prevalent in the country and the hardening of white opinion. Consequently, it was 
proposed, inter alia that a 'responsible government' had to be established in Rhodesia. 
This 'responsible government' would not be exclusively white but would certainly not 
amount to granting Africans majority rule. Employment and educational opportunities 
for Africans were to be improved as part of the new regime.382 While Africans were 
going to be given a chance to participate in government and while their educational and 
employment opportunities were going to be improved, the proposed constitutional 
changes fell short of what African nationalists were asking for by 1971. Majority rule 
and independence were now being demanded and there was no way that an attempt to 
appease them by offering a fraction of their demands would be accepted by Africans. 
The need to organize African resistance to these Anglo-Rhodesian Constitutional 
proposals emerged. The absence of viable African political activity within Rhodesia was 
likely going to result in the Africans failing to present a unified and informed opinion. 
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Consequently, the African National Council (ANC) was quickly fOlmed in December 
1971, drawing non-partisan allegiance from ZAPU and ZANU supporters.383 Addressing 
the 28th session of the OAU Liberation Committee, Nkomo pointed out that the ANC had 
been formed as a way of rejecting Anglo-Rhodesian Constitutional proposals. A non-
partisan leader, Abel Muzorewa, was chosen to lead the unified campaign that became 
the ANC. Given the extent of the underground structures ZAPUIPCC had already 
established, the ANC inevitably made use of these contacts to enable total 
mobilization. 384 
The outstanding feature of the ANC was its non-partisan character. Even though 
it profited from making use of ZAPU structures, the other members of the ANC 
executive were representatives of the broad perspective of African politIcal 
consciousness. Canaan Banana, Edison Sithole, Eddison Zvobgo, Michael Mawema, 
Josiah Chinamano, and C.C Ngacebetsha were part of the Executive.385 Mawema, 
Sithole, and Zvobgo represented ZANU interests within the ANC, while Chinamano, 
Msipa, and Chadzingwa represented ZAPU. ZANU and ZAPU were thus represented on 
the ANC Executive even though the overall leadership lay in non-partisan men, 
Muzorewa and Banana, religious leaders. These were not elected leaders since the ANC 
Executive was made up of people appointed by their own parties.386 
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The name ANC was chosen deliberately as a way of reviving ancient loyalties to 
the struggle. In the formative phases of organized African nationalism in Rhodesia, the 
ANC had been a popular party that commanded support in the whole country. A 
technicality which many Africans were not likely going to pick out, but which the 
Rhodesian government would certainly pick out, was the fact that the group formed in 
1971 was called African National Council, not the African National Congress which had 
been banned in 1959. The choice of the name and the nature of the leadership thus 
helped in rallying Africans behind the ANC. The mobilization of Africans by the ANC 
to respond to the Pearce Commission offered an opportunity for the revival of African 
nationalism within Rhodesia.387 
The essence of the ANC's objection to the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement lay in 
rejecting a settlement that had been draw up without the participation of authentic 
African nationalist leaders. African nationalists regarded the Anglo-Rhodesian 
settlement as an attempt to legalize Smith's UDI since the notion of responsible 
government presented in the settlement did not grant Africans majority rule.388 In 1972, 
the Pearce Commission set up by the British government to sound out African opinion to 
the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals heard loud and clear that Africans were not 
happy with Smith's regime and were thus not going to accept the proposals.389 The 
unarmed African population managed to defeat the government in rejecting proposals 
that were aimed at promoting the government's interests. 
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In successfully campaigning for a 'NO' vote to the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement, 
the ANC achieved its purpose. It was the first instance of successful collaboration by 
African nationalists from different parties in the struggle. A common enemy, the Anglo-
Rhodesian constitutional proposals, had been identified, and political ambitions by the 
leaders of the various parties had been set aside. As ZAPU and ZANU were banned, 
there was no way that they could mobilize support under the banners of their respective 
parties. Given the situation, a non-partisan collaboration was the only way forward in 
promoting the interests of African nationalism. 
Having achieved its mandate in 1972, the ANC should have disbanded or 
transfonned itself into something else if it was to remain relevant and useful in the 
struggle. Nkomo claimed to have encouraged Muzorewa to continue spearheading the 
cause of African nationalism since ZAPU and ZANU were still banned and their top 
leadership was in prison.390 A revival of African political activity within Rhodesia was 
necessary to compliment the pressure coming from the war front. A politically active 
civilian population would support guerrillas, understanding that they were sacrificing 
their lives for the liberation of the African people in Rhodesia. The revival of African 
political activity within Rhodesia would also help in countering the network of infonners 
that the Rhodesian government had set up among the civilian popUlation. The ANC 
filled the gap that had been left by the banning of ZAPU and ZAND. The release of 
political leaders from detention in 1974 changed the nature of the ANC. The following 
chapter will discuss, among other things, the manner in which the collaboration 
established by the ANC disintegrated as political leaders began competing for power. 
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The Decisive Phase, 1974-1980: 
Introduction: 
The return of political leaders from prison in 1974 resulted in struggles and 
tensions within the ANC. African nationalist leaders expressed an intention to unite in 
December 1974, but before they could agree on holding a congress for the ANC at which 
leadership would be elected, Nkomo held his own congress where he was elected leader 
of the ANC-Zimbabwe. This was essentially Nkomo's attempt to outmaneuver 
Muzorewa and ZANU in leadership. The 'new' party set up by Nkomo was effectively a 
revival of ZAPU's internal wing. Muzorewa expelled Nkomo from the ANC while 
ZANU boycotted the congress called for by Nkomo. Political ambitions and power 
struggles began crippling the effectiveness of the ANC. ZANU was waiting to 
participate in the congress once it had stabilized after the assassination of Herbert 
Chitepo and the instability caused by the Nhari rebellion. ZANU also realized that 
Nkomo's presence in Rhodesia after his release from prison had resulted in ZAPU 
officials taking over most of the leadership positions in the ANC since the ANC had been 
built largely on ZAPU's internal structures.391 
The failure of the political union attempted under the ANC saw another bid to 
unite nationalist military wings. The Frontline States encouraged the formation of the 
Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA); bringing together cadres from ZAPU and ZANU 
under a joint military leadership. There were inherent contradictions within ZIP A, 
stemming from the different training backgrounds and different political ideologies that 
the two parties had. Consequently, putting cadres from the two parties together was a 











'time bomb.'392 Mistrust and tension among cadres within ZIPA was deepened by 
Nkomo's negotiations with Smith in 1975. The 'unfinished businesses from the 1963 
tension between ZAPU and ZANU took a new shape as cadres fought each other in 
ZIPA. ZANLA cadres at Mgagao in Tanzania killed many ZIPRA cadres.393 
The establishment of ZIP A meant that ZIPRA cadres had to move from their 
camps in Zambia and join ZANLA cadres in Tanzania and Mozambique. This move 
gave ZANU a territorial advantage over ZAPU since ZAPU's headquarters was in 
Lusaka. The insecurity that ZAPU felt with the arrangements was reflected in the fact 
that ZIPRA did not send all its cadres to ZIP A. Most ZIPRA cadres were kept in camps 
in Lusaka.394 
Strategic targets and not the quantity of attacks or the number of cadres infiltrated 
determined ZIPRA's approach to fighting in the decisive phase ofthe struggle. ZAPU 
had infiltrated cadres in very large groups during the first phase, most of who were either 
killed or arrested in encounters with government security forces. During the decisive 
phase, ZAPU infiltrated cadres in small groups, having more cadres outside the country 
than inside at the end of the war.395 Critics have claimed that since the bulk ofZIPRA 
cadres were out of the country at the time of ceasefire, ZAPU did not make a significant 
contribution to the armed struggle. However, when one considers some of ZIPRA's 
significant targets, the impact of ZAPU's participation in the struggle is acknowledged. 
ZIPRA made a huge impact to the armed struggle by bringing down two Air Rhodesia 
Viscount Passenger planes. Attacks on fuel reserves in Salisbury were a sign that ZIPRA 
392 Interview with Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa, ZIPRA's chief of intelligence, Bulawayo. 
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was ready to take the war into the backyard of the white community, while the heat-
seeking missiles that ZIPRA began to use, brought fear to the white suburbs. These 
missiles were supplied by the Soviet Union but ZIPRA officials kept the source of the 
weapons secret.396 
During the final phase of the war, ZIPRA came up with a detailed military plan 
aimed at giving the Rhodesian government a decisive blow. 'The Turning Point' was 
ZIPRA's strategy to end the war, after it realized that the suffering of the African people 
could not be removed by verbal agreement only.397 ZIPRA had resolved to end the war 
through the barrel of the gun. Ultimately, the agreement at Lancaster House pre-emptied 
the execution of 'The Turning Point'. While most cadres were waiting for the order to 
advance, political leaders were negotiating a peaceful settlement. Though the plan was 
never executed, it was a source of pressure on the Rhodesian government since the CIO 
was aware ofit.398 
By the beginning of 1977 , ZIP A had collapsed and ZIPRA cadres had all returned 
to Zambia. Another initiative by the Frontline States emerged. Having failed with 
military collaboration, there was another attempt at political collaboration. This was the 
time that Chikerema, Muzorewa and Sithole were trying to establish an internal 
settlement with Smith. The Patriotic Front (PF) was set up on October 9 1976 as a way 
of uniting African opposition to minority rule.399 What ZIP A and the JMC had failed to 
achieve, the PF managed to achieve. At the Geneva talks and during the Lancaster House 
Constitutional Conference, ZAPU and ZANU were able to speak with one voice. ZAPU 
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and ZANU eventually collaborated on a political front to negotiate the independence of 
the Zimbabwe. While the impact of the armed struggle should not be overlooked, it is 
important to remember that the independence of Zimbabwe was not attained through a 
military victory. A negotiated settlement brought independence to Zimbabwe. The 
intensity of the war contributed to the pressure experienced by the Rhodesian 
government. Britain and America added to this pressure after taking an interest in the 
Rhodesian crisis as a way of blocking the influence of the Soviet Union on Rhodesia.40o 
Frontline States and Commonwealth Heads of State also played their part in encouraging 
Britain to settle the Rhodesian crisis. Having achieved its purpose at Lancaster House, 
the PF was dissolved, much to the annoyance ofNkomo who had regarded it as a ticket to 
power. The PF was a 'marriage of convenience,' set up to unite ZAPU and ZANU in 
negotiating with the Rhodesian government.401 Once the path to independence was set 
out, there was no more need for the PF because it was time for the nationalists to compete 
for votes. 
The Mrican National Council, (Zimbabwe) (ANC (Z»: 
International and regional pressures, the impact of the changing situation in 
Mozambique, pressure coming from the Frontline States and the intensification of the 
armed struggle resulted in the release of nationalist leaders from detention in 1974.402 
John Vorster, South Africa's Prime Minister, put pressure on Smith to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement with the nationalists, while Frontline States were putting pressure on 
the nationalists to negotiate. This was the period of the 'Detente' exercise, which was an 
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attempt by Vorster to establish a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian crisis. Vorster 
worked to ensure that Smith released political prisoners before engaging them in talks. 
The ban on ZAPU and ZANU would be lifted before the holding of a Constitutional 
Conference.403 The release of these political leaders changed the nature of the ANC. 
While it had emerged as a non-partisan body, unifying African opposition to the 
government, African nationalists were going to compete for control of the ANC, 
embracing it as a passage to power. The Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity, drawn up in 
Lusaka on 7 December 1974 was an attempt to transform the ANC into a political front 
that would unite African opposition to the minority regime. Leaders from ZAPU, ZANU, 
FROLIZI and the ANC agreed to unite under the banner of the ANC. Each party would 
appoint three representatives to the ANC executive. The Executive would then prepare 
for the holding of a congress within four months from the time of the signing of the 
Declaration of Unity to enable the transfer of power to an elected leadership. Meanwhile, 
Muzorewa was to continue leading the ANC until the holding of the congress.404 ZAPU, 
ZANU, FROLIZI and the ANC were essentially agreeing to unite and form a new party, 
the ANC, which would continue the struggle for majority rule in Rhodesia.405 African 
political leaders who had sought to depose the Rhodesian government were agreeing to 
come together and launch combined military and political offensives. These African 
nationalists were aware that they had to compete for the leadership of the ANC. 
Prior to the holding of the ANC congress, ZAPU was beginning to feel tension 
resulting from the release of its political detainees. A clear division emerged between 
403 Mordechai Tamarkin The Making of Zimbabwe pp. 26-28. 
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militants and centralists. Militants comprised the party's leadership in exile, the people 
who had coordinated ZAPU's war, while centralists consisted of the released political 
detainees, a number of who had remained in Rhodesia with Nkomo, following the 
collapse of the Victoria Falls Bridge talks.406 While militants were keen to continue the 
armed struggle, centralists were more inclined towards talks. The presence of centralists 
within the country after their release from prison played an essential role in the revival of 
ZAPU activities within Rhodesia.407 
In November 1974 ZANU experienced a mutiny. Thomas Nhari led of group of 
ZANLA cadres from the battlefront and tried to seize the military leadership of the party. 
The ZANLA High Command managed to recapture Chifombo camp in Mozambique, 
where Nhari's group was based, in January 1975. Nhari and a number of his supporters 
were executed.408 Chitepo, the leader of ZANU, was assassinated in Lusaka in March 
1975. The Zambian government arrested most of the party's leadership in Zambia, 
accusing them of assassinating Chitepo.409 Consequently, ZANU felt that it was not yet 
ready for the holding of the ANC congress because of its internal crisis, but Nkomo 
pushed for it. Muzorewa realized that ZAPU structures had saturated the ANC such that 
in voting, ZAPU had an advantage. Consequently, he suggested the postponement of the 
congress, but Nkomo did not accept the idea. There were fears among the nationalists 
that Smith was manipulating Nkomo into sidelining the other members of the ANC in 
seeking an internal settlement. Nkomo met with Smith at the latter's house and it was 
406 African nationalists held talks with Smith on 25 August 1975 at the Victoria Falls Bridge. John Vorster, 
South African Prime Minister, and Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia's President, facilitated the talks. The talks 
collapsed because of Smith's threat to arrest exiled nationalists once they came to Rhodesia, where the talks 
were supposed to be concluded. Most of the ANC leaders went into exile after the collapse of the talks. 
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suggested that Nkomo should abandon ZANU, and separate from Muzorewa by calling 
for a congress to discuss the leadership of the ANC. These allegations and the secret 
movements Nkomo was involved in resulted in his expulsion from the ANC by 
Muzorewa.410 Unity had been achieved in the absence of most senior nationalist leaders. 
Now that they were present and the ANC had a solid following within the country since it 
was the only party for Africans with a legal existence at the time, politicians were trying 
to benefit from the possibility of commanding a large following in the country. In 
September 1975, it was agreed by African nationalists and the Frontline States that the 
ANC should postpone its congress to avoid dividing the people since there were clear 
signs of instability of nationalist structures.411 
Mocking his expulsion by Muzorewa and referring to him as a leader who had not 
been elected to his post and thus had no power to expel him, Nkomo went ahead and held 
a congress that was boycotted by ZANU, FROLIZI, and the ANC. On September 26-27, 
1975, a congress was held, electing new leadership and resulting in the birth of the 
African National Council, (Zimbabwe) (ANC (Z». Nkomo was elected President, 
Chinamano became Vice President, Moyo was elected second Vice President, Msika 
became General Secretary, with Amon Jirira as Treasurer and Samuel Munodawafa was 
elected National Chairman.412 The elected leadership of the ANC (Z) was essentially 
ZAPU. While Nkomo held the congress claiming to be following up on the Zimbabwe 
Declaration of Unity, participants at the congress were not representative of the 
signatories of the Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity. The absence of the other signatories 
to the declaration at the congress meant that Nkomo could not claim to be fulfilling the 
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agreement reached in Lusaka. The unrepresentative nature of the congress made 
NImmo's election unconstitutional. According to Gordon Chavhunduka, Nkomo wanted 
to ensure that he secured the leadership of the ANC for himself by holding a Congress 
after the nationalists and the leaders of the Frontline states had agreed to postpone it.413 
Considering that ZAPU was still banned in Rhodesia, the creation of the ANC (Z) gave 
Nkomo an opportunity to carry out political activities for ZAPU on a legal platfonn and 
free from other nationalists whose strategies he did not approve of. 
Nkomo's faction justified its actions by claiming that the ANC had benefited from 
structures ZAPU had set up to support the struggle. Consequently, ZAPU had emerged 
as the main power base for the ANC 'and as the decisive power in the total rejection, 
through the Pearce Commission, of the Smith-Douglas Home fraudulent constitution in 
1972.' Nkomo was thus claiming justification for his action by arguing that his party was 
the power behind the ANC.414 Nkomo's congress broke down the future prospects of a 
united political front. It was competition time again for nationalist leaders as attempts to 
outdo each other resumed. The assumption that the identification of a common enemy 
would unite African nationalists was proved false. While ZANU continued the anned 
struggle, Nkomo concentrated on reviving ZAPU branches under the disguise of the 
ANC (Z).415 
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The Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA): 
In 1974, the OAU insisted on the establishment of joint training of Rhodesian 
nationalist cadres. Joint training camps were established at Morogoro and Mgagao, 
Tanzania, in 1976. However, ZAPU maintained separate training camps in Zambia and 
Angola. The concept of setting up collaboration on the military front was not new to the 
nationalists. The Zimbabwe People's Army was essentially a revival of the idea that had 
been mooted when the JMC was first talked about in 1967.416 A number of other factors 
also contributed to the formation of ZIP A. There was a general feeling among military 
leaders from ZAPU and ZANU to get together and launch a combined offensive. Moyo 
from ZAPU and Tongogara from ZANU had had talks on the possibility oflaunching a 
combined military offensive .. ZANU claims to have invited ZAPU into launching the 
combined offensive. 417 Contrary to ZANU's claim for the initiative in the setting up of 
ZIP A, Bhebe makes reference to the fact that ZAPU and ZANU military wings were 
forced by Samora Machel and other Frontline States leaders to set up a partnership.418 
The manner in which ZIP A was set up had a huge impact on the way it featured 
as a fighting force. Dabengwa pointed out that ZAPU was forced by the OAU's 
Liberation Committee to participate in the formation of ZIP A. ZAPU weapons in 
Tanzania were held back by the Liberation Committee and ZAPU was told that the 
weapons would be released only after ZIPRA and ZANLA had united. ZIPRA's 
participation in the establishment of ZIP A was consequently a way through which ZIPRA 
was securing the release of its weapons. There was unwillingness from ZIPRA to 
participate in ZIP A because ZANLA was not functioning well at the time ZIP A was 
416 Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin Chimurenga The War in ;Rhodesia 1965-1980, p. 72. 
417 David Martin and Phyllis Johnson The Struggle For Zimbabwe, pp. 217-219. 











being formed. Tongogara, ZANLA's commander and a number of other ZANU leaders 
were in prison in Zambia, following the assassination of Chitepo.419 ZANU was not yet 
settled since the Nhari rebellion. ZIPRA was thus not willing to join forces with a 
military wing which was having problems and which did not have political leaders easily 
accessible, but pressure from the Frontline States prevailed. 
From November 1975 to January 1977, ZIPA had its brief existence. Nine 
representatives from ZAPU and nine from ZANU made up the coordinating team.420 
Nhongo from ZANLA was overall in charge of the combined offensive with Mangena, 
from ZIPRA, as his deputy. According to ZANLA sources, though ZANLA had more 
trained cadres than ZIPRA at the time, ZANLA agreed to give ZIPRA equal 
representation on ZIPA's leadership, but refused ZIPRA's suggestion that Mangena 
should be commander in chief. Instead, ZANLA secured all the key posts, giving them 
the decisive power within ZIPA.421 The partnership that was set up in ZIPA thus had 
inherent contradictions. ZIPRA had been clear about not wanting to participate in the 
combined offensive and when forced to participate, it sought influential positions that 
ZANLA would not let go of. Even though there was talk of a combined force since the 
cadres were going to infiltrate under one command structure and were going to train 
together, there was evidence of underlying forces that sought partisan advantages. The 
manner in which ZAN LA sought the influential positions within ZIP A showed a desire to 
promote the interests of ZANU only. 
419 Dumiso Dabengwa 'ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation,' in N. Bhebe and T. Ranger 
Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War, p. 33. 
420 David Moore 'The Zimbabwe People'S Army: Strategic Innovation or More of the Same? In N. Bhebe 
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Given the dynamics surrounding the formation of ZIP A and its command 
structure, Bhebe argued that as ZIPRA cadres went into ZIP A their commanders in 
ZIPRA instructed them to desert once they got into Rhodesia and recruit cadres for 
ZIPRA before returning to Lusaka.422 If ZIPRA had joined ZIP A as a way of securing 
the release of weapons that the OAU's Liberation Committee was holding in Tanzania, 
then it is plausible to accept the possibility that ZIPRA commanders instructed their 
cadres to defect. Interviews with people who were directly involved with ZIPRA during 
the formation of ZIP A challenge Bhebe's claim. Ex-combatant Baleni was in charge of 
one of the ZIPRA groups that went to Mozambique to be part of ZIP A. He claims that 
they went to join ZIP A with no instruction to desert.423 Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu also 
denies the claim put forward by Bhebe. According to Ndlovu, ZIPRA took the 
arrangements for the establishment seriously. Instead, it was ZANLA that was not fully 
committed to ZIPA. Ndlovu said that during the time of ZIP A, ZANLA cadres had a 
slogan that said' Tamba wakachenjera, ' (be careful in whatever you do.) This slogan 
summarized ZANLA' s approach to ZIP A. ZANLA cadres had to be careful so as not to 
be caught napping. But whom did ZANLA cadres have to watch against? Ndlovu argues 
that ZANLA cadres were instructed to deliberately provoke and attack ZIPRA cadres. 
They had to guard against ZIPRA's prominence in the struggle.424 
While it may not be easy to get to the bottom of the truth about the levels of 
commitment to ZIP A, the flow of events can help in drawing conclusions. The Frontline 
States forced ZIPRA into ZIP A and ZIPRA did not send all its cadres to ZIP A camps.425 
422 Ngwabi Bhebe The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe, p. 64. 
423 Interview with Mr. Baleni, ZIPRA ex-combatant, Bulawayo. 
424 Interview with Mr. Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu, ZAPU's Director of Information and Publicity, BUlawayo. 











Bearing in mind the territorial challenge that ZIPRA was facing, one should not be 
surprised that some ZIPRA cadres ended up defecting from ZIP A. Tanzania and 
Mozambique, which had bases and training camps for ZIP A, were countries in which 
ZANLA had well-established bases. By leaving Zambia, ZIPRA cadres were going into 
ZANLA territory. Moreover, infiltration into Rhodesia from Mozambique was going to 
be through Shona speaking areas. Since ZIPRA cadres had been recruited mainly from 
Ndebele speaking areas, it is possible that some of them found themselves uncomfortable 
and insecure among Shona speaking civilians who were not members of their party. 
Some ZIPRA cadres found the environment in which they had to operate in insecure and 
so they defected. The defections by such cadres, according to Baleni and Ndlovu, were 
not part of ZIPRA's policy but were decisions made by individual cadres. Baleni and 
Ndlovu were interviewed long after the end of the war. It is possible that they refused to 
confirm the fact that ZIPRA cadres were instructed to defect because they wanted to paint 
a positive picture of ZAPU' s contribution the struggle. 
The views held by political leaders from ZAPU and ZANU shed an interesting 
light on the manner in which the parties understood the idea behind ZIPA. Aware that 
ZIP A was being dominated by ZANLA, Nkomo denounced it as an imposition by 
neighbouring states on nationalist movements in Rhodesia.426 It was not surprising that 
while cadres were gathering in camps to form ZIPA in 1976, Nkomo was engaging in 
talks with Smith. A serious commitment to ZIP A by ZIPRA would have ended up 
contradicting the strategy that the leader of their party had adopted. These talks made 
ZIP A impossible to manage. There was no way that cadres from ZAPU could be trusted 
by ZANLA cadres while Nkomo 'was dinning with the enemy.' Even though ZIPRA 











cadres were not in favour ofNkomo's talks with Smith, ZANLA did not make a 
distinction between Nkomo's personal strategy and the strategy his cadres were inclined 
towards. 427 A detailed discussion of the talks follows later in this chapter. 
In a memorandum sent to ZANLA guerrillas on 15 April 1976, Mugabe suggested 
that ZANLA's war efforts were to be glorified while Nkomo was denounced as counter-
revolutionary. For Mugabe, even though ZANLA and ZIPRA engaged in battles 
together, there could not be any equality between them since ZANLA had a numerical 
advantage over ZIPRA. 428 The failure of political leaders to share a common perspective 
on ZIP A made the chances of establishing proper unity between them very slim. ZIP A 
suffered from a lack of common vision. 
On 7 April 1976, Baleni arrived in Chimoio leading a group ofZIPRA cadres 
who were to become part ofZIPA. Baleni's group arrived with their kitbags and while 
they were waiting to be taken to their lodgings in the camp, ZANLA organized a group- of 
young cadres who marched in front of the ZIPRA cadres, possibly with the intention of 
intimidating them. ZANLA cadres then searched ZIPRA cadres. Baleni's two pistols 
were confiscated during the searching and he was locked up and beaten up for the whole 
night, together with the ZIPRA cadres he had come with.429 The experience ofBaleni's 
group is just one among many. At Mgagao and Kingolwira camps, fighting broke out 
between ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres, resulting in the deaths of a number of ZIPRA 
cadres.43o The safety of ZIPRA cadres within ZIP A was not to be taken for granted. 
427 Interview with Mr. Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu, ZAPU's Director of Information and Publicity, Bulawayo. 
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Baleni raised two points to explain the source of the tension which cadres were 
experiencing. ZAPU and ZANU had different approaches to the struggle. ZAN LA had 
adopted a Maoist ideology that was rooted in mass mobilization. Cadres did not have to 
be highly trained for battle then since large numbers rather than quality of training 
mattered. For ZIPRA, proper training of cadres was important since ZIPRA's strategy 
regarded military victory as determining the outcome of the war. ZAPU was thus giving 
its cadres longer training than ZANU. The failure by commanders of ZIPA to reach an 
agreement on which strategy to use caused tension among the cadres as ZIPRA cadres 
resisted using ZANLA's strategy while ZAN LA cadres believed that their strategy was 
the best of the two. 
It had been assumed by Frontline States that since Nhongo and Mangena shared 
the common background of having been trained by ZAPU, they would easily unite the 
cadres from their parties. This was an incorrect assumption because Nhongo and 
Mangena now belonged to rival parties that were each seeking to be prominent in the 
struggle. The two parties also differed on the political education they were exposing their 
cadres to. ZIPRA cadres regarded ZANLA's strategy of infiltrating and then holding 
pungwes with villagers (night vigil meetings) as suicidal since Rhodesian security forces 
could easily ambush these gatherings, killing many villagers and cadres. For ZIPRA, 
cadres had to come in and establish contacts gently with the civilian population. The 
failure of the coordinating team to agree on the ideology and the political approach to 
adopt divided the cadres on party lines. ZIPRA commanders were surprised that ZAN LA 
deployed people who were not properly trained. Cadres who had trained using sticks as 











regarded as dangerous by ZIPRA since a number of ZANU cadres had to get used to their 
weapons while in the process of defending themselves. Lives were lost because of 
deploying people not yet used to firearms. 431 
ZIP A also fell apart because of the tensions that were inherent due to the fact that 
by belonging to different parties, cadres had learnt the history of each party. ZIPRA 
cadres regarded members of ZANU as 'dissidents' who had broken away from the 
'mother' party while ZANLA cadres were aware that ZAPU's Zhanda (youths) had 
hunted down and killed members of ZANU between 1963 and 1964. The competition for 
power that had haunted political leaders in the split in 1963 continued to haunt the 
militants from ZIPRA and ZANLA.432 The partnership that brought ZIPRA and ZANLA 
. together did not dissolve political loyalties. It was inevitable that political tensions would 
resurface in ZIP A. 
ZIPRA's limited deployment in ZIPA contributed to tension among cadres. 
ZIPRA sent two hundred cadres only to ZIP A and only one hundred of these crossed into 
Rhodesia. Many were instructed to desert once they arrived in Rhodesia.433 At the 
launch of ZIP A offensives, only fifteen percent of ZIPA cadres belonged to ZAPu.434 
Such a numerical imbalance made it unrealistic to talk about a combined military 
campaign among the cadres on the battlefront. At any given time during ZIP A 
offensives, ZANLA always felt that it was committing more men to the struggle than 
ZIPRA and hence, a perpetuation ofthe idea that ZANLA was doing most of the fighting. 
43\ Interview with Mr. Baleni, ZIPRA ex-combatant, BUlawayo. 
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According to Nkomo, the collapse of ZIP A can be explained partially by the 
attempt by some elements within the military command of ZIP A to establish a new 
political leadership from among the ZIP A leadership.435 The reason given by Nkomo 
gets support from Mangena's withdrawal of ZIPRA troops from ZIPA, arguing that while 
his contingent had maintained loyalty to ZAPU leadership, some ZANLA cadres were 
beginning to regard ZIPA as an independent entity.436 It must be remembered that most 
ZANU leaders were in prison in Zambia when ZIP A was established. It is not surprising 
then that the ZANLA cadres who were holding key positions in ZIPA began regarding 
themselves as a separate entity from ZANU. The absence of political unity between the 
parties, coupled with the release of ZANLA leaders who had been imprisoned following 
the assassination of Chitepo, resulted in leadership problems within ZIPA. The released 
cadres came out of prison and sought to establish control over ZIP A resulting in clashes 
with the cadres who had been in charge.437 
The Impact of ZIP A: 
While the idea of launching a combined military offensive was brilliant, there was 
no way that ZIP A would make a huge impact on the battlefield because of the problems 
that were deep within the partnership. An army in which cadres do not trust each other 
cannot function effectively. Though unity was the desired goal in ZIP A, it was never 
achieved because of events within and outside ZIPA. In 1975 when Nkomo, Muzorewa, 
and Sithole visited a ZIP A training camp at Mgagao and explained to the cadres plans for 
a constitutional conference and the significance of the ANC, some ZAN LA cadres 
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responded by issuing the Mgagao Manifesto in which they denounced Nkomo, 
Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema as sellouts.438 These cadres saw no value in talking to 
the enemy, the Rhodesian government, instead of fighting. There was no way that 
ZIPRA cadres would stand by and watch their leader being denounced as a sellout. 
Baleni suggests that ZIP A contributed negatively to ZIPRA's engagement in the 
armed struggle. ZIPRA operations were slowed down as some cadres were sent to 
Mozambique and Tanzania to train with ZANLA. The establishment of ZIPA disturbed 
the focus of cadres as tensions and mistrust within ZIP A meant that cadres had to be on 
the lookout for the enemy within and the enemy outside. A number of ZIPRA cadres who 
crossed into Rhodesia as part of ZIPA were eliminated, not by Rhodesian security forces, 
but by ZANLA. Clashes at Mgagao resulted in the death of a number of ZIPRA cadres 
even before they got to the battlefield.439 
David Moore offers a different analysis of the impact of ZIP A. Focusing on the 
heavy counter-insurgency by the Rhodesian army, he points out that some elements in 
ZIP A regarded that as a mark of the effectiveness of their offensives. The setting up of 
protected villages and the massive call-ups by the Rhodesian army were evidence of the 
impact of ZIP A on the enemy.440 While it is true that the Rhodesian government would 
panic at the establishment of a military alliance between ZIPRA and ZANLA, the events 
on the ground do not agree with the glorious analysis of ZIP A , s impact presented by 
Moore. According to Dabengwa, the partnership was a complete failure. ZIPRA had 
never wanted to be part of it, hence the holding back of most of its cadres in Zambia and 
438 Henrick Ellert The Rhodesian Front War Counter-insurgency ad Guerrilla Warfare, p. 37. 
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Angola. 441 With the collapse of ZIPA, military collaboration between ZIPRA and 
ZANLA failed again. 
ZIPRA Military Engagements From 1975: 
Up to 1975, ZAPU's military activities remained on a small scale. Small numbers 
of guerrillas were infiltrated for acts of sabotage and to recruit cadres for training. 
Having learnt the dangers of attempting direct confrontation with the Rhodesia army, 
ZIPRA tended to avoid direct confrontations, opting rather for sabotage of strategic 
points and the use oflandmines as the main strategy. 
As nationalist cadres established new operational areas, Rhodesian security forces 
found themselves stretched. Whereas in the beginning of the armed struggle it had been 
fairly easy for the Rhodesian forces to guard against infiltration across the Zambezi 
River, ZANU's opening of the northeastern frontier from 1972 and the opening by 
ZIPRA of the southwestern frontier along the Botswana border in 1975 stretched the 
manpower available to the Rhodesian security forces. Through stretching the Rhodesian 
army, guerrillas managed to disperse government security forces. 442 
Most ZIPRA guerrillas were deployed in Matebeleland, Midlands and 
Mashonaland West regions because of the location of their rear bases in Zambia. Bases 
had to be close to operational areas to ensure easy access to supplies and manpower.443 
Since ZIPRA had recruited mainly from these regions, it only made sense for ZIPRA 
cadres to return and fight in areas where people knew them and would thus easily support 
them. ZIPRA had four operational zones. In Matebeleland, there were ZIPRA cadres in 
441 Interview with Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa, ZIPRA's chief of intelligence, Bulawayo. 
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the north and the south operational areas, and then there was the Hurungwe Tribal Trust 
Land operational area, north of central Rhodesia; followed by the zone towards 
Botswana's border, the area from Belingwe to Villa Salazar.444 The map that follows, 
taken from Moorcraft and McLaughlin's book, illustrates guerrilla infiltration routes.445 
One sees the manner in which ZIPRA cadres made their way from their headquarters in 
Chikumbi, Zambia, into Rhodesia. Before 1977, there was no major crossing through 
Lake Kariba because ZIPRA did not have speedboats. The small canoes that were being 
used to cross the Zambezi River were not suitable for crossing the lake. ZIPRA 
operational areas are also indicated on the map. The ZANLA side is the only one with 
zones of effective control. While ZIPRA was infiltrating, their cadres came in such small 
numbers, making the establishment of zones of effective control was difficult. 
444 Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin Chimurenga The War in Rhodesia 1965-1980, p. 92. 
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ZIPRA cadres had to gain the trust and support of civilians as they infiltrated in 
small numbers. Unlike ZANLA, which politicized the masses and set up party structures 
as its cadres were infiltrating, it was enough for ZIPRA cadres to introduce themselves to 
civilians as 'Nkomo's boys.' Nkomo remained the respected leader on the minds of 
ZAPU supporters despite the banning of the party. ZIPRA cadres went into some areas 
with a list of names of party leaders, contacts having already been established in the 
period of the first incursions. In 1976, large groups of guerrillas arrived in Nkayi and 
Lupane areas. The arrival of these cadres helped in reviving party structures that had 
gone underground. Local party branches had to meet the logistical and some material 
requirements of the cadres.446 
Nkayi and Lupane districts were located in the middle of ZIPRA's northern front, 
falling under the second of three divisions. The northern front was the passage through 
which the bulk of ZIPRA cadres entered Rhodesia. Most ZIPRA cadres were deployed 
in this region. ZIPRA's first liberated zones were in the northern front. Nicholas 
Nkomo, the deputy commander of the northern front zone code marked areas in the 
region to indicate the level of ZIPRA presence and influence. Green areas were semi-
liberated areas, areas in which Rhodesian soldiers could pass through but without 
maintaining a presence. ZIPRA cadres were free to move around these areas. Yellow 
zones were contested areas, while red zones were under Rhodesian contro1.447 Nkomo 
says that in 1976, Lupane and Nkayi were largely under Rhodesian control but by 1977, 
there was a gradual transition as ZIPRA established control over Nkayi and Lupane. 
ZIPRA cadres restricted encounters with the enemy to yellow zones as a way of avoiding 
446 1. Alexander, 1. McGregor, & T. Ranger, Violence and Memory, One Hundred Years in The 'Dark 
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reprisals on civilians in the green zones. As communications within ZIPRA improved 
with the use of radio communication and with the drawing up of the 'Turning Point,' 
Nkomo was able to maintain regular contact with the Headquarters in Lusaka.448 
According to a combatant's diary for May to September 1976, on May 5 1976, 
ZIPRA cadres in the Plumtree area blew up the railway line linking Rhodesia and South 
Africa. Railway services between Rhodesia and South Africa were disrupted. Being a 
landlocked country and facing economic sanctions, Rhodesia's economy depended a lot 
on trade with South Africa. Disruption of railway services between Rhodesia and South 
Africa affected the Rhodesian economy severely. On 13 May, three enemy boats and 
engines used in patrolling the Zambezi River were captured. Since ZIPRA cadres were 
infiltrating mainly from Zambia, the ability to weaken the capacity of the enemy to patrol 
the Zambezi River was a welcome development for ZIPRA. On July 28, the enemy's 
base at Matetsi was attacked by ZIPRA cadres who only withdrew after the arrival of the 
Rhodesian Air Force to reinforce the Rhodesian security forces that were under siege. 
ZIPRA commandos bombed Woolworths Departmental Store in Bulawayo on September 
18. By launching this attack, ZIPRA showed its ability to take the war into the enemy's 
backyard, the urban areas. The white community came to realize that the war was not 
something happening out in rural areas only. They too could fall victim to the advancing 
ZIPRA forces.449 
These entries show that ZIPRA was fighting in 1976, but operating mainly as a 
guerrilla group that was launching sabotage attacks, especially on the railway line, an 
easy way of sabotaging the economy of the landlocked Rhodesia. 
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Bhebe quotes Dabengwa, ZIPRA's chief of intelligence who said that by 1976, 
ZAPU had sent people 'to train as pilots, aircraft technicians, tank drivers, and tank 
mechanics.' ZAPU had also acquired sophisticated military equipment from the Soviet 
Union.450 These pilots and tank drivers were to play an essential role in ZIPRA's final 
military strategy, the 'Turning Point.' A detailed discussion of the 'Turning Point' 
follows later in this chapter. 
Though ZIPRA had re-organized and planned operations, the release of political 
leaders in 1974 disrupted the plans for the war. The external leadership had to listen to 
those who were corning from prison since the leader of the party was among them. 
NImmo came out of prison and tried to negotiate with Smith. When negotiations with 
Smith yielded no fruit, Nkomo became 'irrelevant' within Rhodesia. His internal strategy 
of seeking a negotiated settlement proved unfruitful. To rejuvenate his political 
influence, he went to Zambia and took over the leadership of the exiled wing of the 
party.451 A new command structure for ZIPRA was set up in 1976. Political leaders took 
over military command. The political leadership overshadowed Moyo, Silundika, 
Ndlovu, and Mangena. Moyo and Mangena, among others, had played significant roles 
in reconstructing ZAPU's armed wing after the second internal crisis. Their removal 
from key military positions saw the disappearance of the plan for ZAPU to launch a full-
scale guerrilla war, a strategy that Nkomo had never supported. The political leadership 
that took over favored a conventional war instead. The armed struggle was in full swing 
450 Ngwabi Bhebe The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
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by 1977 and ZAPU seemed determined to go for a Soviet 'coup' type revolution aimed at 
inflicting a military defeat on the Rhodesian army.452 
Sabotage and landmine warfare by ZIPRA forced Rhodesian security forces off 
their posts along the Zambezi River. This made it easier for ZIPRA cadres to cross the 
Zambezi River and then move across uninhibited lands without having to fight. A report 
by the ZAPU political commissar in Hurungwe, northwest of Rhodesia, said: "The enemy 
was very much affected, especially by mine warfare. They could not move by trucks. 
They had also to move on foot, and when they moved on foot (like us), it was easier for 
us ... People were giving us information on the movements of the enemy." Another 
report said, "We cut the enemy's supplies by ambushing supply trucks and mining roads. 
By so doing, we were starving enemy soldiers. As a result, they had to retreat, going to 
bigger camps and tarred roads." Enemy retreat allowed ZIPRA to penetrate into rural 
areas. From 1977 to 1978, ZIPRA infiltrated about two thousand guerrillas.453 The map 
below, which is taken from Ellert's book, highlights ZIPRA incursions from 1977-
1978.454 By this time, there was infiltration through Lake Kariba. The acquisition of 
speedboats from East Germany by ZAPU in 1978 enabled the cadres to cross the lake 
within a short time. Rhodesian security forces had to patrol the lake and the one hundred 
and fifty miles oflakeshore. This stretching of government security forces depressed the 
government. The army too was feeling the impact of the war.455 A large portion of the 
country was experiencing guerrilla activities from ZIPRA and ZANLA. 
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As the struggle approached its climax, ZIPRA cadres increased their involvement. 
ZIPRA was responding to the intensification of the struggle and also trying to counter 
ZANLA's infiltration oflarge groups. ZIPRA's main contribution to the armed struggle 
was the launching of significant acts of sabotage rather than the number of attacks 
launched or the number of cadres deployed. On 3 September 1978, ZIPRA cadres shot 
down an Air Rhodesia Viscount using a Russian Sam 7 ground-to-air missile, acquired 
from the Soviet Union. Thirty-eight white civilians were killed by one blow. Ten 
survivors were also killed as ZIPRA cadres combed the wreckage. This attack produced 
perhaps the greatest shock as yet experienced by the white community. Never before in 
the armed struggle in Rhodesia had whites been killed in such large numbers.456 
Nkomo argued that the Viscounts were being targeted because the Rhodesian 
government was using them to ferry weapons. Viscounts had been used to carry weapons 
and paratroopers when ZANU bases in Chimoio were attacked in 1978.457 The 
Rhodesian government responded to this attack by bombing ZAPU's Freedom Camp, 
north of Lusaka. According to Nkomo, young men who were refugees lived at Freedom 
Camp. About three hundred and fifty lives were lost in the raid.458 On December 11 
1978, ZAPU forces blasted a fuel deport in Salisbury'S southwestern industrial area. 
Between forty five to fifty five percent of the country's fuel reserves went up in flames. 
Nearby firms were also damaged by the huge flames while other firms were forced to 
456 Mordechai Tamarkin The Making of Zimbabwe p. 229. 
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shut down as firemen battled to put the fire off.459 Again, ZIPRA cadres were showing 
the effectiveness of their urban offensive. 
Even though ZIPRA did not deploy many cadres in Salisbury, the few that went 
in made an impact that caught international attention, showing the qualitative nature of 
ZIPRA's offensives. The country suffered greatly from fuel shortages because of this 
attack. The significance of this attack has resulted in some claims by ZANLA that its 
cadres were responsible for the attack,460 Others, not wanting to acknowledge ZIPRA's 
contribution opt to say that it is not clear who launched the attack. ZAPU's publication, 
'The Zimbabwe Review' acknowledged ZAPU's responsibility, so did Dabengwa, 
Swazini Ndlovu, and Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu, in separate interviews. ZAPU had taken the 
war into the backyard of the white community again. 
On 17 February 1979, ZIPRA cadres brought down another Air Rhodesia 
Viscount, killing fifty-nine whites.461 Just as the Rhodesian Air Force was killing 
ordinary ZAPU supporters in raids, ZIPRA was eager to physically attack the white 
civilian community. While ZIPRA was criticized by the Rhodesian government for 
attacking a civilian plane, Dabengwa pointed out that ZIPRA intelligence reports had 
picked up the fact that the commander of the Rhodesian forces, General Peter Walls, was 
going to be on that flight coming from Kariba. Walls had gone to Kariba that morning 
with his wife and they were supposed to fly back to Salisbury on the said flight. 
According to Dabengwa, the presence of Walls on the flight made it a military target. 
Unfortunately for ZIPRA, Walls' wife insisted that they go fishing in the afternoon and 
459 'The Zimbabwe Review' 'ZAPU Forces Destroy Regime's Fuel Deport,' October -December 1978, 
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consequently missed their return fight to Salisbury. When the plane was brought down, 
ZIPRA cadres believed that Walls was on the plane.462 
The shooting down of the two planes and the attack on fuel reserves left the white 
community in Rhodesia very frightened. Wherever they were, Rhodesians began to feel 
insecure, realizing that the war could not be allowed to drag on because the guerrillas 
were proving not to be just a band of 'terrorists' operating in rural areas. The rising 
number of white soldiers being killed resulted in the formation of the War Widows 
Association in June 1976. Gloom crept into the white community that had previously not 
felt the pinch of the war.463 A white woman in 1976 said 'Things seem to be getting 
worse, and the awful thing about it is that we do not appear to be achieving the military 
breakthrough that we all want. ,464 The movement of white people in the country became 
restricted because of the security situation. Skilled white male labour was removed fro,m 
the market and taken to the war. This led to a gradual deterioration of the economy. 
About 14000 whites emigrated from Rhodesia in 1976 because of the war.465 The rise of 
defense expenditure also took a toll on the economy. In 1975, the Rhodesian government 
spent Rh $ 77 million on defense. In 1976, the figure had gone up to Rh $ 96 million, 
then up to Rh $ 146 million in 1977. Forty percent of the country's budget in 1978 was 
assigned to defense.466 Ian Smith tried to keep the morale of the white community high 
by claiming that an internal settlement with Muzorewa would end the war. He claimed 
that morale was high among the soldiers though he admitted that there were some circles 
462 Interview with Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa, ZIPRA's chief ofintelligence, Bulawayo. Dabengwa said that 
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ofthe white community that were complaining that the pain from the war.467 The new 
intensity of the struggle contributed to the gradual shift of the Rhodesian government's 
position and eventually led to the negotiated settlement at Lancaster House. 
'The Turning Point:' 
Even though ZIPRA did not deploy its full military force in terms of manpower 
and equipment before ceasefire, 'The Turning Point' distinguished ZIPRA as a unique 
liberation army, capable of fighting a war against a conventional army.468 'The Turning 
Point' was ZIPRA's final military strategy that was inspired by Vietnamese theories that 
guerrilla warfare was only a preparatory stage, after which higher forms of warfare in 
which military victories were expected had to be activated. The renowned Vietnamese 
theorist and practitioner, General Vo Nguyen Giap said: "To keep itself in life and 
develop, guerrilla warfare has necessarily to develop into a mobile warfare. This is a 
general law ... If guerrilla warfare did not move to mobile warfare, not only the strategic 
task of annihilating the enemy manpower could not be carried out, but even guerrilla 
activities could not be maintained and extended.,,469 
ZIPRA's High Command drew up plans for 'The Turning Point' in 1978. The 
idea behind it was that semi-liberated zones would be cleared of the enemy and 
established as rear bases. Regular forces would be introduced to defend these liberated 
zones. Meanwhile, using larger and heavier equipment, ZIPRA cadres would launch 
attacks on the Rhodesians in their areas of defense. Guerrilla warfare would continue to 
467 Rhodesia Ministry of Infonnation 'Prime Minister's Address To The Nation,' January 24, 1977. 
468 J. Alexander, J. McGregor & T. Ranger, Violence and Memory, One Hundred Years in The 'Dark 
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be used while mobile forces achieved military victories.47o ZIPRA had aircraft based in 
Angola. Pilots were being trained in the Soviet Union so that ZIPRA's Air Force would 
give cadres on the ground air cover as 'The Turning Point' was being launched.471 Semi-
liberated zones had been established by ZIPRA in Hurungwe, Sipolilo, Gokwe, Lupane, 
and Tsholotsho. These would be key launching points for 'The Turning Point.' 472 This 
'Turning Point' was distorted during the Lancaster House talks and in the post 
independence period by people who said that it was ZAPU's plot to seize power from 
ZANU by military force, in the post independence period.473 
ZIPRA had also drawn up the 'Zero Hour Plan' in 1978. The idea behind this 
strategy was the launching of coordinated offensives on several fronts. Bridgeheads in 
the northern front in Kanyemba, Chirundu and Kariba were to be seized by ZAPU. 
These places would provide crossing areas for ZIPRA cadres and artillery. Airfields at 
Kariba, Victoria Falls and Wankie would also be attacked and seized so that ZIPRA Air 
force would shift from Angola to Rhodesia. The 'Zero Hour Plan' was meant to 
compliment the launching of 'The Turning Point. ,474 
In October 1979, the Rhodesian Special Air Service and Light Infantry engaged in 
a battle with ZIPRA. The Rhodesian ground force failed to break ZIPRA's fire, marking 
a victory for ZIPRA as the Rhodesians were forced to retreat. 'The Turning Point' had 
been planned to be launched around October-November 1979 but a delay in the return of 
trainee pilots from the Soviet Union delayed the launch. ZAPU's War Council decided 
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to wait until air cover was available. Meanwhile, talks at Lancaster House progressed 
and a ceasefire agreement was drawn up. ZIPRA thus lost the opportunity to display its 
might in battle through executing 'The Turning Point. ,475 
At the end of the war, ZIPRA had about twenty thousand fighters, mostly 
recruited and trained from 1976-1978.476 However, most of these fighters were outside 
the country by the time the war ended. This can be used as evidence of the fact that 
ZIPRA did not really engage in the armed struggle. One could also argue that since 
ZAPU's major military campaign after the second internal crisis was going to be the 
execution of 'The Turning Point,' its failure to take off meant that ZAPU and ZIPRA did 
not really engage in the struggle after 1972. This is perhaps pushing the assessment too 
far. Respect must be paid to ZAPU's strategy, which was informed by past experiences. 
ZAPU deliberately decided that strategic attacks not quantity were the way forward. 
Consequently, instead of infiltrating large groups of cadres, the few that came in were 
tasked with launching significant attacks on the enemy. The Rhodesian intelligence had 
picked up wind of the possibility of the launching of 'The Turning Point' while the 
Lancaster House Conference was in session.477 Uncertainty over the effectiveness of the 
impending attack and the insecurity that had been instilled in the minds of the white 
community by the shooting down of the Viscounts and the rocket attack on the fuel 
deport, must have put pressure on the Rhodesian delegates at Lancaster House. Though 
ZANU committed more manpower to the struggle because of the strategy it was using, 
475 ibid. pp. 62-64. 
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ZAPU's military contribution to the struggle for independence was essential, especially 
in stretching the enemy's defense positions.478 
Nkomo's talks with Smith: 
Following the collapse of the Victoria Falls Bridge Conference in 1975, Nkomo 
remained within Rhodesia, pursuing a strategy which he had always believed in, talks 
with the enemy, with the hope of achieving a peaceful transition.479 Mugabe and Tekere 
left the country to seek more direct involvement in the armed struggle. The manner in 
which Nkomo engaged in talks with Smith was sometimes very dangerous to the cause 
for the liberation of African people. In these talks, Nkomo occasionally compromised his 
position as leader of an African nationalist party by indicating that he was willing to give 
whites assurances that their interests would remain secure. The idea behind the armed 
struggle was to challenge the privileges the white community had set for itself, privileges 
which Nkomo seemed willing to uphold. Nkomo went into talks with the support of the 
leaders of the revived internal ZAPU, but he did not bother to consult the external wing 
of the party that was coordinating the armed struggle, thereby causing a contradiction of 
. h 480 strategy In t e party. 
Unlike Mugabe, Nkomo did not believe that the armed struggle was the only way 
forward in the struggle for independence. However, Nkomo miscalculated the 
commitment of the Rhodesian government to the liberation of Africans. Coming out of 
prison after the ANC had been allowed to voice its opinion to the Pearce Commission, 
and the background of the holding of the Victoria Falls Bridge Conference may have 
478 Interview with Mrs. Mary Ndlovu, member of ZAPU, Bulawayo. 
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created the impression on Nkomo' s mind that Rhodesians were now willing to talk. 481 
With time, Nkomo discovered that Smith was not yet ready for talks. 
Nkomo and others, locally and regionally remained convinced that a peaceful 
settlement was possible despite the collapse of the Victoria Falls Bridge Conference. The 
South African government was eager to assist in drawing up a peaceful settlement in 
Rhodesia as a way of blocking the influence ofthe Soviet Union. Zambia's gradual 
economic deterioration, partly because of the war in Rhodesia, made Kaunda willing to 
participate in seeking a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia.482 Regional influence on 
Nkomo and Smith formed the background of the talks between the two. The South 
African government brought Smith to the talks, while Kaunda influenced Nkomo. The 
South African government wanted to ensure a settlement with an acceptable nationalist 
leader acceptable to the white community and also claiming credibility among the black 
population. Nkomo was the suitable candidate for such a settlement.483 He was moderate 
enough not to pose a threat to the interests of the white community, and as the leader of 
ZAPU, he commanded a following among the African population. 
In going into the talks, the Rhodesians believed that they could reach a settlement 
with Nkomo that did not amount to majority rule. Nkomo took a gamble to negotiate 
because he was convinced that negotiations would lead to majority rule. He wanted to 
inherit the colonial state and then gradually Africanize it. Nkomo was also aware that 
ZANU had the upper hand on the battlefield because of the infiltration of large groups of 
481 Cindy L. Courville 'The Zimbabwe Nationalist Movements: Strategy For Liberation,' p. 116. 
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cadres from Mozambique. A peaceful settlement would thus pre-empty ZANU's 
achievement on the battlefield and see ZAPU assume power.484 
Nkomo began talks with Smith in 1975. While Nkomo was aware that African 
nationalists were demanding one man one vote, the case for which ZIPRA cadres were 
fighting, in its proposals to the Rhodesian government, the ANC (Z) suggested that it was 
willing to calm the fears of the Rhodesian Front by compromising to accept a three tier 
electoral system. This system would result in the establishment of a National Assembly 
with one hundred and forty four seats. Thirty-six 'A' seats would be elected by universal 
adult suffrage, while seventy two 'B' seats would be elected by qualified suffrage. 
Minimum educational qualification to vote for the 'B' role seats was set at two years of 
secondary education. Thirty-six seats for the 'C' roll would be elected on the basis of a 
very highly qualified suffrage.485 
Rather than promote independence, the three tier electoral system would have 
meant that all Africans voted for thirty-six 'A' roll seats only. Power would have 
essentially remained in the hands of the white community, giving it power to elect three 
quarters of the members of the National Assembly. The original ANC, which had 
expelled Nkomo, denounced his talks with Smith, pointing out that they did not represent 
the interests of the majority.486 
Nkomo was not able to see the game the Rhodesian Front was playing because of 
his own interest in power and because he believed that the Rhodesians were genuine. He 
484 Mordechai Tamarkin The Making of Zimbabwe pp. 86-88. 
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promised Smith "ZAPU would safeguard political and economic rights for the 
Europeans," and guarantee the security of the private sector. On 1 December 1975, 
Nkomo and Smith agreed to call for a constitutional conference but by 19 March 1976, 
the Nkomo-Smith deal had fallen apart because of Smith's unwillingness to gradually 
give power to blacks over a period of ten to fifteen years.487 
The transitional period of ten to fifteen years Nkomo intended would have meant 
a longer period of suffering for the African population in Rhodesia. Nkomo had opted 
for such a long transitional period as a way of calming the fears of the white population, 
but in so doing he was slowing down the cause for the liberation of the Africans in 
Rhodesia. Explaining the failure of his talks with Smith, Nkomo's ANC (Z) pointed out 
that the Rhodesian Front's refusal to grant immediate majority rule to Africans had 
shown that the Rhodesian Front still wanted to hold on to power.488 Smith refused to 
grant majority rule to blacks, announcing at the breakdown of the talks that there would 
be no majority rule in Rhodesia in a thousand years to come.489 Nkomo failed to see that 
from the time that he started engaging Smith in talks, there was no intention to give 
blacks power. Smith was just buying time to perpetuate white minority rule and cause 
division among the African nationalists. Smith and Nkomo met for fourteen times and 
there were very clear signs that Nkomo would compromise, as shown by his willingness 
to accept a three tier electoral system and a ten to fifteen year transitional period. It is 
interesting that Nkomo should be the one to compromise while Smith remained hard on 
487 Henrick Ellert The Rhodesian Front War Counter-insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare, p. 39. 
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his principles. As leader of a nationalist movement, Nkomo should have been the one 
pushing for demands rather than easily compromising.49o 
Reference has already been made to the impact of Nkomo's talks with Smith on 
ZIP A. The talks also strained relations between Nkomo and Moyo who was keen on 
fighting rather than seeking a peaceful transition.491 Though unintended Nkomo's talks 
with Smith revealed Smith's true colours and contributed to the intensification of the 
armed struggle. Smith's declaration that he did not believe in black majority rule was a 
clear message to the nationalists that the barrel of the gun was their only hope. One can 
argue that having been embarrassed by the failure of his talks with Smith, Nkomo 
became more committed to the armed struggle as he relocated to Lusaka. ZIPRA's 
'Turning Point' and 'The Zero Hour Plan' were drafted in the aftermath of the failure of 
Nkomo's talks with Smith, indicating ZIPRA's plans for intensive attacks on the enemy. 
Old habits die hard. In August 1978, Nkomo engaged in secret talks with Smith 
agam. The involvement of the British and American governments in initiating the talks 
made Nkomo respond positively. The British and the Americans favored an internal 
settlement as a way of blocking the influence of the Soviet Union on Rhodesian 
nationalists. Nkomo hoped that Mugabe would subsequently participate in the talks. 
Mugabe refused to participate, and the shooting down of an Air Rhodesia Viscount in 
September 1978 closed the Nkomo option as Nkomo fell out of favor with Rhodesians 
because his cadres were killing whites.492 
Smith wanted to establish an internal settlement with Nkomo as a way of ending 
the war. By appealing to Nkomo again in 1978, Smith was showing that even though 
490 Martin Meredith The Past is Another Country Rhodesia UDI to Zimbabwe, p. 211. 
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their first attempt at talks had been an embarrassment to Nkomo, the nationalist was not 
yet a spent force. Nkomo's participation in the PF and his command over an armed wing 
made him an indispensable figure in the settlement of the Rhodesian crisis. Having learnt 
from his past mistakes, Nkomo was not going to ignore ZANU in an attempt to reach a 
settlement with Smith.493 The talks collapsed again without achieving anything 
significant in the struggle. Instead, when Mugabe discovered that Nkomo was having 
secret talks with Smith, mistrust deepened between them.494 
A consistent approach to the struggle would have made Nkomo's contribution to 
ZAPU's participation in the struggle and indeed to the cause of the liberation of Africans 
in Rhodesia positive on the whole. Without belittling the sacrifice Nkomo made in the 
struggle for liberation, one must acknowledge that his engagements with Smith by 
himself and in secret were detrimental to ZAPU's war effort. Wbile Nkomo was engaged 
in talks with Smith, ZIPRA could not launch massive offensives on the Rhodesian 
government. ZIPRA played a significant role on the battlefront but perhaps not as much 
as it would have had Nkomo not engaged in talks with Smith immediately after his 
release from detention. Nkomo's attempt at talks came at the wrong time: the impact of 
the armed struggle and international pressure had not yet put significant pressure on the 
Rhodesian government. Consequently, the talks came to nothing. 
The Patriotic Front (PF): 
What the other attempts at collaboration between ZAPU and ZANU, in various 
forms, failed to achieve, the Patriotic Front (PF,) complimented by the impact of the war 
and international and regional pressure, managed to achieve. The essence of the struggle 
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in Rhodesia had been to seek the granting of independence and majority rule to Africans. 
ZAPU and ZANU sought to dislodge the Rhodesian government from power through 
various means and up to 1979, had not succeeded. Under the auspices of the PF, African 
nationalists from ZAPU and ZANU negotiated the settlement that saw the granting of 
independence to Zimbabwe. 
The PF was set up on 9 October 1976, due to pressure from the OAD. The failure 
of ZIP A saw the OAU pushing for a united front on a political level among African 
nationalists in Rhodesia.495 The desire to unite African nationalists lay in the fact that the 
OAU and the Frontline States were aware of the impact ofa divided approach to the 
struggle. A divided opposition would weaken the position of the nationalists. Nkomo's 
attempt to reach a negotiated settlement with Smith had failed on 19 March 1976 and so 
there was need to reunite African nationalists. A conference at Geneva was coming up, 
following the presentation of the Kissinger Plan. It was going to be essential for African 
nationalists to speak with one voice at the Geneva Conference to avoid weird 
compromises such as the ones Nkomo had proved liable to make.496 
The PF was in essence an alliance between ZAPU and ZANU, uniting the parties 
in negotiating with the enemy. The primary objective of the PF was the liquidation of 
colonialism, imperialism and minority rule. Democratic structures would be set up across 
the country by the PF, ensuring the existence of a socially just environment in the 
country. The promotion of peace, stability, and security were among its objectives.497 
The rejection of the internal settlement, which Smith was seeking to establish with 
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Muzorewa, was a shared vision between members of the PF and the Frontline States. 
They were against Smith's attempt to co-opt some black leaders into a government that 
kept power in the hands of the white minority.498 
Ten men were appointed to coordinate ZAPU and ZANU affairs in the PF. 
Nkomo and Mugabe became joint leaders of the PF. While it was clear that collaboration 
on a political level was necessary, military unity, given the experiences of ZIPA, 
remained a challenge. Deep differences separated the armed wings of the two parties. 
ZIPRA was still angry at the shooting of some of its cadres at Mgagao by ZANLA in 
1976. The PF thus remained a platform of convenience with neither party willing to 
settle for unity on the basis of equality. The unity formed under the PF was on the 
political front whereby Nkomo and Mugabe as co-leaders would speak with one voice. 
Party ideologies remained a barrier against complete unity. Mugabe's concept of unity 
within the PF was for ZAPU to join ZANU while Nkomo was afraid of complete unity 
because of his thin ethnic base. Nkomo feared that complete unity would result in him 
being swallowed up by the Shona majority in ZANU. Instead of complete unity, Nkomo 
was comfortable with a loose alliance that aUowed him room to occasionally flex his 
muscles as the leader of ZAPU.499 Zvobgo pointed out that since the armies ofthe two 
nationalist organizations were operating in different areas, joint operations were not 
necessary. This was despite the fact that ZANU was keen to keep the political parties 
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separate while launching combined military operations. ZAPU wanted to establish 
political unity before joint military operations were taken up.500 
The armed struggle continued as the main strategy in the PF's struggle for 
independence. Strikes, sabotage, and diplomatic talks were still embraced as 
complimentary engagements to the armed struggle.501 It was in the interest of the PF to 
ensure that the two parties agreed on strategy. Again, this was building on the lesson 
learnt from the failure of ZIP A where differences in the manner of executing the war had 
brought serious division among the cadres. With the PF, each party was expected to 
continue engaging in the armed struggle, using tactics that it was comfortable with. 
ZAN LA could thus freely continue engaging in guerrilla warfare, while ZIPRA made 
preparations for launching a conventional warfare. 502 
Circumstances surrounding the formation of the PF create two possible ways of 
understanding it. According to Sithole, in one respect, it was and had to be 'a marriage of 
convenience.' Though Nkomo and Mugabe did not like each other, the political situation 
they faced caused them to unite against a common enemy. Nkomo was just recovering 
from the impact of the failure of his talks with Smith, while Mugabe, just coming out of 
'political hostage' in Mozambique,503 was beginning to gain influence and control over 
ZANU and ZANLA. The two inevitably needed each other since the Frontline States had 
expressed their support for a united African nationalist approach to the upcoming Geneva 
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Conference.504 Mugabe and Nkomo were also aware that they had to find a way of pre-
emptying attempts by Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole, and other black leaders who had 
begun negotiating with Smith in an attempt to set up an internal settlement. 
On the other hand, Sithole argues that the PF could be considered as 'a marriage 
of patriots' if one argued that Nkomo and Mugabe had genuine interests in the liberation 
of Zimbabwe, going beyond personal ambitions for power. As such, the establishment of 
the PF would have just been a natural development in the struggle.505 It goes without 
saying that a competition for power was at the heart of the struggle among African 
nationalists. The reason other attempts at collaboration had not worked was because of 
the competition for power which haunted African nationalists. Nkomo looked forward to 
taking over from Smith just as Mugabe did. It is perhaps fair to conclude that the PF was 
actually 'a marriage of convenience' since it created the platform that enabled ZAPU and 
ZANU to present a united political front when dealing with the enemy, regardless of the 
differences and tensions that existed between the two parties. 
On 20 August 1979, the PF accepted an invitation to the Lancaster House 
Constitutional Conference. At the Commonwealth Heads of States meeting in Lusaka in 
August 1979, Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, was asked by the heads of 
states to take responsibility for the granting of independence to Rhodesia. An 
independent government for Zimbabwe was to be elected through free and fair elections 
supervised by the British government and by members of the Commonwealth.506 
Muzorewa and Sithole had thought that by entering into an internal settlement with 
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Smith, the war would come to an end. However, Smith and the rest of the white 
community realized that the internal settlement was not going to produce the anticipated 
results. 50? The call by the Commonwealth Heads of States for free and fair elections in 
Rhodesia implied a rejection of the Smith-Muzorewa internal settlement. 
Stedman argued that at the Lusaka meeting, the British appeared as if they were 
undecided about the future of Rhodesia because they wanted all the suggestions to come 
from the gathered Heads of States. Frontline leaders, especially Kaunda and Machel 
were feeling the pinch of the war and thus put pressure on the PF to settle for an 
agreement that ended the war. Frontline states threatened to withdraw their support if the 
PF caused the failure of the conference.508 
ZAPU and ZANU went to the conference and represented the interests of the 
majority Africans with one voice. Each party had its own delegation but the position of 
the PF was presented with one voice. Nkomo, given a chance for talks again, was 
determined to ensure the success of the conference, especially now that he was 
negotiating with ZANU on his side. Given the temperamental nature of the ZANU 
delegation and constant threats by Mugabe to walk out of the conference, Nkomo became 
a stabilizing factor within the PF at the Lancaster House talks.509 
A bone of contention between Nkomo and Mugabe at Lancaster House was the 
suspicion that ZIPRA was preparing a military force that would seize power from ZANU 
after independence. The mobilization and preparation for 'The Turning Point' and 'Zero 
Hour Plan' had seen massive mobilization and training by ZIPRA. Distortion of facts by 
the CIa and an attempt to split the PF saw the generation of the false impression that 
507 Stephen 1. Stedman Peace Making in Civil War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.) 1988, p. 188. 
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ZAPU was preparing for an onslaught against ZANU. Rhodesian security forces were 
trying by all means to find a way of weakening African opposition before and during the 
Lancaster House Conference. Consequently, creating hostility between ZAPU and 
ZANU was adopted as a strategy.510 Fortunately, the alliance lasted long enough to cover 
the period of the conference and the PF sustained a united presentation. 
At the Lancaster House Conference, the PF did not just accept all the points that 
were put forward by the British government. Making a clear shift from the compromises 
that Nkomo had promised Smith, the PF insisted that the new constitution had to embrace 
universal suffrage, majority rule, and the granting of independence to Zimbabwe. With 
these reasons for fighting removed, a ceasefire agreement could then be drawn up.51l The 
PF did not want a constitution that granted automatic citizenship to people who had taken 
up Rhodesian citizenship between the period ofUDI and the granting of independence 
since this would imply incorporating mercenaries who had come to Rhodesia specifically 
to support the oppressive government. The idea of dual citizenship proposed by Britain 
was rejected by the PF.512 
The PF found the provision on the right to property and arrangements over land 
acquisition on a willing buyer-willing seller basis impossible to accept. The land 
question had been used during the war as the main tool for mobilizing the masses yet the 
proposed constitution was going to make it difficult for the government to redistribute 
land. Mugabe and other hardliners threatened to walk out of the conference because of 
this issue but Tongogara reminded him that Machel would close ZANLA bases in 
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Mozambique, while Nkomo expressed an unwillingness to walk out. The PF eventually 
gave in to the constitution after an ambiguous offer by America of assistance in financing 
land redistribution.513 When Mugabe threatened to walk out again because of 
unsatisfactory ceasefire arrangements, pressure from Machel and Nkomo' s stability 
brought him back to the conference.514 
Some critics have accused the PF of compromising by accepting the Lancaster 
House constitution. Astrow argued that the compromises accepted by the PF at Lancaster 
House benefited the white community. External pressure to end the war saw the PF 
accepting a constitution that set out a willing buyer wiling seller arrangement over land 
redistribution. The government would never afford to buy land from white commercial 
farmers under such an arrangement.515 However, it is. important to acknowledge that for 
once, since the establishment of the ANC to respond to the Anglo-Rhodesian 
constitutional proposals, the political leaders of ZAPU and ZANU managed to get 
together and represent the concerns of African people with one voice under very difficult 
conditions in which the radical demands of Mugabe and Nkomo's moderate approach had 
to complement each other. It was through the negotiations at Lancaster House that the 
constitution for an independent Zimbabwe was drawn up. Pressure from the battlefront 
and the concerns of international and regional leaders also added to the pressure on the 
Rhodesian government and the PF. The Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government set up by 
Smith and Muzorewa collapsed with the conclusion of the Lancaster House talks.516 
513 Stephen 1. Stedman Peace Making in Civil War, p. 182. 
514 ibid. p. 201. 
515 Andre Astrow Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost its Way? p. 155. 











As a ceasefire was declared, ZIPRA cadres who had been preparing to launch 
'The Turning Point' and the' Zero Hour Plan,' were forced to submit to a deal signed by 
their political leaders. Even though the militants within ZAPU would have preferred 
military victory, the leadership ofNkomo carried the day. As co-leader of the PF, 
Nkomo participated in negotiations that brought independence to Zimbabwe. Nkomo had 
hoped that ZAPU and ZANU would contest the first elections as one, under the banner of 
the PF. If the PF was a marriage of patriots, contesting the elections as PF would have 
been a natural development. But since the PF was 'a marriage of convenience' to get 
ZAPU and ZANU to negotiate with the Rhodesian government with one voice, and to 
challenge the internal settlement set up by Smith and Muzorewa, once the goals of the PF 
were attained, it became irrelevant. The stage was now set for African nationalist parties 
to contest the first majority elections in Zimbabwe by competing for power with all the 
other parties that were in the country. 
The pacts and attempts at collaboration during the struggle for independence in 
Zimbabwe show the way in which African nationalists tried to work together for the 
liberation of the country. They also indicate the manner in which different people 
approached the struggle. While some advocated for independence through the barrel of 
the gun only, there were others who regarded talks as the best strategy. The danger of 
compromising through talks, the dirty tactics of the Rhodesian Front in dividing African 
nationalists, and the underlying competition for power that haunted the nationalists made 
alliances and collaboration essential among African nationalists. It was because of their 











managed to exert sufficient pressure that Smith's attempt to pretend to give blacks in 













This study has highlighted the part played by ZAPU and ZIPRA in the struggle 
for the independence of Zimbabwe. In 1980, ZANU won the first democratic elections. 
Victory in the elections has been used by some people as a measure of the significance of 
the party's participation in the struggle for independence. While ZANU's invaluable 
commitment to the struggle for independence is undoubted, such an assessment of the 
struggle fails to acknowledge ZAPU's contribution. Election results should not be used 
as the only way of measuring the participation of nationalists in the struggle. This 
chapter concludes the discussion by evaluating some aspects of ZAPU's participation in 
the struggle. The roles played by both ZAPU and ZANU were essential in bringing about 
the collapse of the internal settlement set up by Smith and Muzorewa, thereby paving the 
way for the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference at which a negotiated settlement 
was reached by the warring parties.517 
ZAPU was the first African nationalist party in Rhodesia to give prominence to 
the name Zimbabwe, by taking the name Zimbabwe African People's Union. Zimbabwe 
was the name that the oppressed Africans in Rhodesia regarded as the legitimate name of 
the country. The party chose a name that appealed to the quest of the oppressed Africans 
to set up their own independent nation called Zimbabwe.518 The naming of ZAPU also 
contributed to cementing unity among African people, as the party commanded a national 
following at the time it was founded. 'Mwana wevhu' (son/daughter of the soil) was the 
manner in which members of ZAPU addressed each other, overlooking anything that was 
517 Interview with Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa, ZIPRA's chief of intelligence, Bulawayo. 











bound to divide them.519 In ZAPU, the African population found a national body that 
united them in pressing for their liberation. Political activity among the Africans was no 
longer limited to urban areas only. ZAPU spread African political consciousness to rural 
areas, thereby upsetting the control government appointed Native Commissioners had 
over the rural population. Native Commissioners were part of the oppression of the 
Rhodesian government, appointed to maintain control over the rural population. 520 
ZAPU must be given credit for being the first nationalist party in Rhodesia that 
mobilized and radicalized the concerns of the African people in Rhodesia. The parties 
that existed before ZAPU laid the foundation upon which ZAPU was able to coordinate a 
national campaign against the Rhodesian government. The founding leaders of ZAPU 
were able to articulate the concerns of the African population in a manner that coherently 
represented the concerns of the Africans in the country. Notions of imperialism and Pan-
Africanism were embraced in the. rhetoric of the nationalists, thereby uniting the political 
aspirations of the Africans in Rhodesia with the general wave of liberation rhetoric that 
was prevalent on the continent at the time. 521 
ZAPU provided the training ground for the nationalists, most of whom still hold 
leadership positions in the country. They were members of ZAPU when it was formed 
and their political careers began to take shape within ZAPU. Mugabe was ZAPU's first 
Publicity Secretary; Joseph Msika, the current second Vice President, was a member of 
ZAPU to the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987.522 ZANU came into being in 1963 
because the attempt to depose Nkomo from the leadership of ZAPU failed. The vision 
519 Interview with Mr. Welshman Mabhena, ZAPU founding member, Bulawayo. 
520 Interview with Mr. James Chikerema, ZAPU founding member, Harare. 
521 Wellington Nyangoni African Nationalism in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), p. 50. 











which Sithole and others shared in moving away from ZAPU to form their own party was 
generated by their active participation in Rhodesian politics as members of ZAPU. 
ZAPU conscientized the minds of these nationalists and helped them understand the 
dynamics of the political situation they were facing. This understanding enabled them to 
identifY what was lacking in ZAPU's strategy, a radical commitment to the armed 
struggle. ZANU thus emerged to fill the gaps that had been identified in ZAPU's 
strategy. Despite the inter-party clashes that were witnessed throughout the struggle, 
ZANU was formed to complement the task which African nationalists had taken upon 
themselves at the time ZAPU was formed, to struggle for the independence of the African 
population. Nkomo was clear what ZAPU's task was. Presenting a statement on 
ZAPU's approach to the struggle, Nkomo said, "We do not think in terms of violence. 
Our basic duty lies in urging the British government in every way we can to carry out her 
inherent responsibilities to the people of our country by granting majority rule as she has 
done to the rest of her former colonies." This non-radical approach became characteristic 
of ZAPU's strategy in the struggle.523 The goal was clear: like ZANU, ZAPU struggled 
for independence. 
Nkomo put the case for the independence of Africans in Rhodesia on an 
international platform. Through presentations to the United Nations in 1962, Nkomo 
managed to get seventeen nations to vote in favour of a resolution on granting 
independence to Rhodesia.524 Given the limited resources available to Africans in 
Rhodesia, international recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle for independence 
made it possible for various countries within Africa and beyond the continent to support 
523 Wellington Nyangoni Africlcln Nationalism in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), p.l20. 











nationalist movements from Rhodesia. While the Rhodesian government referred to 
nationalist cadres as 'terrorists,' international recognition for the struggle ZAPU was 
about meant that in the eyes of the nations that chose to support the cause for the 
liberation of Zimbabwe, nationalist cadres were liberation fighters. 
From the time ZIPRA was formed in 1972 to the drawing up of 'The Turning 
Point,' in 1978, ZIPRA was clearly building up an armed force that was made up of 
highly trained cadres. The professional training ZIPRA cadres were exposed to enabled 
them to launch effective attacks on the enemy without committing large numbers of 
manpower. In the attacks on the fuel tanks in Salisbury and the shooting down of the two 
Viscounts, ZIPRA displayed the might of its military power by taking the war into the 
backyard of the white community. ZIPRA displayed a high level of planning by 
launching attacks that were bound to affect a wide range of the white community. 
Sabotaging fuel reserves dealt a huge blow to the Rhodesian economy and shooting down 
the Viscounts enabled ZIPRA to kill a large number of whites without committing many 
men to battle.525 The heat-seeking missiles, which were used to bring down the 
Viscounts, showed the extent to which ZIPRA cadres had been equipped to launch 
conventional attacks beyond the limitations of most guerrilla movements. Whereas the 
bulk of the white community had generally remained safe and far removed from the line 
of fire, the might of ZIPRA weapons must have instilled fear in the urban white 
community, which came to realize that it was not beyond the reach of ZIPRA attacks.526 
Though hostile to each other since the 1963 split, the awareness that a common 
enemy was being fought against made it possible for ZAPU and ZANU to respond to 
525 Interview with Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa, ZIPRA's chief of intelligence, Bulawayo. 











efforts by Frontline states to set up a united African opposition to the Rhodesian 
government. At various times during the struggle, alliances were drawn up that resulted 
in efforts to establish collaboration between the two parties. The setting up of the ANC 
in 1972 is of special significance here. Going beyond immediate party interests, the 
African popUlation was mobilized in such a manner that it resoundingly rejected the 
Anglo-Rhodesian constitution. The Pearce Commission heard loud and clear in 1972 that 
Africans were not going to accept a constitution that had been drawn up without the 
involvement of their nationalist leaders.527 Attempts to establish the JMC, ZIPA and the 
eventual setting up of the PF were all motivated by the recognition of the roles ZAPU and 
ZANU were playing in the struggle. A united opposition would thus strengthen them. 
However, since the motivation to unite the two parties was not always rooted in the 
goodwill of their respective leaders, ambitions for power and differences of strategy 
made collaboration difficult at times. Like ZANU, ZAPU intended to set up the first 
independent government in Zimbabwe. Consequently, selfish ambitions from both sides 
blocked some efforts at collaboration. 
Despite the great courage displayed by some ZIPRA cadres and the show of 
ZIPRA's military strength, there are elements of ZIPRA's strategy that will continue to 
haunt ZAPU's contribution to the struggle, aspects of strategy that indicate that ZAPU 
did not commit itself fully to the anned struggle. By 1979, ninety five percent of 
Rhodesia was under martial law, a sign that the impact of nationalist cadres from ZANU 
and ZAPU was being felt as the government was failing to control the country 
527 ANC 'Why ANC Says 'NO' To The Settlement Proposals' Statement to The Pearce Commission in 
Salisbury, 3 January 1972, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro (eds.) Zimbabwe Independence Movements Select 











effectively528; but the two parties committed hugely unequal numbers of cadres to the 
battlefield. 
At the time of the Lancaster House Conference, the situation was as follows: 529 
ZIPRA ZANLA 
Cadres deployed internally 4055 10 275 
Trained cadres in external bases 16000 3500 
Cadres in training (external bases) 2950 14000 
Totals 23005 27775 
The statistics indicate that ZIPRA deployed less than half the number of cadres deployed 
by ZANLA. It is evident that by 1979, the bulk of trained ZIPRA cadres were in external 
bases, not fighting. The 16000 cadres ZIPRA had in external bases was higher than the 
number of cadres ZANLA deployed. It is also evident that the number of cadres ZANLA 
still had in training was higher than that of ZIPRA cadres. As a result, ZANLA emerged 
as the larger of the two armies. 
The 4 055 cadres deployed by ZIPRA certainly contributed to the fighting on the 
battlefield but there was no way that they were going to match the impact of the 10 275 
cadres deployed by ZANLA. The high number of cadres deployed by ZANLA enabled 
ZANU to spread its influence among the African population much wider than ZAPU. 
The numerical advantage ZANLA had over ZIPRA makes it plausible to accept the claim 
that ZANLA did most of the fighting that resulted in the failure of the Rhodesian 
government to exert effective control over the country. ZIPRA did not make use of its 
full military potential since the bulk of its trained cadres were in exile by the time the war 
528 Henrick Ellert The Rhodesi!!Front War, Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare 1962-1980, p. 51. 











ended. 'The Turning Point,' ZIPRA's glorified military strategy, was never 
implemented. While credit must be given to the detailed planning that went into drawing 
up 'The Turning Point,' and the pressure it exerted on the government since Rhodesian 
forces were aware of the plan, ZIPRA did not benefit on the battlefront because the plan 
was never executed. The liberated zones envisioned by 'The Turning Point' remained 
ideas on paper. 
When analyzing statistics of cadre deployment into Rhodesia by nationalist 
forces, one must take cognizance of the difference of geographical terrain faced by the 
two parties. ZIPRA cadres had the challenge of conquering the harsh Zambezi River 
while ZANLA cadres had the advantage of a generally friendlier terrain. Nature made it 
possible for ZANLA to infiltrate large numbers of cadres at a time from Mozambique, a 
thing that was not possible for ZIPRA. Inevitably, ZIPRA found deployment of cadres 
from Zambia difficult.53o 
Why did ZIPRA keep the bulk of its forces outside the country? Given that by 
1979, ZIPRA had a total of20 055 trained cadres while ZANLA had about 13 775 
cadres, why did ZANLA deploy a higher number of cadres to the battlefield? The answer 
perhaps lies in Nkomo's conviction that reason would prevail, allowing for the drawing 
up of a peaceful settlement to the Rhodesian struggle. This approach greatly affected the 
manner in which ZIPRA cadres were deployed.53l Responding to regional pressure from 
South Africa and persuasion from Kaunda, Nkomo engaged in secret talks with Smith. 
From 1976, ZAPU lacked a consistent approach to the struggle. As Nkomo went into 
talks with Smith, ZIPRA's effort on the battlefield was pulled back. 
530 Interview with Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa, ZIPRA's chief of intelligence, Bulawayo. 











This study has highlighted one of the problems that haunted the military 
campaigns of ZIP A from the very beginning. There was lack of trust among cadres, a 
lack of trust rooted in the difference of approach by the leaders of the two parties. 
ZAN LA cadres found it difficult to fight alongside ZIPRA cadres while Nkomo was 
seeking a peaceful transition of power. While radicals in ZIPRA like Moyo were keen to 
launch a full-scale armed struggle, they found it difficult to go into battle while the leader 
of their party was talking to the enemy. The manner in which Nkomo went into talks 
with the Rhodesian government paralyzed ZAPU's war efforts. At a time when it was 
essential to launch massive military offensives, following the failure of the Victoria Falls 
Bridge Conference, Nkomo miscalculated Smith's attitude and agreed to go into talks. 
As the talks failed, Smith proclaimed boldly that he had no intention of giving blacks 
majonty rule.532 
Though Nkomo' s intention was noble as he went into talks, his miscalculation of 
Smith's commitment to the liberation of Africans and his willingness to accept a three 
tier electoral system contradicted the radical nationalist demands that were being aired 
from 1975. It was proposed that a National Assembly with one hundred and forty four 
seats would be established. Thirty-six 'A' seats would be elected by universal adult 
suffrage while the qualifications for voting for 'B' and 'C' seats were too high for most 
Africans.533 This electoral system was designed to safeguard power in the hands of the 
white minority since blacks were being offered a system that excluded them from 
electing the majority of the members of the National Assembly. Under this arrangement, 
532 David Martin and Phyllis Johnson The Struggle For Zimbabwe, p. 228. 
533 African National Council (Z) 'Smith-Nkomo Talks. The ANC's Proposals on the major points of 
principle which must be agreed on before detailed committee work can begin.' In Nyangoni and Nyandoro 











the white community would have control over three quarters of the members of the 
National Assembly. For a peaceful transition of power, Nkomo was willing to offer the 
white community a number of assurances as a way of persuading them to relinquish 
power. Playing the game of persuading the Rhodesian government clearly contradicted 
the whole notion behind the armed struggle. It became clear that the war was being 
fought as a way of winning power from the white community. Nkomo was hoping to talk 
Smith into giving him power at a time when Smith was least interested in relinquishing 
power. One can accuse Nkomo of failing to read the dynamics of the immediate political 
situation. 
Nkomo's unwillingness to commit ZAPU radically to the armed struggle was 
presented as one of the reasons behind the split in 1963. While members of ZAPU and 
Nkomo deny this accusation by arguing that ZAPU put a lot of effort to the war, the 
events on the ground do not always tally with their argument. While ZIPRA was in the 
process of planning for the implementation of 'The Turning Point' in 1978, Nkomo was 
engaging in another series of secret talks with Smith.534 Nkomo probably noticed that 
Smith was trying to split the PF, so he insisted that Mugabe should be part of the talks. 
Smith's idea was to get Nkomo to establish an internal settlement with him. While these 
talks were underway, ZIPRA cadres shot down the second Viscount, causing much fear 
and anger among the white community. The underlying contradiction in Nkomo's 
strategy is seen here. While he was negotiating a peaceful settlement, his cadres were 
shooting down a passenger plane. Nkomo immediately fell out of favour with Smith and 
their talks collapsed. 535 
534 Andre Astrow Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way? pp. 132-133. 











ZANLA's war effert en the eastern frent benefited immensely frem the 
cemp1imentary effert ef ZIPRA en the seuthwestern frent, especially after the epening ef 
infiltratien reutes through Betswana frem 1975. ZAPU's participatien in the armed 
struggle centributed to. the splitting up efthe enemy's defense. The Rhedesian 
gevernment ceuld net cencentrate all its efferts en dealing with ZANLA infiltratien frem 
the eastern frent. There was need to. guard against ZIPRA infi1tratien acress the Zambezi 
River as well.536 The sheeting dewn efthe secend Visceuntjust befere the Lancaster 
Heuse Cenference sent a clear message to. the white Rhedesian gevernment that the war 
was beginning to. have a direct and painful impact en the white urban cemmunity. 
ZANU and ZAPU tegether engaged the Rhedesia gevernment in a war that had a 
huge negative impact en the ecenemy. In 1978, the gevernment was ferced to. devalue 
the Rhedesian dellar twice within a peried ef six menths, a clear sign that the ecenemy 
was deterierating because ef the war. There was a standstill ef investments and share 
markets, ceupled by an increase in taxatien. The gevernment, as a way ef raising funds 
to. finance the war, intreduced a ten percent cerperate tax. ZIPRA attacks en the 
Elephant Hills Hetel in 1977 greund teurism in Victeria Falls to. a halt. Teurism, a majer 
seurce ef foreign currency fer the ceuntry, was shut dewn. The sheeting dewn ef the 
Visceunts also. scared petential teurists away. Industrial preductien slewed dewn, with 
tea preductien in Chipinge, in the eastern highlands, ceming to. a cemplete halt because 
ef the war.537 
No. ene wen the war in Rhedesia. Ultimately, a negetiated settlement at Lancaster 
Heuse paved the way fer the first majority electiens. The presence ef ZAPU at the 
536 Thomas Arbuckle 'Rhodesian Bush War Strategies and Tactics: An Assessment' Document held at the 
National Archives, Harare, GEN-P/ARB, Acc. 34011, p. 3l. 











Lancaster House Conference and the role played by Nkomo as co-leader of the PF in 
arguing together with Mugabe and also in stabilizing Mugabe when he threatened to walk 
out, are signs that while ZAPU did not commit as much manpower to the battlefront as 
ZANU, ZAPU's own limited contribution cannot be ignored. Regardless of the numbers 
of cadres committed to the battlefront, ZAPU and ZANU sat at Lancaster House as equal 
members ofthe PF. As a member of the PF, ZAPU played a role in determining the 
future of Zimbabwe by accepting the ceasefire arrangements that saw the end of the war. 
The talks that Nkomo had always believed in won the day.538 ZAPU played an 
indispensable part in ensuring the collapse of the Smith-Muzorewa internal settlement. 
The failure of the internal settlement to get recognition foiled Smith's attempt to cheat 
Africans into a settlement.539 Thanks to ZAPU and ZANU's collaboration and 
international pressure, the Rhodesian goverriment was gradually weakened. Though 
ZAPU was haunted by strategic contradictions at times, its contribution to the liberation 
of Zimbabwe should not be downplayed. 
538 Interview with Mr. Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu, ZAPU's Director ofInfonnation and Publicity, Bulawayo. 
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